Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports, Inc., MID-AMERICA
| Decision Date | 28 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-3309,MID-AMERICA,95-3309 |
| Citation | 111 F.3d 1515 |
| Parties | 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1521, 97 CJ C.A.R. 639 Douglas Allan WOLFGANG, individually, and for the benefit of Jerrilyn Ann Wolfgang, Plaintiff--Appellee, v.MOTORSPORTS, INC., R.E.D. Racing, Inc., and World of Outlaws, Inc., Defendants--Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Michael J. Kuckelman (J. Michael Grier and Lori H. Hill with him on the brief), Blackwell, Sanders, Matheny, Weary & Lombardi, L.C., Overland Park, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellants.
Patrick A. Hamilton (Victor A. Bergman and Stephen N. Six with him on the brief), Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chartered, Overland Park, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before BALDOCK, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
In this personal injury diversity action, Defendants Mid-America Motorsports, Inc., R.E.D. Racing, Inc., and World of Outlaws, Inc. appeal from a final judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff Douglas Allan Wolfgang. 1 Defendants also appeal from the partial denial of their summary judgment motion, and the denial of their motions for new trial and to amend the judgment. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
On April 3, 1992, Mr. Wolfgang, a professional race car driver, crashed into a wall during a "media day" practice session at Lakeside Speedway in Kansas City, Kansas. The practice session was in preparation for races scheduled for April 4 and 5, 1992. The races were promoted by Defendant R.E.D. Racing and sanctioned by Defendant World of Outlaws. Lakeside Speedway is owned by Defendant Mid-America Motorsports.
Mr. Wolfgang's car hit a tire placed on the infield at the edge of the track and swerved out of control into a concrete retaining wall. Mr. Wolfgang was knocked unconscious. Because of the design of the car, methanol fuel spilled into the car's cockpit, pooling at Mr. Wolfgang's feet and erupting into flames. While there were normally five to seven firefighters at Lakeside racing events, only two firefighters were present when Mr. Wolfgang crashed. These two firefighters had never trained together and were unfamiliar with sprint car design. They had no extrication equipment, other than pry bars in pickup trucks, and some of their hand-held fire extinguishers were not designed for use on a methanol fire. In this confusion, Mr. Wolfgang sat in his burning car for eight to ten minutes before other drivers were finally able to extricate him. He was airlifted to the University of Kansas Medical Center by helicopter.
Alleging both ordinary and gross negligence in the handling of the fire, Mr. Wolfgang filed suit against Mid-America Motorsports; R.E.D. Racing; World of Outlaws; and ten other defendants, with whom he subsequently settled. Mid-America Motorsports and R.E.D. Racing were treated by stipulation as one entity, "Lakeside Speedway." Lakeside and World of Outlaws were the only defendants at trial.
Both defendants moved for summary judgment based primarily on a Release and Waiver of Liability signed by Mr. Wolfgang prior to the accident. They also argued that they had taken material affirmative steps to prevent the sort of injuries suffered by Mr. Wolfgang, and therefore could not be found liable for wanton conduct as a matter of Kansas law. Defendant World of Outlaws contended that it did not owe a duty to Mr. Wolfgang to ensure that racetrack owners and promoters provided adequate fire safety protection. Mr. Wolfgang also moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Release was void and unenforceable on public policy grounds, and that World of Outlaws had a duty arising in both contract and tort. The district court granted in part and denied in part both of the summary judgment motions. It ruled that the Release was valid and enforceable as to Mr. Wolfgang's ordinary negligence claims, but did not bar his claims for wanton conduct. The district court also ruled that whether Defendants' actions were sufficient to defeat the wanton conduct claim was a question for the jury. Additionally, the district court found that Mr. Wolfgang had presented enough evidence to show that World of Outlaws had undertaken a duty to ensure safe racing conditions, including adequate fire protection, during the practice session at Lakeside Speedway.
