Wood v. Bailey
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-465-WKW-SMD |
| Decision Date | 05 August 2022 |
| Parties | FREDDIE EUGENE WOOD, JR., Plaintiff, v. DARYL BAILEY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se Plaintiff Freddie Eugene Wood, Jr. (“Wood”) brings constitutional and common law claims against Investigator David Tibbs (“Tibbs”)[1] arising from his criminal prosecution. In his Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 63) Tibbs argues that Wood's claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment, Absolute, and Qualified immunity. The undersigned recommends that Tibbs's Motion to Dismiss be granted.
In his Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 59), Wood states that in August 2015 he visited the emergency room at Jackson Hospital in Montgomery, Alabama, complaining of back pain and high blood pressure. 2d. Am. Compl. (Doc. 59) p. 4. After being triaged, Wood spoke with a physician about his back pain and high blood pressure. Id. at 4-5. Wood and the physician disagreed about the proper course of treatment for his conditions. Id. at 5.
In February 2016, Wood filed a complaint with the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners (“ABME”), alleging professional misconduct against the physician. Id. After an investigation, Wood was charged in Alabama's Fifteenth Judicial Circuit with Deceptively Obtaining a Prescription. Id. The criminal case was ultimately dismissed in January 2020. Id. at 6.
After dismissal of the criminal case, Wood filed suit in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, asserting federal and state law claims against various government officials involved in the prosecution in both their official and individual capacities. Defendants removed the case to this Court. Not. of Removal (Doc. 1). Following removal and Wood's two amended complaints (Docs. 6, 59), Tibbs filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 63), which is pending before the Court.
Wood asserts two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Tibbs, in both his official and individual capacities. First, Wood alleges a malicious prosecution claim against Tibbs based on violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 2d Am. Compl. (Doc. 59) p. 6. Wood asserts that the “actions of [] [] Tibbs . . . shock[] the conscience, and . . . [Tibbs] acted with conscious and deliberate indifference to [Wood's] constitutional rights, and with the purpose of depriving [Wood] of such rights, unrelated to any legitimate law enforcement purpose.” Id. at 6-8. Wood claims that Tibbs “committed the afore mentioned [sic] acts and omissions knowingly, willfully, and with malice, and with the intent to harm, injure, vex[,] and harass [Wood], with conscious disregard of [Wood's] known rights[.]” Id. at 8.
Next, Wood asserts a conspiracy to violate civil rights claim. Id. at 9. He alleges that, while acting under color of state law, Tibbs, with Defendants John Joseph Groos, III (“Groos”) and Stan Ingram (“Ingram”), “conspired, agreed, and federated by and between themselves to initiate an investigation and criminal prosecution of [Wood] without justification or probable cause for the offense of Deceptively Obtaining a Prescription.” Id. Wood contends that, upon service of the indictment, he “suffered an unlawful and unreasonable seizure of his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he was arrested[.]” Id. at 10. Wood then repeats his contention that Tibbs, Groos, and Ingram “instituted the criminal prosecution with malice and without probable cause[,]” and further asserts that they “intentionally and/ or recklessly cause[d] [Wood] to suffer extreme emotional distress[.]” Id.
Federal courts must “show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. Of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (italics removed). A document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed,” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). Despite this leniency, a pro se plaintiff must still comply with the threshold requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms. Inc., 146 Fed.Appx. 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005). Importantly, a district court “does not have license to rewrite a deficient pleading,” and- like complaints drafted by attorneys-a pro se complaint must be dismissed if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 Fed.Appx. 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008); Albrata v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 834 (11th Cir. 2007).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief beyond the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 556 U.S. at 555). The Eleventh Circuit explains that “complaints . . . must now contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted). To determine whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, the court should first “eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions” and then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint-assuming their veracity-plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Amer. Dental Assoc. v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “The plausibility standard is met only where the facts alleged enable ‘the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Wood alleges his § 1983 claims against Tibbs in both his official and individual capacities. As to the official capacity claims, Tibbs argues that, because he is considered a state official, and because Wood seeks money damages, he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Mot. (Doc. 63) pp. 6-8. With respect to the individual capacity claims, he asserts that he is entitled to both absolute and qualified immunity. Id. The undersigned finds these arguments persuasive and recommends that Wood's federal claims against Tibbs, in both his official and individual capacities, be dismissed with prejudice. As to Wood's state law claims, the undersigned recommends that the Court (1) dismiss Wood's official capacity state law claims with prejudice and (2) exercise its discretionary authority and dismiss Wood's individual capacity state law claims against Tibbs without prejudice.
The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as barring suits by a citizen against his own state, under federal or state law, unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has abrogated that immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Attwood v. Clemons, 818 Fed.Appx. 863, 867 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1890); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000)).
Official capacity suits are simply another way of pleading an action against the official's employing agency. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). Tibbs is an investigator for the District Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama and is considered a state official for Eleventh Amendment purposes. 2d Am. Compl. (Doc. 59) pp. 4; Mot. (Doc. 63) p. 3. Under Alabama law, all District Attorney's offices are considered agencies of the State of Alabama and their employees are considered state employees for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Garret v. Talladega Cnty. Drug & Violent Crime Task Force, 983 F.Supp.2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ala. 2013); see also Hooks v. Hitt, 539 So.2d 157, 159 (Ala. 1988) (); see also Summit Med. Assoc., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1342 (11th Cir. 1999).
In Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to sovereign immunity, holding that suits alleging a violation of the U.S. Constitution against a state official in his official capacity-for prospective injunctive relief-are not suits against the state, and thus do not violate the Eleventh Amendment. Attwood, 818 Fed.Appx. at 867 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S 123, 155-56 (1908)); see also Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011) (“[W]hen a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, he is not the state for sovereign-immunity purposes.”). “To determine whether Ex Parte Young permits a suit against a state official, we ‘need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleged an ongoing violation of federal law and...
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