Wong v. City of Astoria

• Citation: 11 P. 295,13 Or. 538
• Parties: WONG v. CITY OF ASTORIA.
• Decision Date: 24 June 1886
• Court: Supreme Court of Oregon

11 P. 295

13 Or. 538

WONG v. CITY OF ASTORIA.

Supreme Court of Oregon

June 24, 1886

Appeal from Clatsop county.

C.J. Curtis, for appellant, Jennie Wong.

Geo. Noland, for respondent, City of Astoria.

THAYER, J.

The appellant, a Chinawoman, was arrested by a police officer of the city of Astoria, upon a complaint by which she was accused of keeping, setting up, and assisting to keep willfully and unlawfully, a bawdy-house, in violation of an ordinance of the city. Her attorney filed in her behalf a demurrer to the complaint, upon the grounds that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a crime against the city of Astoria; that the police court thereof had no jurisdiction of the crime charged, or of the person of the defendant; that the ordinance was unconstitutional and void, and was in conflict with the general laws of Oregon. The police court before whom the prosecution was had, overruled the demurrer. Thereupon the appellant demanded a jury trial, but, refusing to deposit the jury fee as provided in the charter of the city, it was denied her, and she was put upon her trial convicted, and sentenced to pay a fine of $50, and costs of prosecution, or, in default thereof, be imprisoned in the city jail for 20 days. Refusing to pay the fine, she was committed to the jail. After an ineffectual attempt to obtain a release from the imprisonment upon habeas corpus, she petitioned the honorable circuit judge of said circuit court for a writ of review, which was duly allowed by him, but, upon the hearing thereof before the said judge, the said judgment of conviction was affirmed, and from which latter judgment this appeal is taken.

The questions presented for the consideration of this court are the overruling of the demurrer by the police court, and the refusal to allow a jury trial. The appellant's counsel urged several points upon the appeal, which I will proceed to notice in their order.

The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant "knowingly" did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's counsel,--that the words "willfully" and "unlawfully" conveyed the same meaning. To "willfully" do an act implies that it was done by design,--done for a set purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was "knowingly" done.

The second point was that the court had no jurisdiction of the crime charged. The city of Astoria, under its charter, has power to pass ordinances to "suppress and prohibit bawdy-houses," and a general power to punish for a violation of its ordinances. In view of this, I am unable to comprehend why it is not authorized to adopt suitable measures to carry this power into execution. The legislative assembly of the state is especially authorized to create by special law corporations for municipal purposes, (section 2 art. 9, Const.;) and the only limitation upon its authority in that respect is that the acts incorporating towns and cities shall restrict their power of taxation, (section 5, art. 9, Const.) The grant of police powers to a city is an absolute necessity. The maintenance of sanitary regulations and good order are the main inducements to incorporate, and if the power conferred for such purposes were a "barren sceptre," the objects of the incorporation would wholly fail. The incorporation of a city clothes the municipality with all the necessary means of self-government concerning local affairs, and a reasonable exercise of the power conferred is not only essential to its maintenance, but is a duty imposed upon the corporators. The power to suppress and prohibit practices that are demoralizing and pernicious would be of little avail if it could not be vindicated. The offense directly affects the welfare of the city, and how could the latter suppress and prohibit it unless it had the right to adopt a by-law against it, and affix a penalty for its violation.

The notion that a municipal corporation has no right to prescribe a penalty for the doing an act that is criminal in its nature, or which is a crime under the general laws of the state, cannot be upheld by authority or principle. An act may be of such a character as to constitute two offenses,--one against the state, and one against the municipal government and when that occurs, the party committing it may be punished under both...