Woman's Club of Chevy Chase v. State Tax Com'n

• Decision Date: 12 April 1950
• Docket Number: 108.
• Citation: 72 A.2d 742,195 Md. 16
• Parties: WOMAN'S CLUB OF CHEVY CHASE, Inc. v. STATE TAX COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

72 A.2d 742

195 Md. 16

WOMAN'S CLUB OF CHEVY CHASE, Inc. v. STATE TAX COMMISSION et al.

No. 108.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 12, 1950

Kathryn J. Lawlor, Silver Spring (Lawlor & Roeder, Silver Spring, on the brief), for appellant.

Ward B Coe, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Hodge Smith, Asst. County Atty. Montgomery Co., Rockville (David Macdonald, County Atty. Mont. Co., Rockville, and Hall Hammond, Atty., Gen., on the brief), for appellees.

Before MARBURY, C J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON and MARKELL, JJ.

MARKELL, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order affirming the action of the State Tax Commission, which affirmed the action of the County Commissioners of Montgomery County in entering an assessment on appellant's club house and land (about an acre) for property taxation for the year 1948-1949, and thereby denying appellant's claim that this property was exempt from taxation, under Art. 81, sec. 7(7) and (8), Code 1947 Supp., as the building and the appurtenant ground of a 'charitable or benevolent' or an 'educational or literary' institution (or both), no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual. The appeal from the commission to the court, under Art. 81, sec. 194(a), 'on questions of law only', in effect presented the question of the correctness of the commission's conclusions of law from undisputed facts as to the nature of appellant's activities, e. g., whether appellant is strictly a charitable or benevolent or an educational or literary institution (or both) or to a substantial degree a social club. This question was argued before us by opposing counsel with candor and with unusual interest and ability. Events, have made it unnecessary for us to decide this question. The commission and the lower court in effect held that appellant was not strictly a charitable or benevolent or an educational or literary institution but was to a substantial degree a social club; appellant argued to the contrary. On this question we express no opinion. It is undisputed that no part of appellant's net income inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. In August, 1941 the county commissioners declared appellant's property exempt from taxation; thereafter no question was raised as to its taxable status until the assessment for the year 1948-1949. The lower court in its opinion says of appellant, 'The Club serves a most useful public purpose in our County. It has greatly assisted in the cultural and intellectual advancement of the people it serves.'

By Chapter 134 of the Acts of 1949, Art. 81, sec. 7(7) was amended so as to provide, inter alia, '* * * All nonpolitical women's clubs * * * whose charter shows that the only purposes of such club are of a charitable, benevolent, educational and civic nature to promote the public welfare, and that any benefits or enjoyment or entertainment received from membership in said clubs are incidental to such purposes shall be deemed to be a charitable, benevolent and educational institution for the purposes of this section.' The lower court in its opinion says 'Chapter 134 of the Acts of 1949 is not retroactive, and the court expresses no opinion...