Wolinsky v. Standard Oil Of Conn. Inc

• Decision Date: 05 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 3:08cv832 (MRK).,3:08cv832 (MRK).
• Citation: 712 F.Supp.2d 46
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Steven WOLINSKY, Plaintiff,v.STANDARD OIL OF CONNECTICUT, INC. and David Cohen, Defendants.

712 F.Supp.2d 46

Steven WOLINSKY, Plaintiff,v.STANDARD OIL OF CONNECTICUT, INC. and David Cohen, Defendants.

No. 3:08cv832 (MRK).

United States District Court D. Connecticut.

May 5, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William Thomas Blake, Jr., Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C., Milford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Glenn A. Duhl, Siegel, O'Connor, O'Donnell & Beck, P.C., Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING AND ORDER

MARK R. KRAVITZ, District Judge.

Plaintiff Steve Wolinksy has brought suit against his former employer, Standard Oil of Connecticut, Inc. (“Standard Oil”) and his former supervisor, David Cohen, Standard Oil's Executive Vice President. Currently pending is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 66] on the three claims that remain in this case.¹ The first of those claims, asserted only against Standard Oil, alleges retaliation for Mr. Wolinksy's engagement in activity protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). See Compl. [doc. # 1] at 7-8. The other two claims, asserted against both Defendants, allege common-law libel and libel per se. See id. at 10-11. The Court held oral argument on the pending motion on March 31, 2010. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that there are disputed issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment, and therefore Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 66] is DENIED.

I.

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the factual background and procedural history to date, and recites only those facts necessary for the resolution of Defendant's motion. The following facts are taken from the parties' statements of material facts not in dispute. See Defs.' Local Rule 56(a) 1 Statement [doc. # 67]; Pl.'s Local Rule 56(a) 2 Statement [doc. # 79]. Unless otherwise indicated, these facts are undisputed, and the Court will introduce other facts below as necessary.

Mr. Wolinksy was hired by Standard Oil, which primarily sells heating oil, in April 1993 as an alarm salesman. In 1995, he was promoted to the manager of oil telesales operation, where he was responsible for hiring, training and supervising oil sales telemarketers. Although there is some dispute about Mr. Wolinksy's work performance from 2003 onward, the employer-employee relationship declined in earnest beginning in 2007. On January 14, 2008, Mr. Wolinksy mailed a complaint to the Connecticut Department of Labor (“DOL”), alleging that Standard Oil was violating the FLSA. Mr. Wolinksy provided Standard Oil with a copy of the DOL complaint the same day.

Around the same time, Standard Oil informed Mr. Wolinksy that while he had previously received commissions on home oil sales, his compensation above his salary would henceforth be in the form of a subjective bonus, purportedly in line with Standard Oil's practice in regards to its other managers.² Mr. Wolinksy says that he was first told of this change on January 15, 2008-the day after he gave Standard Oil a copy of his first DOL complaint. According to Standard Oil, however, Mr. Wolinsky was informed of the change to his compensation structure four days earlier, on January 11, 2008.

What is undisputed, however, is that the employment relationship rapidly deteriorated in the subsequent months, resulting in Mr. Wolinksy's termination on April 17, 2008. In the intervening months, Mr. Wolinksy filed six additional DOL complaints about Standard Oil practices that he believed violated the FLSA. Standard Oil responded to the substance of several of these complaints by defending its practices to its employees, both informally and in formal memoranda. Mr. Wolinksy alleges that several of these efforts by Standard Oil were intended to discredit him within the company and to make life difficult for him, some of which he says amount to independent actions of retaliation. Mr. Wolinksy also alleges that his supervisors began making unreasonable work-related demands of him and his time; refused to pay him commissions he had already earned under his previous compensation structure; and installed surveillance equipment over his desk in order to monitor and intimidate him. Standard Oil, for its part, alleges that Mr. Wolinksy became openly hostile to performing his legitimate work responsibilities; made unreasonable demands for a severance package in exchange for his resignation; threatened Standard Oil with additional DOL complaints harassed his co-workers to try to have them join his protests of Standard Oil practices; and otherwise violated his duty of loyalty to the company.