The case was tried to a jury on the issue of wanton conduct. The jury found for Mr. Wolfgang, assessing damages of $1,215,000, and allocating sixty percent fault to Lakeside and forty percent fault to World of Outlaws. Defendants filed a motion for new trial on the basis of newly acquired evidence, which was denied, and a motion to amend judgment on the grounds that a portion of the medical damages awarded were not supported by the evidence, which was granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants now raise eight issues on appeal, alleging pretrial, trial and post-trial errors. Regarding the district court's pretrial determinations, Defendants contend that it misapplied Kansas law in denying summary judgment on Mr. Wolfgang's wanton conduct claim. Defendant World of Outlaws also argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law because it had no legally cognizable duty to provide fire and rescue services during the practice session at which Mr. Wolfgang crashed. We affirm the district court on both rulings.
Defendants next raise three trial errors. They argue that the district court erred in 1) refusing to instruct the jury on negligence, 2) excluding as evidence certain audio and video tape statements by Mr. Wolfgang, and 3) excluding evidence of the Release and other testimony which Defendants claim should have been considered as part of the totality of circumstances surrounding the crash. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to these evidentiary rulings, and therefore affirm.
Defendants also allege three errors in the district court's denial of their requests for post-trial relief. Regarding damages, they contend that a $65,000 award for loss of services damages was non-economic in nature and therefore in excess of Kansas' statutory cap, and that the evidence did not support a significant portion of the medical expenses awarded to Mr. Wolfgang. Finally, Defendants claim the district court erred in not considering their motion for new trial based on newly acquired evidence of Mr. Wolfgang's ability to earn money as a race car driver. We find these claims meritless.
Defendants first challenge the district court's denial of their summary judgment motion on Mr. Wolfgang's wanton conduct claim, arguing that because they took certain fire protection measures, they could not be found wanton as a matter of Kansas law. The denial of summary judgment based on factual disputes is not properly reviewable on an appeal from a final judgment entered after trial. Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc., 974 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973, 113 S.Ct. 1417, 122 L.Ed.2d 787 (1993). "[E]ven if summary judgment was erroneously denied, the proper redress would not be through appeal of that denial but through subsequent motions for judgment as a matter of law ... and appellate review of those motions if they were denied." Id. at 1251. Failure to renew a summary judgment argument--when denial was based on factual disputes--in a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1) at the close of all the evidence is considered a waiver of the issue on appeal. Allahar v. Zahora, 59 F.3d 693, 695-96 (7th Cir.1995).
By contrast, when the material facts are not in dispute and the denial of summary judgment is based on the interpretation of a purely legal question, such a decision is appealable after final judgment. Wilson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 56 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir.1995); Ruyle v. Continental Oil Co., 44 F.3d 837, 841-42 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 906, 116 S.Ct. 272, 133 L.Ed.2d 193 (1995). Because of this "critical distinction between summary judgment motions raising the sufficiency of the evidence to create a fact question for the jury and those raising a question of law that the court must decide," Ruyle, 44 F.3d at 842, prudent counsel will not rely on their own interpretations of whether an issue is purely a question of law or fact. Out of an abundance of caution, and good trial practice, counsel should renew summary judgment grounds in a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence, and again, if necessary, after the jury has returned a verdict and the trial has concluded.
Defendants argue that the district court's denial of their summary judgment motion was based on an erroneous interpretation of a purely legal question. Citing Ruyle, they argue that the denial of their summary judgment motion is therefore appealable. It is clear from the record, 2 however, that the district court recognized the genuine factual disputes raised by Mr. Wolfgang's evidence, and denied summary judgment on that basis. Thus, we may only review Defendants' claims if they were renewed in a Rule 50 motion at the close of all the evidence.
Rule 50 provides that Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2). At the close of Plaintiff's case, Defendants made a written Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on several grounds, but did not mention any of the arguments previously advanced in their summary judgment motion. At the close of all the evidence, Defendants orally renewed their Rule 50 motion on the same grounds they asserted at the close of Plaintiff's evidence, and on the basis that the evidence precluded a finding of recklessness. In the context of this trial,...
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