Women Prisoners of DC Dept. of Corr. v. DC

• Decision Date: 14 August 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 93-2052 (JLG).
• Citation: 899 F. Supp. 659
• Parties: WOMEN PRISONERS OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

899 F. Supp. 659

WOMEN PRISONERS OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 93-2052 (JLG).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

August 14, 1995.

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Peter J. Nickles, Caroline M. Brown, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, Brenda V. Smith, Deborah L. Brake, National Women's Law Center, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Richard Love, Maria Amato, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Washington, DC, Grace M. Lopes, Special Officer of the Court, Washington, DC, Seattle, Washington, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

JUNE L. GREEN, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Revised Motion to Stay and/or Modify Judgment. The Court shall deny the Motion to Stay because the Defendants have not met the necessary standards used to justify such action. The Court, however, will modify certain provisions of the remedial Order of December 13, 1994, 877 F.Supp. 634, as amended ("the Order").

II. Background

This matter came before the Court as a class action in which women prisoners at the Lorton Minimum Security Annex ("Annex"), the Correctional Treatment Facility ("CTF") and the Central Detention Facility ("Jail") sued the Defendants and asked the Court to grant them declaratory and injunctive relief in order to correct alleged violations of the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, Title IX and the D.C.Code Ann. § 24-442 (1989).

The Court held a three week trial and found Defendants liable for certain constitutional violations via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) and statutory violations of D.C.Code Ann. § 24-442 (1989). The Court issued a Memorandum Opinion ("Mem.Op.") and an Order which sought to correct the specific constitutional and statutory violations. The Defendants subsequently filed a Motion to Stay and/or Modify the Order and the Court denied it. The Defendants then sought a Stay of the Order in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals ordered that the case be held in abeyance pending additional proceedings on the Defendants' Motion to Stay in this Court. Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections v. District of Columbia, No. 95-7041 (D.C.Cir. April 4, 1995). The Defendants ultimately filed a Revised Motion to Stay and/or Modify Judgment. After a review of the parties' briefs and oral argument, the Court temporarily stayed 30 paragraphs of the Order and ordered the parties to attempt to negotiate an agreement on those paragraphs. Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections v. District of Columbia, No. 93-2052 (JLG) (D.D.C. May 16, 1995). In commendable fashion, the parties were able to reach agreement on 26 paragraphs. The results are embodied in the Joint Status Motion and Motion Proposing Modifications to the Order for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief ("Joint Motion"). The Motion to Stay as it relates to the four remaining provisions and the Motion to Modify which was based on legal and practical arguments are left for resolution.

In the Joint Motion, the parties informed the Court that the Defendants seek a stay of Paragraphs 20, 43, 79 and 96 of the Order. Although the parties agreed to modify Paragraphs 20 and 43, the Defendants requested a stay due to lack of funds to hire additional medical staff. The four paragraphs, as modified, provide the following:

20. The Defendants shall hire within 90 days:

(a) a health educator with appropriate training in obstetrics and gynecology in a half-time position who shall provide clinical and health educational services to the entire female prisoner population; and

(b) an additional nurse practitioner, physician's assistant with special training in obstetrics and gynecology, or nurse midwife to provide clinical services to women prisoners at CTF.

43. The health educator shall implement, within 60 days from the day that the health educator is hired, an obstetrical and gynecological health education program that satisfies a recognized national medical standard. Educational material should also be made available in the CTF library. The Defendants shall maintain adequate documentation on the program so that it can be evaluated by the Court within 60 days after implementation.