The parties do not dispute, however, that on March 31, 2008, Mr. Wolinksy placed envelopes on employees' vehicles in the company parking lot that contained copies of all seven of his DOL complaints, along with a letter that accused Standard Oil of not only engaging in illegal labor practices, but also of distributing intentionally misleading and false information to employees regarding the legality of its practices. The following day, Standard Oil distributed a letter to its employees, signed by Mr. Cohen, that respond to Mr. Wolinsky's accusations. The letter states, in relevant part:

You may have recently found a letter from Steve Wolinsky, our sales manager, on your car's windshield along with a host of complaints that Steve has filed against us with the State and Federal Departments of Labor. I am sorry you are being dragged into this bizarre situation, but given what Steve is doing, I feel it is important that you are informed as to what is going on.

At the beginning of January, 2008, we informed Steve that we were changing his bonus compensation package to bring it more in line with his performance and the pay of other managers in this company.... He immediately started to file complaints against Standard Oil with the various labor departments so that he could get “whistleblower” protection. He• also wanted us to pay him to “go away”....

I think you know Roy [Friedman, President of Standard Oil] and me well enough that we will not submit to extortion, even though that might be the easier path....

Letter from David Cohen, Ex. A-46 to Defs.' Local Rule 56(a) 1 Statement [doc. # 67] at 1 (emphasis added). On April 2, 2008, Mr. Cohen suspended Mr. Wolinksy for approximately two weeks, and explained in a letter to Mr. Wolinksy that his suspension was based on his March 31 letter to employees and his “harassing and inappropriate behavior” of the prior three months. See Suspension Letter dated Apr. 2, 2008, Ex. A-50 to Defs.' Local Rule 56(a) 1 Statement [doc. # 67] at 1. Mr. Cohen requested that upon his return, Mr. Wolinksy attempt to remedy the damage he had caused by apologizing to coworkers and to “act appropriately in all circumstances.” Id. at 2. Mr. Cohen warned that “if I find any instance that you are again behaving inappropriately, you will be terminated immediately.” Id.

By letter dated April 3, 2008, Mr. Wolinksy's counsel demanding that Mr. Cohen retract the statement in the April 1, 2008 letter to employees accusing Mr. Wolinksy of extortion. See Pl.'s Counsel Letter dated Apr. 3, 2008, Ex. A-51 to Defs.' Local Rule 56(a) 1 Statement [doc. # 67]. Mr. Cohen did so in a memo to company employees dated April 12, 2008, explaining that “I have come to find that the word ‘extortion’ has a particular legal meaning. Steve's actions, and his request that we pay him to ‘go away,’ while troubling, may not technically rise to the level of extortion. I therefore hereby retract that particular sentence in my letter.” Def. Cohen's Mem. dated Apr. 12, 2008, Ex. A-52 to Defs.' Local Rule 56(a) 1 Statement [doc. # 67].

Mr. Wolinksy returned to work on April 14, 2008, but his return was short-lived. According to Defendants, several of Mr. Wolinksy's coworkers expressed discomfort with his continued presence, and the Defendants felt as though Mr. Wolinksy was not complying with Mr. Cohen's prior request that he attempt to rectify the damage done to his relationships with other employees. Defendants also say that when he returned, Mr. Wolinsky was spending an inordinate time writing in a journal (Mr. Wolinksy says he only wrote in it during breaks). On April 17, 2008, Mr. Cohen and Mr. Friedman demanded to see the contents of the journal. Mr. Wolinsky resisted, saying that he wished to speak with his attorney before handing over the journal. Mr. Friedman and Mr. Cohen then decided to terminate Mr. Wolinksy. Mr. Cohen memorialized the reasons for doing so in a letter dated April 18, 2008. See Cohen. Aff. [doc. # 68-1] ¶ 114.

Mr. Wolinksy filed suit in Connecticut Superior Court on May 5, 2008, alleging, in part, that he had been retaliated against for engaging in activity in protected by the FLSA and that Mr. Cohen's statement accusing Mr. Cohen of extortion constituted libel and libel per se. See Compl. [doc. # 1]. Defendants removed the case to this Court on June 2, 2008 see id., and filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 66] on November 30, 2009, following the close of discovery.

II.

The standard for deciding motions for summary judgment is a familiar one. In short, the purpose of summary judgment is not to resolve factual disputes, but rather to see if there are any facts material to a claim that remain in dispute. Summary judgment will not be granted unless “the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)(2). The burden is on the moving party to show that there are no disputed issues of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once that burden has been met, in order to defeat summary judgment the non-moving party must come forth with specific facts, supported by non-conclusory, admissible evidence, that demonstrate the existence of a dispute of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v....