Wolkoff v. Villane

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
Writing for the CourtBROCHIN
CitationWolkoff v. Villane, 672 A.2d 242, 288 N.J.Super. 282 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996)
Decision Date14 March 1996
PartiesArlette WOLKOFF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carl VILLANE, Villane Construction, John Doe (said name being fictitious and unknown), and John Doe (said name being fictitious and unknown), Defendants-Respondents.

Stanley F. Friedman, Florham Park, for appellant.

Brian Peoples, Cedar Knolls, for respondents (Leary, Bride, Tinker & Moran, attorneys; Mr. Peoples, on the brief).

Before Judges LONG, MUIR, Jr. and BROCHIN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BROCHIN, J.A.D.

Plaintiff Arlette Wolkoff appeals from the Law Division's denial of her motion to vacate its order for the entry of judgment dismissing her case as settled. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing.

Plaintiff sued defendants Carl Villane and Villane Construction Corporation for injuries which she allegedly sustained when the car that she was driving was struck from the rear by a vehicle driven by the individual defendant. The most serious of those injuries was a closed head injury. A clinical neuropsychologist whom plaintiff retained to testify at trial submitted a report which expressed the opinion that plaintiff suffered a "cerebral injury" and that, as a result, "she will have difficulty coping with novel situations or situations in which learning is prioritized." He also stated that plaintiff's "abstract thinking is impaired, she will have difficulty in complex decision making and in complex problem solving."

On December 7, 1994, the day the case was called for trial, the attorneys for the parties negotiated a settlement. The settlement discussions took most of the morning and were conducted in or near the courtroom where the case was scheduled to be tried. Plaintiff alleges that she waited on another floor of the courthouse. Her attorney conferred with her from time to time and she rejected several offers. Finally, her attorney reported to the court that the parties had agreed to settle for $85,000, and an order was entered dismissing the case.

The next day, plaintiff told her attorney "not to accept" the settlement. According to plaintiff, "he refused," presumably because he had agreed to the settlement on the basis of what he understood to be his client's approval of its terms. On December 9, 1994, plaintiff telephoned the trial judge's chambers and left a message for the judge that she had not settled. On December 13, 1994, she wrote her attorney, requesting that he advise the court that her "understanding [was] that no settlement has been reached" and asking him to file a motion immediately. On February 7, 1994, represented by substituted counsel, she moved to vacate the settlement.

In the certification which plaintiff filed in support of her motion to set aside the settlement, she alleged:

3) On December 7, 1994 I came to the Union County Court House for what I believed was going to be the start of my trial on the injuries. I do not remember it all, but apparently a "settlement" was reached. Nothing was ever signed, nor was anything placed on the record.

4) On the day in question, I was in a lot of pain and under a lot of stress. I was in such pain that I could not find the handicapped entrance, I could not pour myself a cup of coffee, and found myself in a room with a glass ceiling in the court house basement alone and in pain. Because of my cognitive deficits and the overwhelming stress and pain, I had difficulty processing the information my attorney was giving to me and did not understand the terms and results of this alleged "settlement."

5) Although ... my attorney was giving me information, I was incapable of processing that information. Although I remember figures were being mentioned, I could not retain them long enough to understand what they meant. I could not process the simplest of mathematical functions. I was unaware that we had reached a settlement. When I did leave the Courthouse I was aware that I had to meet [my attorney] at his office later that same afternoon, but because of the pain I want home to bed and stayed there.

....

7) On December 7, 1994, the day in question, I was in more pain than usual and had taken pain medication.... I was intimidated. The head injury I sustained in the accident interfered with my thought and memory process, as it does on many occasions, when aggravated by stress, fatigue and unusual pain.

Attached to plaintiff's certification are letters from a psychologist and a psychiatrist. The substance of both letters is that although neither of the writers can verify plaintiff's description of how she was feeling or what was happening to her cognitive processes during the settlement negotiations, her allegations are consistent with what she could have been experiencing in view of her condition.

Defendants did not submit any medical testimony to dispute plaintiff's claim that she underwent the deterioration of mental functions which she described. However, defendants' attorney filed a certification in which he stated that he had observed at least one of plaintiff's conferences with her attorney from a distance and that plaintiff did not seem to him to be "confused, incapable of understanding [her attorney], or unaware of what was taking place."