79. The Defendants shall provide women prisoners at CTF with at least one apprenticeship program as defined by Department order.¹

96. The Defendants shall immediately provide all women prisoners at CTF, including pregnant prisoners subject to medical approval, with recreation for twenty-five hours per week. Women shall have the option of going outside or to indoor recreation facilities during the time period. This recreation schedule shall be effective at CTF within 15 days of this Order.²

III. Analysis of Motion to Stay

In deciding the Defendants' motion for a stay, the Court must determine whether the Defendants have demonstrated a strong showing that they are likely to prevail on the merits of the appeal and that they will be irreparably injured in the absence of a stay. WMATC v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C.Cir.1977). The Court also must determine whether a stay would substantially harm other parties interested in the proceedings and whether the public interest would be served by a stay. Id. When the other three factors strongly favor granting a stay, a Court may exercise its discretion to grant a stay "if the movant has made a substantial case on the merits." Id. Essentially, the Court may properly stay its own order when it has "ruled on an admittedly difficult legal question and when the equities of the case suggest that the status quo should be maintained." Id. at 844-45.

A. Merits of the Appeal

1. D.C.Code Ann. § 24-442 (1989)

Paragraphs 20 and 43 of the Order rest on the Court's finding of a lack of adequate obstetrical and gynecological care at CTF in violation of D.C.Code Ann. § 24-442 (1989). The statute provides, in pertinent part:

The Department of Corrections ... shall ... be responsible for the safekeeping, care, protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons committed to facilities under its jurisdiction.

D.C.Code Ann. § 24-442 (1989). This statute "implicitly recognizes the common law rule which imposed upon prison authorities, a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in the protection and safe-keeping of prisoners." Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.1988). Nothing in the statute explicitly curtails the equity jurisdiction conferred on the Court by D.C.Code Ann. § 11-921(a) (1995).³ The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has "always construed this grant of jurisdiction broadly ... and has upheld the Superior Court's exercise of equitable jurisdiction in a variety of contexts, even when statutes did not explicitly provide access to the Superior Court." Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 571 (D.C.1992) (citations omitted).

The Defendants argue that the statute merely extends the common law of torts to prisons and does not permit equitable relief to prevent future torts. Implicit in the argument is the view that the common law of torts forbids injunctive relief to prevent future torts. It is well-settled, however, that the common law recognizes that an important form of remedy for a tort is an injunction, granted before any damage occurs. Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21, 22 (D.C.Cir. 1947) ("No one can seriously contend that money is an adequate remedy for all sorts of personal wrongs. Clearly `injunctions and similar flexible remedies of equity are much better suited than a speculative action for damages to protect personal interests....'"); see also Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, Ch. 1, § 1 p. 2 (5th Ed.1984).

In negligence actions where irreparable injury is threatened, a court may act by injunction to prevent harm before it occurs. Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, Ch. 5, § 30 p. 165 n. 8 (5th Ed.1984). The availability of an injunction against a threatened tort depends upon various factors including "the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an injunction and of the other remedies, plaintiff's laches or unclean hands, the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction should be granted and to plaintiff if it should be denied, the interests of third persons and of the public and the practicability of framing and enforcing the order of judgment." Restatement (Second) of Torts, Ch. 48 § 933(1) p. 559 and Comment a. on Subsection (1) p. 560 (1979). The threatened tort must be of sufficient seriousness and imminence to justify coercive relief. Restatement (Second) of Torts, Ch. 48 § 933 comment b. on Subsection (1) p. 561 (1979). A common method of proving a threat of a future tort is by proving a past tort under conditions that render its repetition or continuance probable. Id. It is not necessary, however, to prove a past wrong. Id.

The Defendants' failure to meet the standard for obstetrical and gynecological care is the proximate cause of past injuries and it is reasonably foreseeable that their actions or inactions will lead to future injuries to the Plaintiffs. The Defendants' failure appropriately to educate women prisoners results in their refusal of medical help. Inadequate examinations and follow-up treatment permit cervical and breast cancer, opportunistic infections in AIDS patients, sterility as a result of chlamydia and gonorrhea, peritonitis from gonorrhea, and aortic aneurysms, dementia, psychosis or death from syphilis. Plainly, an award of damages is no remedy for these medical problems. Furthermore, women prisoners do not have the option of finding other doctors. Only equitable relief will provide an adequate remedy.

The Defendants argue that the Court should refrain from using its equitable powers in the absence of any guidance...