Wolfork v. Yale Med. Grp.
Decision Date | 22 April 2020 |
Docket Number | SC 20344 |
Parties | Karla WOLFORK, Administratrix (Estate of Daeonte Wolfork-Pisani) v. YALE MEDICAL GROUP et al. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Brock T. Dubin, with whom, on the brief, was Colleen Noonan Davis, for the appellants (defendants).
Karen E. Haley, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff Damian Pisani).
Robinson, C.J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Kahn and Ecker, Js.
The defendants, Yale Medical Group, Yale School of Medicine, Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., and Yale New Haven Health System, appeal from the order of the trial court granting the motion of the substitute plaintiff, Damian Pisani (Pisani), to open and vacate the trial court's final judgment of dismissal for failure to prosecute the present action with reasonable diligence under Practice Book § 14-3.1 The defendants contend that the trial court improperly opened the judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-2122 and Practice Book § 17-433 because (1) Pisani was not a party to the action and, therefore, lacked standing, (2) the motion was not verified by oath, did not demonstrate that a good cause of action existed, and did not establish reasonable cause to excuse the failure to prosecute the action with reasonable diligence, and (3) "there [was] absolutely no claim of fraud on the part of the present defendants." We dismiss the defendants’ appeal in part because we conclude that appellate jurisdiction exists only with respect to the defendants’ challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court to open the judgment on the ground of Pisani's alleged lack of standing. We reject the defendants’ standing claim and, therefore, uphold the trial court's determination with respect to the issue of standing.
In October, 2010, the decedent, Daeonte Wolfork-Pisani, the eleven year old son of Pisani and the plaintiff, Karla Wolfork, died while hospitalized at Yale-New Haven Hospital. The Probate Court appointed the plaintiff as the administratrix of the decedent's estate, and, in February, 2013, the plaintiff, in her representative capacity, filed a medical negligence action against the defendants on behalf of the decedent's estate. The trial court issued a scheduling order requiring the plaintiff to disclose her expert witnesses on or before December 1, 2014. The trial court informed the parties that they "may modify any of the deadlines contained in [the scheduling] order by mutual agreement, except the trial management conference date and trial date set by the court, which shall not be modifiable under any circumstances."
The trial court subsequently modified the scheduling order and extended the filing deadline for the plaintiff's expert witness disclosures to August 15, 2015.
The plaintiff failed to disclose any expert witnesses. Approximately two months prior to trial, the defendants moved for an order precluding the plaintiff from offering expert testimony, claiming that such testimony would prejudice their defense. The trial court deferred ruling on the defendants’ motion.
The trial did not go forward as scheduled, and, in May, 2016, the trial court issued a notice indicating that No withdrawal was filed. The trial court issued a second notice, this time ordering the parties "to file all necessary withdrawals and/or motions for stipulated judgment" on or before July 28, 2016, with the same admonition that the failure to file a timely withdrawal "will result in dismissal of the case."
On July 28, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to file a withdrawal. In her motion, the plaintiff explained that, The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion and extended the deadline to file a withdrawal to August 29, 2016.
The plaintiff again failed to file a withdrawal within the allotted time. On September 29, 2016, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the action pursuant to Practice Book § 14-3 "for failure to file a withdrawal of [the] action within the time period allotted by the court." The trial court issued a final judgment of dismissal and notified the parties that, 4
On January 24, 2017, Pisani5 moved to open and vacate the judgment of dismissal under General Statutes § 52-212a6 and Practice Book § 17-4. In a memorandum of law in support of his motion, Pisani explained that the plaintiff had Pisani's memorandum also represented that, on July 27, 2016, the plaintiff's attorney had sent a letter to the Probate Court (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pisani claimed that "[c]ounsel for the [plaintiff] was aware of these facts and yet failed to request the warranted second request for [an] extension of time to file a withdrawal." Pisani alleged that the "lack of the request for [an] extension of time was due to mistake or accident or other reason unknown in that [the plaintiff] should have communicated to the [trial] court that there was a pending probate issue [and] requested an extension of time to file a withdrawal." Pisani's memorandum advised the trial court that the plaintiff had been removed as administratrix of the estate and that he had been appointed sole administrator "with the authority to handle ... all litigation."
The defendants opposed Pisani's motion to open and vacate the judgment of dismissal on the grounds that (1) Pisani lacked standing because he was not a party to the medical negligence action, and he had not filed a motion to be substituted as the plaintiff, and (2) the motion failed to comply with the requirements of § 52-212 because it was not verified by oath, did not demonstrate that a good cause of action existed, and failed to establish that the plaintiff had been prevented from prosecuting the action by mistake, accident, or other reasonable cause. Pisani responded that (1) he had standing to move to open and vacate the judgment because, as the sole administrator of the estate, he "stepped into the shoes" of the plaintiff, (2) the final judgment of dismissal was not a judgment of default or nonsuit, and, therefore, the motion to open was governed by § 52-212a, not § 52-212, and (3) neither a good cause of action nor a reasonable cause needs to exist if the case was settled, and, to determine whether the case was settled, the judgment must be opened so Pisani can conduct an investigation into the status of the parties’ settlement negotiations.
Pisani filed a supplemental motion to open and vacate the judgment of dismissal, claiming that "he has reason to believe that fraud has been committed." (Emphasis omitted.) Specifically, Pisani alleged that he "has reason to believe that a settlement was reached in the [medical negligence] matter, that [the Probate Court] was not told of the settlement, and did not authorize a settlement, [and] that the estate of his son should have received the proceeds of the settlement and did not." In support of this contention, Pisani referenced "a video [the plaintiff] posted online with the hashtag #4andahalfyearsin on April 25, 2016," in which she "was clearly happy, celebrating and satisfied," despite reportedly being informed by her attorney on that date that no settlement had been reached. The video, "[c]ombined with the fact that [Pisani] was kept in the dark about the estate for years" and "the fact that a representation was made by [the plaintiff's] attorney that [the plaintiff] was aware of no pending litigation and the estate should be closed" in 2013, led Pisani to believe "that a fraud was committed and allowing the case to be dismissed was part of that fraud."
The defendants opposed Pisani's supplemental motion, contending that (1) Pisani still lacked standing because he was not a party to the action, (2) "no settlement payment was made by the defendants in connection with the [medical negligence] action," (3) even if a settlement had been reached, it would not provide a basis on which to open and vacate the judgment because the plaintiff would be forced to withdraw the action in light of the settlement, and (4) Pisani did not allege that the defendants had participated in the alleged fraud.
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...matter jurisdiction to adjudicate motions to open." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wolfork v. Yale Medical Group , 335 Conn. 448, 468–69, 239 A.3d 272 (2020) ; id., at 469, 239 A.3d 272 and n.12 (recognizing distinction between civil and criminal judgments). "[ General ......
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...a court possesses subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law over which our review is plenary. See Wolfork v. Yale Medical Group , 335 Conn. 448, 470, 239 A.3d 272 (2020). In addition, "[i]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, ever......
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...judgment before considering the merits of the claim." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wolfork v. Yale Medical Group , 335 Conn. 448, 459, 239 A.3d 272 (2020). We begin by setting forth the following relevant procedural history. On October 2, 2019, the plaintiff filed ......