Wood v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company

• Citation: 192 F. Supp. 351
• Decision Date: 10 August 1960
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 489,490.
• Parties: Mrs. Phoebe A. WOOD v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY. James Dawson WOOD v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

192 F. Supp. 351

Mrs. Phoebe A. WOOD v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY.

James Dawson WOOD v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY.

Civ. A. Nos. 489, 490.

United States District Court M. D. Georgia, Valdosta Division.

August 10, 1960.

E. Way Highsmith, Highsmith, Highsmith, Alaimo & Knox, Brunswick, Ga., H. C. Eberhardt, Valdosta, Ga., for plaintiffs.

Alexander, Vann & Lilly, Thomasville, Ga., S. Spencer Bennet, Quitman, Ga., for defendant.

BOOTLE, District Judge.

These cases are now for decision upon motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdicts.

On February 2, 1958, at 1:30 o'clock a. m., the plaintiff Wood was driving his Cadillac automobile north on Ridge Avenue in the City of Tifton, Georgia. His wife, the other plaintiff, was sitting beside him as a guest passenger. Ridge Avenue runs in a general north and south direction, and is intersected by the defendant's tracks which run in a general east and west direction. This is a public crossing maintained by the railroad. As Wood approached the crossing he was traveling pretty well over on the left-hand side of the street, and he says he was probably over there to get off the bumps that were on the right-hand side of the road just before the crossing. Wood drove his car into the 38th railroad car behind 4 diesel engines of the railroad company's 101-car freight train which was moving across the crossing, the freight train consisting of a total of 105 units. Wood had lived in Tift County all of his life and in Tifton for 6 or 7 years or longer prior to the date of the collision, and was familiar with the crossing at which the collision occurred and with the street at the crossing. He testified that it is probable that he could have crossed that crossing 4 or 5 times a week in the year preceding the collision. During the evening of the collision Wood had been drinking beer and whiskey, 2 or 3 cans of beer, the last one around 9 o'clock, and a drink of whiskey between 9:30 and 10. Mrs. Wood, too, had had "about 3" cans of beer. The lights on the car were in good condition, but were on dim. Wood saw the train when he was between 75 and 100 feet from it. He said 70 or 75 feet on direct, but 75 to 100 on depositions and on cross. He was not familiar with the schedule of freight trains moving across the crossing. The train was traveling between 12 and 15 miles per hour. The engineer sounded the horn several times 1,200 or more feet before he got to the crossing. The bell was ringing and the horn being sounded. No cars were approaching when the train crossed the crossing.

The plaintiffs claim that the defendant was negligent in several respects in failing to maintain signal lights or gates at the crossing, in failing to illuminate the crossing and in permitting large quantities of sand to accumulate along the approach to the crossing making it difficult for plaintiff's car to obtain proper braking when Wood applied his brakes. The complaints, as amended, alleged that the tracks leading to the crossing from the west were obscured by a dense growth of high weeds which the defendant had allowed to grow along the right of way and that the tracks to the east of the crossing were completely obscured by a large building situated on the southeast corner of the crossing. And as amended the complaints allege also that at a point north of the crossing Ridge Avenue goes up a hill so that the crossing lies close to the bottom of a valley, that the asphalt pavement is dark in color and blended in with the dark railroad cars, and that it was a dark night.

The complaints survived motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, the court being of the opinion that the evidence should be heard. They survived also motions for directed verdict, the court then being of the opinion that it would be advisable to see what the jury decided, this being an advisable practice as permitted by Rule 50(b), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 28 U.S.C.A.; Savannah Wholesale Company v. Continental Casualty Company, 5 Cir., 1960, 279 F.2d 706.

The following question and answer summarizes Mr. Wood's contentions:

"Q. Mr. Wood, state to the jury just why it was that if your lights were burning well and your brakes were in good order — you had good lights and good brakes — why you couldn't see those cars across the road in time to stop before sliding into them. A. Well, in approaching the crossing, approximately four hundred feet you start on a decline and at approximately — I wouldn't say exact how many feet, but just before you get to the crossing your decline ceases and you go up for just — the car raises up, and my lights being on dim and shining down, it would almost be impossible to see a train unless your lights hit it, due to the dullness and condition of the street, because of the fact that when you —approximately four hundred feet from the crossing if there was a train of flat cars you could almost see completely across over the train to the other side of the street."

