Wood's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 01 January 1964
• Docket Number: No. 32,32
• Citation: 374 Mich. 278,132 N.W.2d 35,5 A.L.R.3d 1
• Parties: , 5 A.L.R.3d 1 In the Matter of the ESTATE of Albert F. WOOD, Deceased. May A. FLEMMING and National Bank of Detroit, Proponents and Appellees, v. Countessa Wood HALL, Contestant and Appellant. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 35

132 N.W.2d 35

374 Mich. 278, 5 A.L.R.3d 1

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Albert F. WOOD, Deceased.

May A. FLEMMING and National Bank of Detroit, Proponents and Appellees, v. Countessa Wood HALL, Contestant and Appellant.

No. 32, Jan. Term, 1964.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. 4, 1965.

Harold R. Smith, Detroit, for National Bank of Detroit, proponent and appellee.

Fildew, DeGree, Fleming & Gilbride, Detroit, for May A. Flemming, proponent and appellee.

Moll, Desenberg, Purdy, Glover & Bayer, Detroit, for contestant and appellant.

Before the Entire Bench.

SOURIS, Justice (for reversal and remand).

This is a will contest case in which contestant attacked the validity of her uncle's alleged last will and a codicil thereto. Her uncle, Albert F. Wood, died in 1960 at the age of 91 years. At jury trial in circuit court contestant argued that the will and codicil should be set aside because their execution had been procured through undue influence exercised upon testator by proponent May Flemming. At the close of all proofs the court granted proponents' motion for a directed verdict, reasoning that there was nothing in contestant's proofs which would suffice to sustain a jury finding of undue influence.

On appeal, as at trial, contestant argues, and we agree, that sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to her (In re Hartlerode's Estate, 183 Mich 51, 54, 148 N.W. 774), was produced to establish the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between Miss Flemming and testator and that, such relationship existing, the recipt, by Miss Flemming and interests which she represented, of benefits as a result of the questioned instruments raised a presumption that testator's execution thereof was secured by her undue influence. The jury might not have been willing to accept as preponderantly true the proponents' contrary proofs, in which event the presumption would suffice to sustain a jury verdict for contestant. Under such circumstances, the trial judge should not have been the case from the jury by the directed verdict.

In Van't Hof v. Jemison, 291 Mich. 385, 289 N.W. 186, this Court had occasion to consider the definition of a confidential relationship. Defendants appealed from the chancellor's decree awarding to plaintiff the proceeds of certain bank accounts which had stood jointly in the names of one of the defendants and decedent.

'Another point in issue is whether there was a confidential or fiduciary relationship existing between Mrs. Meyers and Mr. Jemison.

"One founded on trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another. * * * The term is a very broad one, * * * the rule embraces both technical fiduciary relations, and those informal relations which exist whenever one man trusts in and relies upon another.' Black's Law Dictionary [3d Ed.], Fiduciary or Confidential Relation, p. 775.

'The foregoing is but one of many definitions to be found of such a relationship.

'Mr. Jemison was acting in a capacity of trust and confidence in his dealings with and for Mrs. Meyers. She had the utmost faith in him. He was trusted in handling the bank accounts for her, and acted solely as her agent in these transaction. These acts would come within the definition. Such a relationship existing, the burden is upon defendants to show the validity of the gift and that no undue influence was exercised by the donee.' 291 Mich. 385, 393-394, 289 N.W. 186, 189.

3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 956a (5th ed., 1941), is in accord with this broad definition:

'Courts of equity have carefully refrained from defining the particular instances of fiduciary relations in such a manner that other and perhaps new cases might be excluded. It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that the principle extends to every possible case in which a fiduciary relation exists as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one side, and the resulting superiority and influence on the other. The relation and the duties involved in it need not be legal; it may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal. If a relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties--that is to say, where confidence is reposed by one party and a trust accepted by the other, or where confidence has been acquired and abused--that is sufficient as a predicate for relief. The origin of the confidence is immaterial.'

