Wolfson v. Mills

• Decision Date: 14 December 1933
• Parties: WOLFSON et al. v. MILLS et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

169 A. 359

WOLFSON et al.

v. MILLS et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Dec. 14, 1933.

Action by Harold A. Wolfson, by his next friend, Raymond Wolfson, and others against Leland G. Mills and another. On defendants' motion to compel plaintiffs to furnish particulars.

Motion granted.

Argued before Justice HEHER at the Passaic Circuit.

Kitay & Schwartz, of Paterson (Sol Schwartz, of Paterson, of counsel), for plaintiffs.

Arthur T. Vanderbilt, of Newark, for defendants.

HEHER, Justice.

Defendants served a demand for a bill of particulars. Plaintiffs refused to answer some of the questions propounded, and defendants now move to compel full compliance with the demand. The questions made the subject of this motion may be grouped under three heads.

Class I: Questions numbered 1 to 4, 7 to 11, 32 to 41, 67 to 76, and 100 to 105. They were framed to elicit more specific information respecting the nature and extent of the injuries claimed to have been sustained by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs answered these inquiries merely by making reference to the allegations of the complaint.

Class II: Questions numbered 15 to 20, 61 to 66, 79 to 82, 93, 99, and 108 to 113. These inquiries related to the disability, if any, suffered by plaintiffs by reason of the claimed injuries. Plaintiffs refused to make answer on the ground that the questions are "improper."

Class III: Questions numbered 21 to 29, 44, 46, 47, 49 to 60, 84 to 97, and 114 to 127. They seek information as to disbursements made for medical treatment and hospital service. Plaintiffs refused to answer these inquiries, also on the ground that they are "improper."

The bill of particulars has the two-fold effect of informing defendants with relation to the details of plaintiffs' case, with a view of preparation of a proper pleading in reply to the complaint, and also of limiting plaintiffs' proof on the trial, as well as apprising defendants of what plaintiffs propose to set up, to the end that defendants may prepare a proper defense. Its primary function is not to expose a party's evidence to his adversary, but to amplify the pleadings, and indicate, with more particularity than is ordinarily required in a formal plea, the nature of the claim made, in order that surprise upon the trial may be avoided, and the issue more intelligently met. It may be required for the purpose of giving definite information as to a claim made by an adversary in respect of any material fact at issue. Hopper v. Gillett, 140 A. 17, 6 N. J. Misc. 63; Locker v. American Tobacco Co. (D. C.) 200 F. 973, 975; Jacobson v. Massachusetts Bonding, etc., Co. (Sup.) 165 N. Y. S. 776; Sundheimer v. James S. Barron & Co., 62 Misc. 203, 114 N. Y. S. 804. It limits and defines, for the purposes of trial, the scope of plaintiffs' claim. "A bill of particulars is appropriate in all descriptions of actions where the circumstances are such that justice demands that a party should be apprised of the matters for which he is to be put for trial with greater particularity than is required by the rules of pleading." Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N. Y. 176, 184, 17 Am. Rep. 337.

The questions propounded by defendants are, therefore, proper. As to the first group of questions, plaintiffs insist that they have been fully answered, in that the pertinent allegations of the complaint have by reference been incorporated in the answers. Defendants obviously seek, by the inquiries made, more specific information than is afforded by the complaint. This is the office of a bill of particulars, and, inasmuch as these queries relate to matters that are properly the subject of inquiry by this method, they are entitled to specific answers. Items of damage have habitually been...