Wolff v. Padja, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:14-cv-01466-CL |
| Parties | STEPHEN WOLFF, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of JUDITH WOLFF, deceased; Plaintiff; v. PADJA, INC, an Oregon corporation; OREGON SHAKESPEARE FESTIVAL ASSOCIATION, an Oregon nonprofit corporation; MICHAEL DONOVAN, DAVID TAUB, DOUGLAS VOLK, and PARTICIA VOLK, individuals; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Plaintiff decedent, Judith Wolff, fell while attempting to pass through a doorway in the Chateaulin Restaurant and Wine Shop ("Chateaulin"). She sustained injuries that allegedly contributed to her eventual death. Mrs. Wolff's widower, Stephen Wolff, brings this premises liability and wrongful death action against the owners and landlords of the at-issue building; Michael Donovan and David Taub (collectively, the "Landlord Defendants"); and the former owners of Chateaulin; Padja Inc., Douglas Volk, and Patricia Volk (collectively, the "Chateaulin Defendants").1 Currently before the Court are Defendants' motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, both motions (#25, #27) are GRANTED.
Plaintiff moves to strike Mrs. Wolff's purported statement, as inadmissible hearsay. The statement does not qualify as hearsay because it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EVI. 801(c). Defendants do not submit the statement to prove that there was a step or to establish that Mrs. Wolff could handle a step. Rather, they offer the statement as evidence that Mrs. Wolff knew of the step's existence. Additionally, because this action is brought on Mrs. Wolff's behalf by her estate, the Court finds this statement to be admissible as an admission by a party opponent. FED. R. EVI. 801(d)(2); see Kesey, LLC v. Francis, No. CV. 06-540-AC, 2009 WL 909530, at *18 n.17 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 2009), opinion adopted, No. CIV. 06-540-AC, 2009 WL 1270249 (D. Or. May 5, 2009), aff'd, 433 F.App'x 565 (9th Cir. 2011) (). For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion is denied. The Court notes that even if the statement was stricken, its absence from the summary judgment record would not be outcome determinative.
The Chateaulin Defendants move to strike all references to the first responders' note that Mrs. Wolff "didn't see" the step. The statement is hearsay. It is an out-of-court statement submitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EVI. 801(c). Therefore, the Court cannot consider it unless it falls within an exclusion or exception to the rule against hearsay. Themost likely basis upon which this statement could be admitted is as a statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) exempts statements made for medical care from the rule against hearsay. The "critical inquiry" is whether the statements were made for the purpose of, and are reasonably pertinent to, medical diagnosis or treatment. U.S. v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 1003 (9th Cir. 2014); FED. R. EVI. 803(4). Mrs. Wolff's statement that she "didn't see" the step meets this standard. Mrs. Wolff was describing the nature of her fall to a medical professional. Her assertion that she did not see the step is reasonably pertinent to the manner in which she fell, the cause of her fall, and the medical care necessary to address her injuries. The statement is not an inadmissible statement of fault. JDT, 762 F.3d at 1003 (). It does not assign blame to any person or entity. Defendants' motion to strike is, therefore, denied. Again, this statement's presence in the record does not materially affect the Court's ruling on the pending summary judgment motions.
The Landlord Defendants are part owners of the building located on 50 E. Main Street in Ashland, Oregon. Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 4. They leased the first floor of the building to the Chateaulin Defendants. Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 6. The leased property was comprised of two separate spaces. The Chateaulin Defendants operated a wine bar in one and a restaurant in another. Volk Decl. ¶ 4. Each space had its own front door. Volk Decl. ¶4. The Chateaulin Defendants created an interior doorway between the restaurant and wine bar during a 2010 remodeling project. Volk Decl. ¶ 5; Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 13, 1-2. Pursuant to their rental agreement, the Landlord Defendants consented to the door installation on the condition that it was approved by the city. Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 2, at 9; Ex. 5, at 8. The Landlord Defendants were not otherwise involved inthe doorway's construction or design. Sweitzer Decl. Ex 2, at 9-10. The City, an architect, and an engineer approved of the remodel. Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 2, at 7; Ex. 13.
The building is situated on a slight hill. Pl.'s Resp., at 3. Because of the variation in elevation between the wine bar and restaurant, the doorway had a single step down into the restaurant. McLellan Decl. Ex. C, at 9. The step was just over six inches high. McLellan Decl. Ex. A, at 3. The wine bar's flooring was black and white tile. Pl.'s Resp., at 4. The restaurant was darkly carpeted. Pl.'s Resp., at 4. A gold plastic strip identified the flooring transition. Pl.'s Resp., at 4. A red velvet rope hung across the passageway. Volk Decl. ¶ 6. Guests were generally not permitted to remove the rope or use the passageway without assistance. Volk Decl. ¶ 7. The restaurant was more dimly lit than the wine bar. Wolff Decl. ¶ 6; Tran-Caffee Decl. Ex. 3, at 11.
Chateaulin employees received on-the-job training regarding how to handle customers who entered on one side of the property but wanted to patronize the other. Volk Decl. ¶ 8. They were trained to recommend that the guest exit through the front door and re-enter the property through the other door. Volk Decl. ¶ 8a. If the guest asked to use the interior passage, or if the guest was transitioning to one space after spending a period of time in the other, staff would warn the guest of the step, escort the guest to the passageway, remove the rope, offer assistance, and then replace the rope. Volk Decl. ¶ 8b.
On September 16, 2011, Mrs. Wolff entered the wine bar. Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 3. She was using a walker. Wolff Decl. ¶ 2. A Chateaulin employee, Ross Williams ("Williams"), greeted Mrs. Wolff. Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 3. He explained that her dinner reservation was for the restaurant next door. Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 3. He suggested that she exit the wine bar and enter the restaurant's front ramped entrance. Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 3. Mrs. Wolff asked if she could use the interior passageway instead. Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 3. Williams told her that she could, but notedthere was a "big step." Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 3. Williams states that Mrs. Wolff said a step was not a problem, and moved toward the doorway. Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 3. He describes her demeanor as "confident, insistent, and dismissive to my suggestion of using the ramp." Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 3. Williams opened the velvet rope and Mrs. Wolff attempted to move through the doorway. Sweitzer Decl. Ex. 3. Only the first two legs of Mrs. Wolff's walker made it over the step. McLellan Decl. Ex. D, at 3. The back two remained tilted on the wine bar's higher floor. McLellan Decl. Ex. D, at 3. Mrs. Wolff fell forward and hit her head. McLellan Decl. Ex. D, at 3.
There is some dispute regarding whether Mrs. Wolff saw the doorway's step. Williams testifies that Mrs. Wolff "picked up her walker to attempt to put it down on the second level." McLellan Decl. Ex. D, at 3. This statement suggests that Mrs. Wolff perceived the step and was attempting to navigate over it. Conversely, a first responder's report notes that Mrs. Wolff "fell forward down a step she didn't see[.]" Tran-Caffee Decl. Ex. 1, at 1.
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is not proper if material factual issues exist for trial. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001). An issue of fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If the moving party fulfills its burden, the burden shifts to thenon-moving party who must go beyond the pleadings to identify genuine issues of fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposing party must, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by FED. R. CIV. P. 56, designate specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076.
The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Szaier v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011). All reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact should be resolved against the moving party. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976). Where different ultimate inferences may be drawn, summary judgment is inappropriate. Sankovich v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 638 F.2d 136, 140 (9th Cir. 1981). However, facts must be "viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). "Where the record taken as a...
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