Wong v. Minn. Dep't of Human Servs.
| Decision Date | 26 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 13-3378 (DWF/JSM) |
| Parties | Eric Wong, Plaintiff, v. Minnesota Department of Human Services; Lucinda Jesson, in her capacity as Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Human Services; Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department; and Rex. A. Holzemer, in his capacity as Director of Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Paul R. Hansmeier, Esq., Class Justice PLLC, counsel for Plaintiff.
Uzodima Franklin Aba-Onu, Assistant Attorney General, counsel for Defendants Minnesota Department of Human Services and Lucinda Jesson, Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Human Services.
Toni A. Beitz, Senior Assistant County Attorney, and Daniel D. Kaczor, Assistant County Attorney, counsel for Defendants Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department and Rex A. Holzemer, Director of Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department.
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss brought by the Minnesota Department of Human Services ("DHS") and Lucinda Jesson, Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Human Services ("the Commissioner") (together, "StateDefendants") (Doc. No. 16); and a Motion to Dismiss brought by Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department ("HCHS") and Rex A. Holzemer, Director of HCHS ("Holzemer") (together, "County Defendants") (Doc. No. 22) (collectively "Defendants"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motions.
DHS is a state agency that provides services for people with disabilities, including a financial support program called Minnesota Supplemental Aid ("MSA").1 HCHS is a county agency that administers MSA. (Id. ¶ 11.) Jesson is the Commissioner of Minnesota DHS. (Id. ¶ 10.) Holzemer is the Director of HCHS. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff Eric Wong ("Plaintiff") alleges that he is currently, and has been for the past two years, receiving SSI benefits from the federal government on the basis of his disability—Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, a genetic disorder caused by a "defect in the synthesis of collagen" that results in elasticity of joints, blood vessels, and organs. .)
Plaintiff began receiving general assistance benefits ("GA") from the State in late 2005, and soon thereafter began the process of seeking SSI. (Compl. ¶ 32.) Upon being found eligible for SSI in March 2011, Plaintiff became ineligible to receive GA payments. (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges that he sought MSA benefits for medically necessary diets and housing assistance and that, in March 2011, HCHS initially denied MSA assistance based on a verbal screening process. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that in August 2011, he was again verbally denied MSA benefits after submitting a written application. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff asserts that he sent "multiple written appeals" to HCHS supervisors and that, on August 31, 2012, HCHS reconsidered its position and approved Plaintiff for the special diets benefit, but did not approve the shelter needy benefits. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36.)
Plaintiff alleges that he continued to appeal "the action and inactions of HCHS" and the denial of benefits. (Id. ¶¶ 37-43.) In April 2013, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants notified him of a reduction in benefits because of a reported increase in his federal benefits; this included completely closing his MSA account. (Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff asserts that he appealed this decision in writing. (Id. ¶¶ 41, 43.) Plaintiff alleges that HCHS was unresponsive. (Id.)
On July 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal with DHS because of the alleged unresponsiveness of HCHS and lack of action on his appeal to reinstate MSA benefits. (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff also requested back payments of his special diets benefitsunder MSA and that reasonable accommodations be made in his application for shelter needy benefits so that a required Personal Care Assistance ("PCA") assessment2 could be waived. (Id.)3 Two of these issues—the MSA back payments of special diet benefits and the reinstatement of his MSA case—were resolved before the administrative hearing took place. (Id. ¶ 45.)
In his appeal, Plaintiff alleged that the required PCA assessment would pose a danger to his physical health if given by someone who was not familiar with his rare genetic disorder. (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff instead requested that, as a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), other "documentation of his limitations in major life activities" be accepted in lieu of a PCA assessment for proof of eligibility for shelter needy benefits. (Decision of State Agency on Appeal at 3.)
On August 22, 2013, Human Services Judge Marion F. Rucker (the "HSJ") held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 256.045, subdivision 3,4 addressing the following issue on appeal: "Whether the County agency correctly denied [Plaintiff's] request for the [MSA] housing allowance on the grounds, he does not meet the eligibility criteria." (Id. at 2.) At the hearing, Plaintiff entered several exhibits. (Doc. No. 19 ("Aba-Onu Aff.") ¶ 3, Ex. B.)
In a Decision of State Agency on Appeal dated October 29, 2013, the HSJ found that a PCA assessment was required and that Plaintiff was not eligible for shelter needy benefits without one, despite being otherwise qualified. (Decision of State Agency on Appeal at 2-5.) Specifically, the HSJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
5. It is the agency's position the appellant does not meet the eligibility criteria for a MSA shelter needy allowance because he did not relocate to the community from an institution or treatment center; is not eligible for Personal Care Assistant (PCA) services (he has not had a PCA assessment) and does not receive waiver services. However, he meets all other requirements. He is on a waiting list for subsidized housing, he is under age 65 and his shelter expenses exceed 40 percent of his income.. . .
10. The appellant's eligibility for MSA is not at dispute. What is at dispute is whether he meets the eligibility criteria for a MSA shelter needy allowance. It is the representative's position an exception should be made for the requirement of having a PCA assessment because the appellant's diagnoses of Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome proves his eligibility for PCA services. He further argued the appellant should be allowed reasonable accommodations under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The judge concludes reasonable accommodations can be made, if needed, when conducting a PCA assessment. However, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act does not negate the requirements set forth in law for a MSA shelter needy allowance or PCA assessments.
11. The judge concludes the appellant does not meet the eligibility criteria for a shelter needy allowance based on the law set forth under conclusions of law three. To qualify for the MSA needy shelter allowance, the appellant must receive PCA services. Pursuant to the law, an assessment for PCA services must be completed and the appellant must be determined eligible for services. There is no exception to this requirement. Therefore, the judge concludes the appellant does not qualify for the MSA shelter needy allowance. Accordingly, it is recommended the agency's decision not to approve the appellant for a MSA shelter needy allowance be upheld.
(Id. at 2-5.) On October 30, 2013, the Commissioner adopted the HSJ's recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order (the "DHS Decision"). (Id. at 5.)
On December 9, 2013, Plaintiff filed the present action. (See Compl.) Plaintiff alleges five causes of action: (1) violations of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.; (2) violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794; (3) violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (5) Judicial Review of State Administrative Decision, Minn. Stat.§ 256.045, subd. 7. (Id. ¶¶ 56-82.) Attached to the December 9, 2013 Complaint is a "Notice of Appeal" from the October 30, 2013 DHS Decision that is dated November 27, 2013. (Doc. No. 1-1.) Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims in their entirety. (Doc. Nos. 16, 22.)
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). In doing so, however, a court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged. Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). A court may consider the complaint, matters of public record, orders, materials embraced by the complaint, and exhibits attached to the complaint in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it must contain facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. As the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,"will not pass muster under Twombly....
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