Contestant produced ample evidence that a confidential or fiduciary relationship, as this Court has broadly defined the terms, existed between testator and Miss Flemming, by which we mean only that a jury would have been entitled so to find on the basis of that evidence. Testator lived and worked on an upper floor of the four-story Wood Building, in which Miss Flemming had occupied a ground-floor office for over 30 years. Miss Flemming was on duty at least five days a week, during which correspondence was channeled through her, as were testator's visitors and telephone calls. She paid herself and other employees by checks drawn upon testator's bank accounts and signed by her. On March 25, 1953 testator opened an individual checking account with power of attorney vested in Miss Flemming, and on June 27, 1957 he opened a joint savings account with her. Several safety deposit boxes were rented, access to which was had either by testator or Miss Flemming.

Miss Flemming was a trustee with important powers under certain trusts established by testator, and was an executrix of his challenged will. The chronology of trusts, wills, and other matters, including benefits obtained by Miss Flemming from testator during his lifetime and by will, is set forth in the margin. ¹ Favorably viewing all these evidentiary facts, we conclude that a jury could find a relationship of trust and confidence between testator and Miss Flemming; indeed, as a trustee she was a fiduciary. Once such a relationship is established and the fiduciary or an interest which he represents benefits therefrom, the law recognizes a presumption that he in whom trust was reposed exercised his influence unduly.

In Re Hartlerode's Estate, 183 Mich. 51, 148 N.W. 774, contestant attacked provisions of her mother's will which bequeathed personalty and realty to her step-father for life, and upon his death one-half to contestant and one-half to a church.

'At the trial in the circuit court, at the close of the testimony, the court directed a verdict and judgment for the proponent, and the will was admitted to probate. Contestant has appealed, and the principal contention is that there was a question for the jury upon the subject of undue influence. In stating the case the contestant's evidence is to be considered in its aspect most favorable to her; for, if, in giving contestant's evidence its strongest probative force it was sufficient, unexplained, to support a verdict, then she was entitled to have the case submitted to the jury.' 183 Mich. 51, 53-54, 148 N.W. 774, 775.

The Court considered contestant's proofs and concluded that decedent's relation with the rector of the beneficiary church were such as to raise a presumption of undue influence, and therefore reversed for new trial.

'There are certain cases in which the law indulges in the presumption that undue influence has been used, as where a patient makes a will in favor of his physician, a client in favor of his lawyer, or a sick person in favor of a priest or spiritual adviser, whether for his own personal advantage, or for the advantage of some interest of which he is a representative. This rule has been recognized and applied by us.' 183 Mich. 51, 60, 148 N.W. 774, 777.

It should not be thought, however, that the Court was restricting the presumption to the enumerated situations, for after discussing some cases supporting the presumption the Court noted: 'The case of Ross v. Conway [(1892) 92 Cal. 632, 28 P. 785,] supra, is worthy of examination on this subject.' 183 Mich. 51, 61, 148 N.W. 774, 777. In Ross plaintiff sought to set aside certain deeds of trust made for the benefit of a church and its pastor, alleging that they had been obtained by undue influence. In affirming a lower court finding favoring plaintiff, it was stated:

'The rule is inflexible that no one who holds a confidential relation towards another shall take advantage of that relation in favor of himself, or deal with the other upon terms of his own making; that in every such transaction between persons standing in that relation the law will presume that he who held an influence over the other exercised it unduly to his own advantage; or, in the words of Lord LANG-DALE in Casborne v. Barsham, 2 Beav. 78, the inequality between the transacting parties is so great 'that, without [any] proof of the exercise of power beyond that which may be inferred from the nature of the transaction itself, this court will impute an exercise of undue influence;' that the transaction will not be upheld unless it shall be shown that such other had independent advice,[ ² and that his act was not only the result of his own volition, but that he both understood the act he was doing and comprehended its result and effect. This rule finds its application with preculiar force in a case where the effect of the transaction is to divert an estate from those who, by the ties of nature, would be its natural recipients, to the person through whose influence the diversion is made, whether such diversion be for his own personal advantage, or for the advantage of some interest of which he is the representative. It has been more frequently applied to transactions between attorney and client or guardian and ward than to any other relation between the parties, but the rule itself has its source in principles which underlie and govern all confidential relations, and is to be applied to all transactions arising out of any relation in which the principle is applicable. It is termed by Lord ELDON 'that great rule...