Wollin v. Gondert
| Decision Date | 02 September 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-1857,98-1857 |
| Citation | 192 F.3d 616 |
| Parties | (7th Cir. 1999) GERALD R. WOLLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRUCE GONDERT, Deputy Sheriff, JOSEPH SEIDEL, Deputy Sheriff and JEFFERSON COUNTY, WISCONSIN, Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 97 C 0568 S--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before POSNER, Chief Judge, CUDAHY and COFFEY, Circuit Judges.
In August of 1997, Plaintiff-Appellant Gerald R. Wollin ("Wollin") filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 against Sheriff's Deputies Bruce Gondert and Joseph Seidel of the Jefferson County (Wisconsin) Sheriff's Department alleging that he was arrested for contempt of court without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint also named Jefferson County ("the County") as a defendant alleging that the deputies were acting within the scope of their employment when they effectuated Wollin's arrest therefore, according to Wollin's theory, requiring the County to indemnify the officers.
The County and the deputies filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that the deputies had probable cause to arrest Wollin and furthermore, even if the court concluded that probable cause did not exist, the officers were still entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants further argued that there were no substantive claims stated against the County. The court granted Jefferson County summary judgment, finding that the County was not a proper defendant because "the undisputed facts indicate that the County had no policy or custom to violate constitutional rights or that any policy of the County caused the alleged violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights." The trial judge also granted summary judgment to the deputies finding that they had probable cause to arrest Wollin.1 Wollin appeals the grant of summary judgment to officers Gondert and Seidel, but does not appeal the grant of summary judgment to the County. We AFFIRM.
In August of 1995, Wollin filed an action for divorce in the Jefferson County Circuit Court. Three months later, Wollin's wife filed a motion and affidavit requesting that the Jefferson County Family Court Commissioner ("the Commissioner") issue an order requiring that Wollin, among other things, vacate the marital residence, cease harassing her, and avoid all contact with her. In support of her motion, Ms. Wollin alleged that her husband had threatened to inflict physical harm upon her and that she had "grave fears for her personal safety." On November 28, 1995, at 3:00 p.m., the Family Court Commissioner held a hearing on the wife's motion and while hearing testimony from the estranged couple he was made aware of the fact that Wollin kept a number of firearms as well as ammunition in their home. After this testimony was presented and the Commissioner was making his oral ruling but before completion of the same, Wollin exited the courtroom and journeyed to his home.2
Shortly after the hearing concluded, the Court Commissioner telephoned Sergeant Paul Wallace of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department and informed him that, based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the defendant-appellant Wollin was believed to have made threats of physical violence against his wife and that he stored firearms and ammunition in his home. According to Sergeant Wallace's uncontested affidavit,3 the Family Court Commissioner expressed his concern at this time that Wollin might not comply with the court order to surrender his firearms and ammunition. The Commissioner further requested that officers be immediately dispatched to the Wollin residence to take delivery of the weapons and ammunition. Sergeant Wallace inquired of the Commissioner if Wollin could be taken into custody if he failed to comply with the court's order, to which the Commissioner responded that the "intentional violation of a court order could result in arrest and a criminal charge for contempt." Sergeant Wallace met with Deputy Gondert and relayed the Commissioner's statement, and personally instructed Deputy Gondert that if Wollin refused to turn over his weapons, "he should be taken into custody." Deputies Gondert and Seidel were dispatched to Wollin's residence.
When the deputies arrived at Wollin's residence, they knocked on the front door and the defendant- appellant answered. According to Deputy Gondert's uncontested affidavit, while Wollin remained just inside the doorway of his residence, the deputies advised him that at the end of the hearing, the Commissioner ordered Wollin to immediately surrender his guns and ammunition. Wollin claimed that he was unaware of any such order and asked to see a written copy of it and further stated that because the officers were unable to produce a written copy of the court order he refused to surrender his guns and ammunition. At this time, the deputies advised Wollin that they would apply for the issuance of a summons and complaint charging him with criminal contempt of court. Before the officers left the premises, however, Wollin exited his home, portable phone in hand, and advised the deputies that someone from the Sheriff's Department wanted to speak with them. The officers returned, and after a brief phone conversation, Deputy Gondert advised Wollin that he was under arrest for contempt of court because of his refusal to comply with the Commissioner's order to surrender his firearms and ammunition.4 A brief struggle ensued when Wollin was handcuffed.5
On August 18, 1997, Wollin filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 against the County of Jefferson, Wisconsin and Deputies Gondert and Seidel, alleging that their arrest of him without probable cause or lawful authority was in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.6 On January 15, 1998, the County and officers filed a joint motion for summary judgment, asserting that there existed both probable cause and lawful authority for the arrest and that at that time the officers were acting in their official capacities as duly appointed deputy sheriffs of the Jefferson County, Wisconsin Sheriff's Department and were thus entitled to qualified immunity. Wollin's response brief argued, among other things, that the deputies lacked lawful authority "to initiate criminal contempt proceedings by arrest just because [they were] aware that an individual [was] in violation of a court order in a civil case."
On February 19, 1998, the district judge granted summary judgment to each of the deputy defendants as well as Jefferson County. In dismissing the claims against the deputies, the court ruled that the officers had probable cause to arrest Wollin, finding that:
[b]ased on the facts and circumstances within the [deputies'] knowledge at the time of arrest, defendants had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was violating the Court Commissioner's order to surrender his weapons which constituted criminal contempt under Wis. Stats. Sec. 785.03(1)(b). Defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for criminal contempt based on Wisconsin law.
The court further determined that any claim that the deputy sheriffs lacked lawful authority to make the arrest was necessarily dependent upon the probable cause determination, and because the defendants had probable cause to arrest Wollin, his argument that the deputies lacked lawful authority also failed. On appeal, Wollin challenges only the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Deputies Gondert and Seidel.
Wollin contends that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to Deputies Gondert and Seidel on his sec. 1983 claim. Specifically, Wollin argues that the granting of summary judgment was improper because the deputies lacked both probable cause and lawful authority to effectuate his arrest. He argues further that the deputies are not entitled to qualified immunity because they were clearly acting outside the scope of the Commissioner's authority.
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. See Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriately granted if the party seeking the judgment demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law through record materials filed with the court (i.e. pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Reid v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 157 F.3d 1106 1110 (7th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once the movant has met this burden, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial, and may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings. See Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1031 (7th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Moreover, the proper standard of review in qualified immunity cases where probable cause is at issue is de novo. See Jones v. Watson, 106 F.3d 774, 777 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 56 (1997).
Section 1983 of Title 42 authorizes a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by federal law or the United States Constitution. Wollin alleges that Deputies Gondert and Seidel violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures because they lacked probable cause or lawful authority to effectuate his...
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