The motion judge decided plaintiff's application solely on the basis of the certifications, without taking any live testimony. He found that plaintiff

was aware of her injuries and was cognizant of the figures that were being discussed for settlement. [Her attorney] had numerous discussions with [plaintiff] and she was capable of understanding and ... rejecting lesser settlement amounts.... This court finds that Mrs. [Wolkoff] was able to process information to make this settlement based on her ability to reject lower settlement offers over the course of the day.

On the basis of these findings, the motion judge denied plaintiff's application to vacate the settlement. Plaintiff has appealed, arguing that because of her "cognitive defects," "no settlement agreement was reached [and] even assuming that there had been a settlement, plaintiff is entitled under rule 4:50-1 to set aside the order of dismissal and to a trial on the merits."

We begin our review of the order appealed from by reiterating the axiom that for "a trial court to decide contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits, without considering the demeanor of witnesses, is contrary to fundamental principles of our legal practice." Conforti v. Guliadis, 245 N.J.Super. 561, 565, 586 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1991), aff'd on this point, 128 N.J. 318, 322-23, 608 A.2d 225 (1992). To the same effect, see Intek Auto Leasing, Inc. v. Zetes Microtech Corp., 268 N.J.Super. 426, 433, 633 A.2d 1029 (App.Div.1993); Prostak v. Prostak, 257 N.J.Super. 75, 81, 607 A.2d 1349 (App.Div.1992); Berrie v. Berrie, 252 N.J.Super. 635, 649, 600 A.2d 512 (App.Div.1991); Fusco v. Fusco, 186 N.J.Super. 321, 327, 452 A.2d 681 (App.Div.1982). In the present case, the parties clearly dispute issues of fact. Plaintiff alleges that brain damage prevented her from understanding and knowingly approving the settlement made in her name. Defendants deny these allegations. Whether the motion judge was correct in ruling on these disputed facts on the basis of the parties' certifications, without an evidentiary hearing, therefore depends on whether the disputed facts are material. Another way to put that question is to ask whether plaintiff would be entitled to have the settlement vacated if she proves her allegations.

As we noted in Aponte v. Williard, 229 N.J.Super. 490, 493, 551 A.2d 1054 (App.Div.1989),

The settlement of a law suit has three aspects: the initial agreement, which is a contract between the parties; the order of the court dismissing the suit, which is subject to the court rule controlling the relief from an order or judgment, R. 4:50-1; and the delivery of a release, a document with independent legal significance.

In the present case, plaintiff has neither executed a release nor received any money. Whether plaintiff is entitled to vacate the order of judgment of dismissal depends on whether she is entitled to treat the settlement agreement as void or to have it rescinded.

The basic rule pertinent to our decision of that question was stated as follows in Hillsdale Nat. Bank v. Sansone, 11 N.J.Super. 390, 399, 78 A.2d 441 (App.Div.1951) [W]here there is not the mental capacity to comprehend and understand, there is not the capacity to make a valid contract.

The rule is of long standing. 1 In somewhat more antique language, it was stated this way in Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N.J.L. 108, 113 (Sup.Ct.1874):

The test of capacity to make an agreement ... is, that a man shall have the ability to understand the nature and effect of the act in which he is engaged, and the business he is transacting.... [I]f the mind be so clouded or perverted by age, disease, or affliction, that he cannot comprehend the business in which he is engaging, then the writing is not his deed.

Furthermore, subject to exceptions which are inapplicable here, "transactions of third parties, which, under the circumstances, would be invalid if had directly with the principal, must be equally invalid though they be done with the agent." Matthiessen &amp Weichers Refining Co. v. McMahon's Adm'r, 38 N.J.L. 536, 546 (E. & A. 1876).

Applying these principles, courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that a settlement in a personal injury case will be set aside, even after a release has been delivered, if the proofs show with sufficient clarity that the plaintiff was incompetent to authorize the settlement. For example, in Pattison v. Highway Insurance Underwriters, 292 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.Civ.App.1956), a husband and wife were severely injured as the result of their car's colliding with a truck that was making a U-turn at night on a...

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