Wolverton v. Young, No. 24117-3-III (WA 1/24/2006)
| Decision Date | 24 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 24117-3-III,24117-3-III |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Parties | GLENDA WOLVERTON, an individual taypayer and resident-citizen of Richland; BRANDY LEIGHTER, an individual taxpayer and resident-citizen of Kennewick; MARY MAHONEY, an individual taxpayer of Kennewick; LEONORA CLAIRE CLARKE and JOSEPH DAVID CLARKE, husband and wife, married taxpayers of Kennewick; the State of Washington ex rel. GLENDA WOLVERTON, BRANDY LEIGHTER, MARY MAHONEY, LEONORA CLAIRE CLARKE, and JOSEPH DAVID CLARKE; and the Cities of Kennewick, Pasco, and Richland ex rel. THE TRI-CITY ANIMAL CONTROL AUTHORITY, a Ch. 39.34 RCW entity formed by interlocal cooperation agreement ex rel. GLENDA WOLVERTON, BRANDY LEIGHTER, MARY MAHONEY, LEONORA CLAIRE CLARKE and JOSEPH DAVID CLARKE, on behalf of all taxpayers, residents, and citizens in the Cities of Kennewick, Pasco, and Richland, Appellants, v. BRUCE W. YOUNG and SANDY A. YOUNG, in both their individual and official capacities as animal control officers, as well as husband and wife, and the marital community composed thereof; TRI-CITIES ANIMAL CARE & CONTROL SHELTER (UBI 601-992-382 corporation d/b/a TRI-CITY ANIMAL CONTROL; TRI-CITY ANIMAL CONTROL & SHELTERING SERVICES (UBI 602-019-162 for-profit corporation d/b/a TRI-CITY ANIMAL CONTROL; CITY OF KENNEWICK, a Washington municipal corporation; CITY OF PASCO, a Washington municipal corporation; and CITY OF RICHLAND, a Washington municipal corporation, and DOES 1-10, Respondents. |
Appeal from Superior Court of Franklin County. Docket No: 04-2-50599-5. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 01/04/2005. Judge signing: Hon. Robert G Swisher.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Adam Phillip Karp, Attorney at Law, 114 W Magnolia St Ste 425, Bellingham, WA 98225-4354.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Tyler Moore Morris, City of Kennewick City Attys Ofc, PO Box 6108, Kennewick, WA 99336-0108.
John Stephen Ziobro, Kennewick City Attorney, 210 W 6th Ave, Kennewick, WA 99336-5649.
George Fearing, Attorney at Law, 2415 W Falls Ave, Kennewick, WA 99336-3068.
Leland Barrett Kerr, Paine Hamblen Coffin Brooke & Miller LLP, 7025 W Grandridge Blvd # a, Kennewick, WA 99336-7724.
Alicia Marie Berry, Liebler Ivey Connor Berry & St Hilaire, 1141 N Edison Ste C, PO Box 6125, Kennewick, WA 99336-0125.
Ronald Francis St. Hilaire, Liebler Ivey Connor Berry & St Hilaire, 1141 N Edison St Unit C, Kennewick, WA 99336-1434.
Thomas Oliver Lampson, Attorney at Law, 505 Swift Blvd, PO Box 190, Richland, WA 99352-0190.
The cities of Pasco, Kennewick, and Richland entered into an interlocal cooperative agreement creating the Tri-City Animal Control Authority (ACA). The ACA contracted with Tri-City Animal Control to provide animal control services. Glenda Wolverton and several other concerned citizens (collectively `Ms. Wolverton') sued Tri-City Animal Control, and its owners, Bruce and Sandy Young (collectively `TCAC'), alleging that TCAC improperly and inhumanely performed its animal control services contract. The suit also named Pasco, Kennewick, Richland, and the ACA (collectively `the Cities'), alleging that the Cities were responsible for the conduct of TCAC. The Cities and TCAC moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that Ms. Wolverton lacked standing to sue under the interlocal agreement, the contract between ACA and TCAC, the public bidding statutes, and 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. Ms. Wolverton sought leave to amend the complaint to add 10 new claims.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Ms. Wolverton lacked standing as a taxpayer and as a third party beneficiary. The court also denied Ms. Wolverton's motion to amend. Ms. Wolverton appeals. We conclude the court erred by dismissing the complaint because Ms. Wolverton has taxpayer standing to challenge illegal governmental acts. However, we also conclude that the court properly dismissed all of the sec. 1983 claims except for those related to Mary Mahoney and Brandy Leighter. Finally, we conclude the court abused its discretion by denying Ms. Wolverton's motion to amend.
The cities of Kennewick, Pasco, and Richland entered into an interlocal cooperative agreement creating the ACA. On a rotating basis, one of the three cities is designated as the operating jurisdiction charged with administering the ACA Personal Services Agreement (PSA) with an independent contractor chosen through the competitive bidding process.
