Wood Coal Co. v. State Comp. Comm'r.

Decision Date08 February 1938
Docket Number(No. 8719)
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesWood Coal Company v. State Compensation Commissioner et al.
1. Workmen's Compensation

Accrued compensation under Code, 23-4-6, is awarded compensation, due and payable.

2. Workmen's Compensation

The limitary provisions of Code, 23-5-1, relate to claimants of personal compensation, not claimants of compensation allegedly accrued to another person.

Kenna, Judge, absent.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Code 1931, 23-1-1 et seq., by Mrs. Rex Hull, claimant, for compensation which had allegedly accrued to her hus- band prior to his death, opposed by the Wood Coal Company, employer. From an award of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, the employer appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

George W. Wood, for appellant.

Ira P. Hager, for respondents.

Hatcher, Judge:

November 8, 1930, the Compensation Commissioner fixed the disability of Rex Hull, an injured claimant of compensation, at 25%, payments on which expired December 30, 1930. Hull made timely objection and asked further consideration. February 27, 1931, the commissioner refused to reopen the claim. Thereafter, from time to time, Hull importuned the commissioner, without success, until September 21, 1933, when the claim was reopened as of July 9, 1933, on the basis of a temporary disability to be carried "for a reasonable length of time." Hull died April 3, 1934, without change in his last rating. April 22, 1934, his widow and children (under eleven years of age) represented to the commissioner that Hull had been totally disabled from the date of his injury to his death, and that they were entitled to the compensation which he should have had but did not receive, between December 30, 1930, and July 9, 1933. May 3, 1934, this claim was refused. May 7, 1934, the claimants protested and demanded a hearing. May 18, 1934, a hearing was refused. Nothing more was done until July 5, 1935, when the claim was re-presented. It was refused initially by the commissioner, but on appeal to the Board a hearing was directed, upon which the commissioner awarded Mrs. Hull "accrued compensation for the periods December 17, 1930, through July 8, 1933, and March 1, 1934, through April 2, 1934, upon a finding of fact that the claimant, Rex Hull, was totally disabled for the periods." On appeal to the Board, it held that Mrs. Hull was barred from participation in the amount found due under the claim of Rex Hull "as accrued compensation", but that it be paid to her for the benefit of the children.

This proceeding involves two questions of law, viz: (1) Did the claimants ever have any lawful right to what they demand; and (2) if so, have they lost that right?

1. The statute relating to the first question is Code, 23-4-6, which provides as follows: "Compensation under this section shall be payable only to the injured employee, and the right thereto shall not vest in his or her estate, except that such compensation as may have accrued to the date of his or her death shall be paid to the dependents of such injured employee * * *." It is not our duty either to justify or criticize the provisions of compensation statutes, but merely to construe them. And while in case of doubt, our construction should favor the injured employee or his dependents, liberal construction does not imply strained construction. If the statutory language is plain, it should be given its customary meaning. Cambridge V. Johnson, 160 Md. 248, 153 A. 283. Under the above statute, the right of the injured employee to compensation is plainly restricted to himself, and perishes with him, except as to the compensation which has accrued at the date of his death. Counsel have diligently cited a number of authorities as persuasive on the construction of this exception. But as said in Sea Gull Specialty Co. V. Snyder, 151 Md. 78, 134 A. 133-4: "* * * decisions of other courts of last resort are of little practical value * * * because there are nearly as many different statutes dealing with and covering workmen's compensation as there are states in the Union * * *." Counsel who would support the award have referred us to no decision based on a statute circumscribed in manner like ours. For example, they stress the case of Butts v. Montague, 204 N. C. 389, 168 S. E. 215. That decision is not persuasive, however, because based on a statute which confers upon the dependents of a deceased employee not merely the compensation which has accrued to him, as our statute does, but "the unpaid balance of compensation" which "the...

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15 cases
  • Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1999
    ...The Court defined "accrue" as to " `come into existence'; `to become vested.'" Similarly, in Syllabus Point 1, Wood Coal Co. v. State Compensation Com'r, 119 W.Va. 581, 195 S.E. 528 (1938), the Court held that "[a]ccrued compensation under Code, 23-4-6, [of the workers' compensation statute......
  • Lester v. State Comp. Comm'r.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1941
    ...Compensation "Accrued compensation under Code, 23-4-6, is awarded compensation, due and payable." Wood Coal Company v. State Compensation Com'r, 119 W. Va. 581, 195 S. E. 528. 3. Statutes Sub-section 6-e, Article 4, Chapter 104, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1937, is applicable ......
  • Maryland Cas. Co. v. Tressell
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    • February 8, 1938
    ... ... 1; 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 308, Note; Warwick ... v. State, 5 Ind. 350; Commonwealth v. Pray, 125 ... Pa. 542, 17 A ... ...
  • Ashworth v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • May 24, 1966
    ...123 W.Va. 516, 16 S.E.2d 920; McDaniel v. State Compensation Commissioner, 121 W.Va. 60, 200 S.E. 47; Wood Coal Co. v. State Compensation Commissioner, 119 W.Va. 581, 195 S.E. 528. No inequity in this rule is apparent where the workman's death was itself caused by a subsequent compensable i......
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