Woman's Christian National Library Ass'n v. Fordyce
| Citation | 86 S.W. 417 |
| Parties | WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN NATIONAL LIBRARY ASS'N v. FORDYCE et al. |
| Decision Date | 11 March 1904 |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Garland County; Alexander M. Duffie, Judge.
Action by the Woman's Christian National Library Association against S. W. Fordyce and another. From a judgment for the defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
The complaint charges, in effect: That Mrs. E. B. Hotchkiss and a number of other ladies, being desirous of founding a free public library in the city of Hot Springs, and of making donations of funds as a matter of purely public charity for the purpose of securing, providing, and obtaining a suitable and attractive building where the literature and books of such a library might be permanently lodged, donated the sum of $100 to be used for the purpose of paying for lots 11 and 12 aforesaid to be used for said purpose only. In order to secure the right to enter said property, which then belonged to the United States government, they petitioned Congress to permit a corporation which they had organized as charitable trustee to receive title to said property, to enter same for said free public library; setting forth in their petition that they had organized said corporation, having for its object the establishment of a free public library and reading room; that its objects were purely public and charitable, and contemplated, for the free use of the thousands of sick who are constantly in attendance at the springs, commodious rooms, a large library and newspapers, etc., from every part of the country. Their petition concluded by asking that an act be passed granting to said association said property "to be held by them while it shall be so used." That Congress, upon receiving their petition, appointed a committee, and adopted their report, which is entitled "Lot at Hot Springs, Ark., for Use of Woman's Library Association." That the report shows that Congress understood the object was "to erect a building thereon for so laudable a purpose as that of furnishing a free library and reading room to the thousands of sick, rich and poor, constantly in attendance at the springs from every quarter of the country." The congressional committee in its report also seemed to understand that these ladies expected to donate these lots, as it says: "The grounds proposed to be donated, etc., your committee, believing said association to be sincere in its work of charity, has concluded that the government in its generosity ought to aid it to the extent of donating the grounds for its building." That the act of Congress authorized the association to enter "for the uses and purposes of such association." The complaint then alleges that thereupon the said corporation used the money donated for said charitable purpose expressly to make entry of said land, and received a patent which alludes to said act. The complaint sets forth the articles of incorporation of the association, which includes the petition to the circuit court alleging that the object of the association was "for the purpose of establishing, providing, and keeping in the city of Hot Springs, Garland county, Ark., a library for the free use of the public generally, and soliciting and receiving donations and aid for said purposes." The articles of the association provide: "They [the officers] shall not make any contract or bill with any one that shall operate as a lien or mortgage on the building or library of the association." Articles 10 and 11 of the association provide as follows: That the corporation is and was a mere trustee of the naked legal title to said property for a public charitable use, and has never had any beneficial interest in the same, or any interest which could be taken, sold, or appropriated to satisfy any judgment obtained against said corporation for the torts of its agents. That the defendants have possession of said property without right, claiming to own the same by virtue of a sale under execution for the enforcement of a judgment for damages rendered for an alleged tortious act of said corporation on account of injuries inflicted by one Murray who was excavating said property under contract, and by means of a blast which injured defendant's grantor, who was plaintiff in said suit and purchaser at said execution sale. That the funds donated to purchase the lots are about to be diverted. That plaintiffs are willing to carry out the charitable object. The complaint concludes with prayer for recovery of possession and all further and general relief. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained. Plaintiff has appealed.
R. G. Davies, for appellant. Wood & Henderson and Ratcliffe & Fletcher, for appellees.
HILL, C. J. (after stating the facts).
The reporter will state the facts showing the object and purposes of the corporation, its organization and plan, and the history of the acquisition of the property in question.
The court holds, on the facts presented, that the property in controversy was acquired by the appellant corporation for the purpose of establishing and maintaining thereupon a reading room and library for the benefit of the members of the corporation and "of the multitude of people who visit" the city of Hot Springs "in search of health and pleasure." Under these facts, is such property subject to sale under execution on a judgment rendered against the corporation for a tort? The judgment was recovered for an injury received by reason of a blast while excavating upon the property under a contract calling for such excavation. In section 3049, Sand. & H. Dig., is an enumeration of property subject to execution, which includes all real estate whereof the defendant or any person for his use was seised in law or equity at the time of the rendition of the judgment. Sections 3052-3055 except certain property which would otherwise fall within the prior section from execution. Such property as this is not eo nomine within the exception, and the question arises whether it is within the definition of property subject to execution. That brings into consideration the nature of the title held by the corporation. It is insisted that this is a charitable trust, and, on the other hand, that it is not. "Charitable trusts include all gifts in trust for religious and educational purposes in their ever-varying diversity; all gifts for the relief and comfort of the poor, the sick, and the afflicted; and all gifts for the public convenience, benefit, utility, or ornament, in whatever manner the donors desire them applied." 2 Perry on Trusts, § 687. The statute of 43 Eliz. c. 4 (1601), was the culmination of the law of England on the question of charitable trusts, and it has generally been followed by construction or statute in this country. 1 Beach on Trusts and Trustees, § 320. Therein are enumerated the various objects and purposes of charitable trusts. Libraries are not specifically mentioned, but the maintenance of various educational institutions and scholarships, and like objects of benevolence and public utility, are enumerated; and it has been uniformly held that there are many such trusts not within the strict letter of the statute, but which fall within its spirit, equity, and analogy, and are considered charitable trusts. 2 Perry on Trusts, § 692; Hill on Trustees, p. 453. Public libraries fall within the spirit and analogy of the charitable trusts. 2 Perry on Trusts, § 700, and authorities in note "a"; Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. 306; Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 34 N. E. 467, 21 L. R. A. 454; Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 365, 25 N. E. 92, 7 L. R. A. 765; 1 Beach on Trusts, § 317. The nature of these trusts are thus expressed: "In distinction from an express private trust, which, by the definition, is designed for the benefit of one or more individuals, the trust for charitable purposes is a public trust, and from the nature of the case the beneficiaries are, to a greater or less extent, unknown or indefinite." 1 Beach on Trusts and Trustees, § 322. "These charitable trusts may be administered by a corporation organized for that purpose, and it becomes a mere agency for the handling of the trust property." 1 Beach on Trusts and Trustees, § 334. This corporation belongs to this class, and holds only a naked legal title to the property, the beneficial interest being owned by the public. 2 Freeman on Execution, § 173. In Grissom v. Hill, 17 Ark. 483, it was held, where there was a deed to trustees for a public charity, and that with or without a prohibition in the deed against a sale, if the sale would defeat the object of the charity, that the trustees would have no power to sell, and their sale would pass no title. It was further held that the trustees could not indirectly do what they could not do directly, and that sales made in pursuance of judgments growing out of...
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