Wolfe v. Coleman, 81-5347

• Decision Date: 02 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-5347,81-5347
• Parties: Milton WOLFE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gerald COLEMAN, Sheriff Pinellas County Florida and Jim Smith, Attorney General of the State of Florida, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1302

681 F.2d 1302

Milton WOLFE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gerald COLEMAN, Sheriff Pinellas County Florida and Jim Smith, Attorney General of the State of Florida Respondents-Appellees.

No. 81-5347.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 2, 1982.

Bruce S. Rogow, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.

Peggy Quince, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, Fla., for respondents-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, HILL and FAY, Circuit Judges.

GODBOLD, Chief Judge:

Petitioner, Milton Wolfe, brought a habeas petition in district court challenging his conviction in a Florida state court for criminal contempt. The district court denied the petition upon recommendation by a magistrate and petitioner appealed. We affirm the district court's decision.

I.

In 1980 the state attorney's office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Clearwater, Florida began investigating possible criminal violations by members of the Church of Scientology. The charges included alleged harassment and intimidation of newspaper reporters. Pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 27.04, the office issued an investigative subpoena to Wolfe, who was a public relations official for the Church. He received a grant of immunity by Judge Patterson, a state circuit court judge, and was ordered to answer the questions posed by the assistant state attorneys. ¹ An assistant state attorney subsequently questioned Wolfe at a deposition on a Friday, and he refused to answer on First Amendment grounds the question, "Who is in charge of the Information Bureau (of the Church) in Clearwater." The assistant state attorney concluded the deposition for the day in order to give petitioner the opportunity to reconsider his refusal and to consult with an attorney over the weekend. He was warned that his continued refusal could result in his being held in contempt.

The following Monday petitioner, whose counsel was now present, ² persisted in his unwillingness to answer the question. Later the same day members of the state attorney's office, Wolfe and his counsel appeared before a different circuit judge, Judge Andrews (Judge Patterson was not available). After some discussion among the attorneys and the judge about appropriate contempt hearing procedures, Judge Andrews decided first to rule on the appropriateness of the question that had been asked of Wolfe and the validity of his First Amendment objection. The judge determined that the question was pertinent to the state attorney's investigation and that petitioner had no valid First Amendment right to protect. The judge directed one of the assistant state attorneys to repeat the question to Wolfe and ordered him to answer. Petitioner still refused to answer the question on First Amendment grounds. The judge ordered that a contempt hearing be held, and the parties stipulated to a hearing date on Thursday, three days away. The judge stated that he thought petitioner could be found guilty of direct criminal contempt ³ whereas petitioner's counsel asserted that only indirect criminal contempt ⁴ was involved.

At the hearing petitioner's customary counsel was present, and he asserted the defense that the assistant state attorney had not demonstrated that the investigation concerned criminal violations. After hearing argument on the issue, the judge made a finding, which he said was based upon representations made by an assistant state attorney at a bench conference held off the record, that the investigation properly focused on criminal violations.

Wolfe then offered to answer the original question to avoid a finding of contempt. The judge rejected this defense, pointing out that at issue was petitioner's refusal to answer the question at the Monday hearing in defiance of the court's order. In the judge's opinion this type of contempt could not be purged by belated compliance. Notwithstanding the judge's explanation, Wolfe announced to the court the name of the information bureau director. The judge then found him in direct criminal contempt and sentenced him to 45 days in jail.

Petitioner remained free on his own recognizance while he pursued his state remedies of direct appeal and habeas relief. When he filed a habeas petition in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, he unsuccessfully sought from the district court and this court release pending determination of his petition. He served his jail sentence before filing this appeal.

On appeal petitioner asserts he was denied due process in several ways. First, he should have been informed by the judge of the possible criminal contempt consequences before the court directed him to answer the assistant state attorney's question. Second, he cannot be guilty of direct criminal contempt because summary proceedings authorized by Fla.R. of Crim.Pro. 3.830 may be employed only if the refusal to answer disrupts an ongoing judicial proceeding, and the state attorney's investigation cannot be so characterized. Third, the initial hearing, which petitioner considers the crucial hearing, did not comply with the reasonable notice requirements of Rule 3.840 for indirect criminal contempt. Predicate to this third argument is petitioner's contention that the second hearing provided him no opportunity to defend because, in the judge's mind, the contempt was complete at the initial hearing.

