Wolfram v. Wolfram, No. 04-03-00686-CV (TX 12/29/2004)

• Decision Date: 29 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 04-03-00686-CV.,04-03-00686-CV.
• Citation: Wolfram v. Wolfram, No. 04-03-00686-CV (TX 12/29/2004), No. 04-03-00686-CV. (Tex. Dec 29, 2004)
• Parties: NANCY J. WOLFRAM, Appellant, v. LOU ANN WOLFRAM, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE HERBERT E. WOLFRAM AND LOU ANN WOLFRAM REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST AGREEMENT DATED JUNE 24, 1997, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

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NANCY J. WOLFRAM, Appellant, v. LOU ANN WOLFRAM, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE HERBERT E. WOLFRAM AND LOU ANN WOLFRAM REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST AGREEMENT DATED JUNE 24, 1997, Appellee.

No. 04-03-00686-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio.

Delivered and Filed: December 29, 2004.

Appeal from the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2001-CI-08847, Honorable Andy Mireles, Judge Presiding.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Sitting: Paul W. GREEN, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice and Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice.

OPINION

KAREN ANGELINI, Justice.

Nancy J. Wolfram appeals the summary judgment rendered in favor of Lou Ann Wolfram, individually and as trustee of the Herbert E. Wolfram and Lou Ann Wolfram Revocable Living Trust Agreement dated June 24, 1997. In one issue, Nancy asserts that the trial court's summary judgment was improper because Nancy's fraudulent transfer suit against Lou Ann was not time-barred by section 16.066(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We reverse the summary judgment of the trial court and remand the cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Nancy J. Wolfram ("Nancy") and Herbert E. Wolfram ("Herbert"), residents of the state of California, divorced in 1987 after a marriage of more than two years. Not being a community property state, on February 4, 1988, the Superior Court of California for Orange County ordered spousal support from Herbert to Nancy in the sum of $1,900.00 per month, "commencing on January 1, 1988, and continuing thereafter until the death of either party, re-marriage of [Nancy] or until further order of court, whichever shall first occur." In August of 1990, Herbert, who had remarried, moved with his new wife, Lou Ann Wolfram ("Lou Ann"), to Bexar County, Texas, at which time it appears he stopped making payments to Nancy.¹

Nancy petitioned the Superior Court of Orange County, California, for issuance of an Abstract of Judgment and Writ of Execution on the unpaid balance of the California alimony judgment, which she received on February 11, 1997. This amount of judgment plus accrued interest totaled $179,173.88. Following the issuance of this abstract of judgment and writ of execution, on or about June 24, 1997, Herbert and Lou Ann created and transferred assets into the HERBERT E. WOLFRAM AND LOU ANN WOLFRAM REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST ("Wolfram trust"). Herbert died on September 7, 1999. Following Herbert's death, on February 10, 2000, Nancy filed a petition entitled "Plaintiff's Original Petition to Enforce Foreign Judgment" against Herbert Wolfram and Estate in the Probate Court of Bexar County, Texas, attaching authenticated copies of the California abstract of judgment and writ of execution. On October 19, 2000, Nancy filed a petition entitled "Supplement to Plaintiff's Original Petition to Enforce Foreign Judgment" in the same court, attaching authenticated copies of the original California alimony judgment along with an affidavit of compliance with the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("Uniform Act").

At the time of his death, Herbert, by his will, requested that Lou Ann serve as independent executor. Nancy contested Lou Ann's appointment and, on June 18, 2001, filed suit to Request for TRO and Temporary Injunction against Lou Ann in District Court in cause number 2001-CI-08847. Nancy sued Lou Ann individually and as trustee, alleging violations of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.001 et seq.). Nancy and Lou Ann filed cross motions for summary judgment.