Immediately ahead of the 38th car was a refrigerator car, a flat car and a box car. There were 5 or 6 Atlantic Coast Line covered hoppers ahead of car 38 and they had prismo reflective paint on them.

The following question and answer to and by Mr. Wood are significant:

"Q. Well, state whether or not, as you enter Third Street, the last street before you get to the Main Line, which is 475 away and you are 15, nearly 16 feet above the line, would it be possible—would that prismo reflective paint help you any if it is on one of these flat cars? A. It would be impossible, due to the fact that once you hit your— come into Third Street, you go down and it would naturally make your lights shine down and, therefore, you couldn't with dim lights on you couldn't see the paint on them."

The rule in Georgia requires that there be something unusual or extraordinary about the situation at the crossing before an automobile driver will be excused for not seeing, or, conversely, a railroad subjected to the duty of giving a warning of the presence of, a thing so obvious as a train occupying the crossing. It is a part of this rule that "no warning need be given of the presence of a thing plainly visible within the range of the statutory headlight requirements, to a person of prudence." Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Kammerer, 5 Cir., 1956, 239 F.2d 115, 117; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Sapp., 5 Cir., 1957, 248 F.2d 889, 891. Judge Hutcheson expresses this rule this way: "* * * in a case presenting no special circumstances * * *." Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co. v. Church, 5 Cir., 1954, 212 F.2d 688, 691.

The real question in this case, therefore, is whether there are such special circumstances proved so as to prevent application of the rule that "one who drives headlong into a train standing or, a fortiori, moving across a highway cannot complain of negligence because no special warning of the presence of the train was given. This is so because the train itself standing starkly there is a warning." Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co. v. Church, supra; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Sapp, supra; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Kammerer, supra.

If the driver of the car could have seen the train "within the range of the statutory headlight requirements" no recovery can be had. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Kammerer, supra, 239 F.2d at page 117; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Sapp, supra; Georgia Northern Ry. Co. v. Stains, 1953, 88 Ga.App. 6, 10, 75 S.E. 2d 833; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Marshall, 1953, 89 Ga.App. 740, 748, 81 S.E.2d 228, 231. These cases are obviously sound because it is the driver's duty to maintain a vigilant lookout ahead and if he sees, or could have seen, a train ahead of him within the range of his headlights or within the range of his statutory headlight requirements and negligently fails to see it no recovery can be had either by him or his guest passenger because his negligence is the sole proximate cause of the collision. In Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Marshall, supra, the rule is stated:

"In order to establish liability in this case, it was necessary for the plaintiff a guest passenger to prove by competent testimony that the fog and smoke impaired the driver's visibility to such an extent that he did not have clear vision for 500 feet, otherwise the fog or smoke would not have been a material factor."

The cases upon which plaintiffs rely in which recovery has been permitted present such special and unusual circumstances as shadows from the moonlight, abandoned spur track, substantial open space in automobile's lane between standing box car and locomotive, as in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Kammerer, supra; fog, highway 4 feet lower than track, highly constructed railroad car so that automobile lights went beneath it after motorist had stopped "as required by law", and train being left across street for more than 5 minutes in violation of city ordinance, as in Southern Railway Co. v. Lowry, 1938, 59 Ga. App. 109, 200 S.E. 553, 554; cloudy and misty weather with railroad sign down as in Savannah & Atlanta Railway Company v. Newsome, 1954, 90 Ga.App. 390, 83 S.E.2d 80; foggy, misty, dark morning as in Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Heard, 1927, 36 Ga.App. 332, 136 S.E. 533; driver of a heavily loaded truck unable to see or hear a box car "standing silently" across crossing with engine detached and driven to some distant point because truck was negotiating "a curve and a deep descent" as in Mann v. Central of Georgia Railway Company, 1931, 43 Ga.App. 708, 713, 160 S.E. 131, 133; motorist approaching crossing with which he was not familiar and absence of highway sign as required by Ga.Code Ann. § 94-511, down-grade curve, presence of shadows, dark colored box car blending with black pavement, inability to see standing train until within 180 feet of it and inability to stop because the new asphalt pavement was slippery, as in Padgett...