The operating jurisdiction is also charged with establishing policies for the implementation of an Animal Control Plan (Plan). The Plan provided the basic level of services for impounding and boarding apprehended animals, euthanizing unclaimed animals, and notifying owners of found animals. In 1998, 2001, and 2004, the ACA — through its operating jurisdiction — entered into three consecutive PSAs with TCAC. Each of these agreements contained requirements to ensure that animals impounded by TCAC: (1) received treatment and care in conformity with applicable laws and industry standards; (2) were handled humanely; (3) were euthanized in a manner approved by the ACA; and (4) were restored as required by law if injured or abused. The three PSAs also contained provisions requiring the maintenance of records which must be provided or made available to the ACA. On August 11, 2004, Ms. Wolverton and four other plaintiffs filed this action against the three cities, the ACA, the TCAC, the Youngs, and unknown employees of TCAC. A first amended complaint was filed on August 30. The complaint alleges numerous acts of mistreatment and deficient care by TCAC and the Youngs. For example, Ms. Wolverton alleges that TCAC and the Youngs systematically under euthanized impounded animals by using as little as one-third of the required dose, failed to scan cats for microchips, did not provide proper care and treatment of animals, and, since 2001, illegally euthanized or adopted out approximately 300 animals prior to the expiration of the applicable hold period.
In her complaint, Ms. Wolverton alleges a breach of contract claim against all defendants, and seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and declaratory relief. The complaint also alleges three claims against the ACA and the Cities: (1) abuse of discretion; (2) avoidance of the 2004-2007 PSA; and (3) negligent administration of the PSAs. Finally, the complaint alleges a claim based on the violation of federal rights against TCAC and the Youngs.
On October 15, 2004, Ms. Wolverton filed a motion to amend the complaint to add 10 more claims. The Cities moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the motion to dismiss, and denied the motion for leave to amend the complaint. Ms. Wolverton sought direct review by the Supreme Court, but the matter was transferred to this court.
Ms. Wolverton's complaint was not dismissed on summary judgment. Instead, her complaint was dismissed as the result of a consolidated motion based on CR 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings and CR 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. Berst v. Snohomish County, 114 Wn. App. 245, 251, 57 P.3d 273 (2002). Courts should dismiss under this rule only when it appears beyond doubt that no facts justifying recovery exist. Gorman v. Garlock, Inc., 155 Wn.2d 198, 214, 118 P.3d 311 (2005). The allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true for the purpose of the motion. Berst, 114 Wn. App. at 251. And any hypothetical situation raised by the complaint will defeat a CR 12(b)(6) motion if the hypothetical situation is legally sufficient to support the plaintiff's claim. Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wn.2d 673, 674-75, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978). Additionally, this court may affirm the lower court's ruling on any basis supported by the record. Wendle v. Farrow, 102 Wn.2d 380, 382, 686 P.2d 480 (1984).
(1) Did the court err by concluding that Ms. Wolverton lacked standing to challenge the Cities' illegal acts based solely on her position as a taxpayer?
The trial court concluded that Ms. Wolverton lacked standing to challenge illegal acts of the Cities in letting and managing the contracts. In making this decision, the court relied on Greater Harbor 2000 v. City of Seattle, 132 Wn.2d 267, 937 P.2d 1082 (1997).
In Greater Harbor, the lead opinion, signed by two justices, stated that taxpayer standing required a showing of the violation of a unique right. Greater Harbor, 132 Wn.2d at 281. But none of the other justices concurred on this point. Also, Greater Harbor relied on American Legion Post No. 32 v. City of Walla Walla, 116 Wn.2d 1, 802 P.2d 784 (1991), which held that taxpayers must show that the government violated a unique right or interest in order to challenge a government's lawful, discretionary acts.
Prior to Greater Harbor, the Washington Supreme Court repeatedly recognized that a taxpayer had standing to challenge illegal governmental acts on behalf of all taxpayers without the need to allege a direct, special, or pecuniary interest in the outcome. State ex rel. Boyles v. Whatcom County Superior Court, 103 Wn.2d 610, 614, 694 P.2d 27 (1985); City of Tacoma v. O'Brien, 85 Wn.2d 266, 269, 534 P.2d 114 (1975); Walker v. Munro, 124 Wn.2d 402, 419, 879 P.2d 920 (1994). However, the taxpayers seeking to bring such action must show that the attorney general refused their demand to institute the action or that this request would have been useless. O'Brien, 85 Wn.2d at 269.
Hence, Washington has recognized litigant standing to challenge illegal governmental acts on the basis of status as a taxpayer. Boyles, 103 Wn.2d at 614. `The recognition of taxpayer standing has been given freely in the interest of providing a judicial forum when this state's citizens contest the legality of official acts...
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