In her motion for summary judgment, Nancy asserted that: (1) Nancy domesticated the California alimony judgment in Texas state court pursuant to the Uniform Act contained within chapter 35 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; (2) Nancy, therefore, is a judgment creditor of Herbert; (3) Herbert transferred all of his assets to the Wolfram trust as sole beneficiary to his Estate; (4) Herbert made this transfer with the actual intent to hinder, delay and defraud Nancy of her right as a creditor of Herbert in violation of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("FTA").

In response, Lou Ann asserted that she was entitled to summary judgment on two grounds. First, Lou Ann argued that Nancy could not maintain a fraudulent transfer action against her because no debtor-creditor relationship existed between them.² Secondly, Lou Ann argued that, alternatively, the fraudulent transfer suit was time-barred by section 16.066(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lou Ann. Nancy appeals from this summary judgment.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Standard of Review

We review a summary judgment de novo. Reynoso v. Huff, 21 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.). Accordingly, we will uphold a summary judgment only if the summary judgment record establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a ground set forth in the motion. Amer. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnel, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997); TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). In deciding whether the summary judgment record establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, we view as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant and indulge every reasonable inference, and resolve all doubts in its favor. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).

B. Scope of Review

In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we sit in the same position as the trial court. See Reynoso, 21 S.W.3d at 512. Accordingly, on appeal, we cannot affirm the summary judgment on a ground not presented to the trial court in the motion. Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 100 (Tex. 1992); see Davis v. City of Palestine, 988 S.W.2d 854, 859 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1999, no pet.) (granting summary judgment on grounds not in motion is reversible error).

When, as in this case, the parties have filed competing motions for summary judgment, and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we may consider the propriety of the denial as well as the grant. Gramercy Ins. Co. v. MRD Inv., Inc., 47 S.W.3d 721, 724 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). If resolution of the issues rests on disputed facts, summary judgment is inappropriate, and we should reverse and remand for further proceedings. Id. If the issue raised is based on undisputed and unambiguous facts, however, we may determine the question presented as a matter of law. Id.

ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT

Nancy contends that the trial court erred in granting Lou Ann's motion for summary judgment because Nancy's fraudulent transfer suit against Lou Ann was not time-barred by section 16.066(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.³ We have consistently applied section 16.066(b) as the relevant statute of limitations to actions brought to enforce foreign judgments from federal courts and sister states. See Carter v. Jimerson, 974 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.); see also Lawrence Sys., Inc. v. Superior Feeders, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, pet. denied). Section 16.066(b) provides that "[a]n action against a person who has resided in this state for 10 years prior to the action may not be brought on a foreign judgment rendered more than 10 years before the commencement of the action in this state." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.066(b) (Vernon 1997).

On appeal, Nancy contends that her fraudulent transfer suit is not a suit brought to enforce a foreign judgment. Instead, Nancy asserts that, because she had already brought an action on a foreign judgment and properly "domesticated this judgment of a sister state" in Texas probate court, her fraudulent transfer suit is an action brought to enforce a valid and final Texas judgment.

A. Was Nancy's suit an action on a foreign judgment?

The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 1, declares that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Under this principle, Texas is required to enforce any valid and final judgment from another state. See Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1992). Texas courts recognize two methods of enforcing foreign judgments: (1) filing a judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("Uniform Act"), or (2) filing a common law action to enforce a foreign judgment.⁴

1. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act

On appeal, Nancy claims to have proceeded under the Uniform Act, which provides:

(a) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an act of congress or a statute of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any court of competent jurisdiction of this state.

(b) The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the court in which the foreign judgment is filed.

(c) A filed foreign judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing, or satisfying a judgment as a judgment of the court in which it is filed.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003 (Vernon 1997).

Under the Uniform Act, by following the relatively simple procedure for filing an authenticated copy of a sister state judgment in a Texas court, the judgment holder can "domesticate" the foreign judgment. In other words, the filing makes the judgment the same as if it had been rendered by that Texas court. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(c) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004-05). There is no further need to file an independent lawsuit in Texas to convert the foreign judgment into a Texas judgment; filing a foreign judgment pursuant to the Uniform...