II.

We first address the state's argument that Wolfe's appeal is moot because he has already served his sentence. A criminal appeal is moot ⁵ when the appellant has completed his sentence only if no possibility exists that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed upon petitioner on the basis of the contempt conviction. Sibron v. N.Y., 392 U.S. 40, 58, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1900, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). We need not make a detailed inquiry into the actual existence of specific collateral consequences that may be presumed. Government of Canal Zone v. Castillo, 568 F.2d 405, 406 (5th Cir. 1978). The former Fifth Circuit has reviewed contempt convictions after the contemnor has served his sentence because of the possibility that the contempt conviction could be later used to impeach his trial testimony or to increase his sentence for subsequent offenses. In Re Stewart, 571 F.2d 958, 966-67 (5th Cir. 1978); U. S. v. Camil, 497 F.2d 225, 226-28 (5th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 842, 843-44 (5th Cir. 1974).

It is sufficient that, because of his contempt conviction, petitioner may be subject to an enhanced sentence as an habitual misdemeanant. ⁶ Fla.Stat. § 775.084. Additionally petitioner could not have appealed to this court before his sentence had been served because his attempts to secure release pending determination of his federal habeas petition did not succeed. See U. S. v. Schrimsher, supra, 493 F.2d at 843. Consequently we hold that petitioner's appeal is not moot.

Turning to the merits, we first differentiate between the several types of contempt to determine what procedural rights petitioner was due. Civil contempt is designed to coerce the contemnor to comply with a court order, and a civil contempt action is brought by a private party, not the court. For example, when a witness who has been given immunity still refuses to testify at trial, the court may confine him in jail until he agrees to testify or until the trial is finished, whichever comes first. The contemnor always has the ability to purge himself of contempt by obeying the court order. Criminal contempt is punitive rather than remedial. It punishes disobedience of the court's order as vindication of the court's authority. The contemnor serves a fixed sentence and cannot gain release by complying with the order. See Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-445, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498-99, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911); Skinner v. White, 505 F.2d 685, 688-689 (5th Cir. 1974). ⁷

There are two types of criminal contempt, direct and indirect, and they differ mainly in procedure. When the offending behavior occurs in the presence of the judge, the court may summarily adjudge a contemnor guilty of direct criminal contempt without holding a separate contempt hearing. Summary punishment may only be imposed under narrowly circumscribed conditions, such as when the offensive behavior amounts to intentional obstruction of ongoing court proceedings. U. S. v. Brannon, 546 F.2d 1242, 1248 (5th Cir. 1977). Indirect contempt is committed outside the court's presence. One accused of indirect contempt, or direct contempt that does not merit summary punishment, is entitled to reasonable notice of the charges and a separate contempt hearing. U. S. v. Hankins, 624 F.2d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1980).

On a habeas petition we review a state contempt conviction only for constitutional infirmities. Whether the court properly denominated petitioner's offense as direct rather than indirect criminal contempt is not relevant to our inquiry. ⁸ We are concerned with whether petitioner was accorded full procedural rights guaranteed him by the Constitution. We first decide whether constitutionally he could be punished for contempt summarily, in which case the range of guaranteed rights was narrower, and, if summary punishment was not permissible, whether he received the broader range of rights required of a nonsummary contempt hearing.

We hold that the judge could not have summarily punished Wolfe for criminal contempt because there were no ongoing court proceedings to justify immediate vindication of the court's authority. Although petitioner refused to answer in the court's presence, the hearing cannot be characterized as a court proceeding. Harris v. U. S., 382 U.S. 162, 164-65, 86 S.Ct. 352, 354, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965) (immunized witness who refused to testify before grand jury brought before judge and ordered to answer; held, no ongoing court proceedings to permit summary adjudication); accord, Pendley v. State, 392 So.2d 321, 322 (...