Wolfe v. Ridley

• Citation: 104 P. 1014,17 Idaho 173
• Parties: JOHN I. WOLFE and MARY WOLFE, Appellants, v. A. R. RIDLEY, Respondent
• Decision Date: 03 November 1909
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

104 P. 1014

17 Idaho 173

JOHN I. WOLFE and MARY WOLFE, Appellants, v. A. R. RIDLEY, Respondent

Supreme Court of Idaho

November 3, 1909

NEW TRIAL-DISCRETION OF COURT-CONFLICTING EVIDENCE-IMPOSING COSTS ON GRANTING NEW TRIAL.

1. The granting of a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and unless there be a clear abuse of such discretion the order will not be disturbed on appeal.

2. The rule in this state is that where the evidence submitted to the jury presents a substantial conflict and the trial court who saw and heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor and conduct, and saw and heard all that was said and done in the trial of the case, thereafter grants a new trial, his order will not be disturbed on appeal.

3. It would be in the interest of good practice and the dispatch of business if trial courts when making orders granting new trials would specify the particular grounds on which such orders are made.

4. Where a trial court grants a new trial it is within the sound discretion of the court as to whether or not he will require the party in whose favor the order is made to pay a part or all of the costs incurred upon the previous trial.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, for the County of Bonner. Hon. W. W. Woods, Judge of the First District, Presiding.

Action by plaintiffs to recover damages. Judgment for plaintiffs and defendant moved for a new trial and his motion was granted. Plaintiff appealed from the order granting a new trial. Order affirmed.

Order granting a new trial affirmed, with costs of this appeal in favor of respondent.

John A Steinlein, for Appellants.

It is the province of this court to examine the record to ascertain if there is a sufficient conflict of the evidence to warrant the trial court in vacating the verdict of the jury and granting a new trial in the action. (Lowe v. Long, 5 Idaho 124, 47 P. 93.) Where a new trial is granted, and the order granting the same does not contain the reasons therefor, it is presumed to have been granted on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, and it should be conditioned on the payment of the costs, and especially so where the verdict is not perverse. (Godfrey v. Godfrey, 127 Wis. 47, 106 N.W. 814; Mills v Conley, 110 Wis. 525, 86 N.W. 203; Garny v Katz, 86 Wis. 321, 56 N.W. 912; 7 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, 176, and notes.)

G. H. Martin, for Respondent.

An order granting a new trial will not be reversed on appeal unless it is made to appear that such order is a plain abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. (Jacksha v. Gilbert, 4 Idaho 738, 44 P. 555; Brossard v. Morgan, 6 Idaho 179, 56 P. 163; Jones v. Campbell, 11 Idaho 752, 84 P. 510; Sherman v. Mitchell, 46 Cal. 577; Pico v. Cohn, 67 Cal. 258, 7 P. 680.)

It is held in the case of Bernier v. Anderson, 8 Idaho 684, 70 P. 1027, that the rule announced in the case of Lowe v. Long, 5 Idaho 124, 47 P. 93, is not applicable to the trial court when exercising its jurisdiction in passing upon motions for a new trial, and that the trial court is warranted in its discretion in granting a new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence, even where there is a conflict in the evidence. (See, also, Jones v. Campbell, 11 Idaho 752, 84 P. 510.)

Where the evidence presents a substantial conflict, and the trial court, who saw and heard the witnesses, and saw and heard all that was done and said in the case, has granted a new trial, its order will not be disturbed on appeal. (Buckle v. McConaghy, 12 Idaho 737, 88 P. 100, and cases cited; Domico v. Cassassa, 101 Cal. 411, 35 P. 1024; Dickey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 569; Sherman v. Mitchell, 46 Cal. 577; Irving v. Cunningham, 58 Cal. 306.) In granting a new trial the court is not required to specify the grounds upon which the order is made. (1 Spelling, New Trial, 399; Piercy v. Piercy, 149 Cal. 163, 86 P. 507.) The taxing of costs or the imposing of any other condition to the granting of a new trial rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, unless regulated by statute or in cases where a new trial must be granted as a matter of right. (4 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 941; Pierson v. Thompson, 4 Kan. App. 173, 45 P. 944; North Center Creek etc. Smelting Co. v. Eakins, 23 Kan. 317; Spore v. Leeper, 27 Kan. 68; Rice v. Gashirie, 13 Cal. 54.)

AILSHIE, J. Sullivan, C. J., and Stewart, J., concur.

OPINION

AILSHIE, J.

This action was originally commenced in the district court of Bonner county, for the recovery of the sum of $ 1,298.50, damages as the value of certain property destroyed by fire. It was alleged that the defendant had carelessly and negligently started and kindled a fire in his woodland and allowed the same to spread to and upon plaintiff's premises and destroy their dwelling-house and other property. A verdict was rendered and a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs. Defendant thereafter moved for a new trial and his motion was granted by the court. Plaintiffs have appealed from the order granting a new trial.

The defendant in his motion for a new trial assigned and specified eighteen errors, upon each and all of which he claimed he should be granted a new trial. The court made a general order granting the motion, and did not specify any particular ground on which a new trial was granted. All of these specifications and assignments of error have been argued by the respective counsel in this court. Under the rule announced in Buckle v. McConaghy, 12 Idaho 733, 88 P. 100, it is only necessary for us, in a case of this kind, to determine whether or not the trial court was justified in granting the motion for a new trial on any one of the grounds specified in the motion. If we find that any one of the assignments and specifications of error set out in the motion for a new trial was well taken, the order of the trial court must necessarily be affirmed.

Among the specifications is one to the effect that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury in the particular respects set out in the specifications. We have examined the evidence in this case and while we agree with counsel for appellant that it is sufficient to support a verdict and judgment, it is also apparent that there is a wide conflict between the witnesses for the respective parties, and we are not prepared to say that the trial court abused the discretion vested in him when he granted the respondent's motion. In Buckle v. McConaghy, supra, this court said:

"It is sufficient to say that there is a substantial conflict, and the rule is, that where the evidence presents a substantial conflict, and the trial court, who saw and heard the witnesses and saw and heard all that was done and said in the case, has granted a new trial, his order will not be disturbed on appeal."

And in support of that holding the court cited Jones v. Campbell, 11 Idaho 752, 84 P. 510; Jacksha v. Gilbert, 4 Idaho 738, 44 P. 555; Brossard v. Morgan, 6 Idaho 479, 56 P. 163. As we view this phase of the case, it is our duty to affirm the order made by the trial court upon this ground. The granting of a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and unless there has been a clear abuse of such discretion the order will not be disturbed on appeal.

The other specifications of error are directed at the rulings of the court in the rejection and admission of evidence and in its instructions given to the jury. Having determined that a new trial has been properly granted, it would be entirely useless to consider the rulings of the trial court in these other respects. In the first place, we are not advised whether the trial court concluded that he had erred in his rulings on the trial of the case, nor are we...