Wood v. Booth

Citation990 So.2d 314
Decision Date22 February 2008
Docket Number1060953.
PartiesBenjamin Russell WOOD, Jr. v. Alfred Q. BOOTH et al.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Mark G. Montiel, Montgomery, for appellant.

Troy King, atty. gen., and James W. Davis, asst. atty. gen., for appellees Autauga County Judge of Probate Alfred Q. Booth and Secretary of State Beth Chapman.

Robert D. Segall and Shannon L. Holliday of Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, P.A., Montgomery, for appellees Edgar C. Gentle III, Marvin Wise, Jean Gerber, Cynthia A. Bell, and Joe Turnham, in his individual capacity.

Joe C. Espy III of Melton, Espy & Williams, P.C., Montgomery, for appellees the Alabama Democratic Party and Joe Turnham, in his official capacity.

PER CURIAM.

Benjamin Russell Wood, Jr., appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court dismissing Wood's action against Alfred Q. Booth, in his official capacity as probate judge of Autauga County, and Nancy Worley, in her official capacity as secretary of state of Alabama.1 We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On October 13, 2006, Wood, a registered voter and a resident of Autauga County, sued Judge Booth and the secretary of state in the Autauga Circuit Court. Wood sought the revocation of the certificates of nomination that had been issued after the primary election to four candidates for the state senate—Lowell Barron, Roger Bedford, Zeb Little, and Hank Sanders.2 Barron, Bedford, Little, and Sanders had not been opposed in their respective districts in the June 6, 2006, primary election, and the secretary of state had certified those candidates on August 31, 2006, as the nominees of the Democratic Party for the office of state senator in their respective districts. Wood also sought to have those candidates' names removed from the ballot for the November 7, 2006, general election.

Wood's complaint sought a declaratory judgment, an injunction, a writ of mandamus, and a writ of quo warranto. The complaint alleged that Barron, Bedford, Little, and Sanders had failed to file certain reports required to be filed by the Fair Campaign Practices Act ("the FCPA"), formerly § 17-22A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 (currently codified at § 17-5-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975).3 Specifically, the complaint alleged that, before the June 6, 2006, primary, Barron, Bedford, Little, and Sanders had not filed the reports described in former § 17-22A-8 (currently § 17-5-8) of the FCPA.4

Judge Booth and the secretary of state filed an answer to the complaint on October 25, 2006. Among other things, the answer asserted that Wood's action was an untimely election contest and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear Wood's claims.

On October 30, 2006, the Alabama Democratic Party; its chairman, Joe Turnham, acting in his individual and official capacities; and two voters moved to intervene in the action.5 The intervenors also filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, among other things, that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction and that Wood had failed to join indispensable parties; a motion to transfer the case to the Montgomery Circuit Court; and a cross-claim and third-party complaint that named various probate judges, the secretary of state, and Republican senatorial nominees Jabo Waggoner, Harri Anne Smith, Del Marsh, and Steve French. The intervenors' complaint alleged that Waggoner, Smith, Marsh, and French also had failed to file pre-primary reports under the FCPA. The intervenors requested that, in the event the trial court granted the relief Wood requested, the trial court also grant similar relief to the intervenors against Waggoner, Smith, Marsh, and French.

The Autauga Circuit Court granted the intervenors' motion to intervene and later granted the intervenors' motion to transfer the case to the Montgomery Circuit Court.6 In the Montgomery Circuit Court, the intervenors filed an amended cross-claim and third-party complaint alleging that 26 additional Republican candidates for various offices had violated the FCPA, but the intervenors did not attempt to add those candidates as parties to the action.

On January 9, 2007, the intervenors filed additional materials in support of their pending motion to dismiss. The intervenors asserted that Senators Barron, Bedford, Little, and Sanders had been elected at the November 7, 2006, election, that they had taken the oath of office and had received certificates of election, and that, under Art. IV, § 46 and § 51, Ala. Const. 1901, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the action.

On March 15, 2007, after the parties had filed several additional pleadings, the Montgomery Circuit Court entered an order dismissing the action on the basis that the court did not have jurisdiction. Specifically, the order asserted that the court did not have jurisdiction under Art. IV, § 46 and § 51, Ala. Const.1901. Wood filed a timely notice of appeal, and the intervenors filed a cross-appeal.7

Standard of Review

"`[B]ecause the underlying facts are not disputed and this appeal focuses on the application of the law to those facts, there can be no presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court's ruling.' Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So.2d 1365, 1373 (Ala.1994) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Duckworth, 502 So.2d 709 (Ala.1987)). Appellate review of a ruling on a question of law is de novo. See Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So.2d 869 (Ala.1999); Ex parte Graham, 702 So.2d 1215 (Ala.1997)."

Ex parte Forrester, 914 So.2d 855, 858 (Ala.2005).

Discussion

This appeal presents issues similar to those we addressed in Roper v. Rhodes, 988 So.2d 471 (Ala.2008), in which we considered whether the Crenshaw Circuit Court had jurisdiction in an action filed by William Roper and Cynthia Roper just before the November 7, 2006, general election seeking to have a candidate's name removed from the ballot. William was a candidate in the June 6, 2006, primary election to select the Democratic Party's nominee for the Crenshaw County Board of Education, district 1. William and Ronald A. Rhodes participated in a runoff election on July 18, 2006, that resulted in a tie vote. William lost to Rhodes in a "domino draw" conducted by the Crenshaw County Democratic Party, and on August 14, 2006, Rhodes was certified as the Democratic nominee. 988 So.2d at 472.

On October 30, 2006, the Ropers filed an action in the Crenshaw Circuit Court against the probate judge of Crenshaw County and the secretary of state. Like Wood's requests for the revocation of the certificates of nomination issued to the senatorial candidates and for the removal of their names from the ballot for the general election, the Ropers sought the revocation of the certificate of nomination issued to Rhodes and the removal of his name from the general-election ballot.8 Additionally, the Ropers' action was based on alleged violations of the FCPA by Rhodes before the primary and runoff elections. 988 So.2d at 477.

Similar to Wood's allegations regarding the senatorial candidates in the present case, the Ropers claimed that Rhodes had violated § 17-22A-8 (currently § 17-5-8) of the FCPA, and the Ropers asserted that the circuit court had jurisdiction to enforce § 17-22A-21 (currently § 17-5-18) of the FCPA, which requires, under certain circumstances, the revocation of a certificate of election or nomination issued to a candidate who has not complied with the FCPA.

After discussing the FCPA, various provisions of Title 17, Ala.Code 1975, and cases interpreting both, we held that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the Ropers' claims. 988 So.2d at 477. Our holding was based first on the conclusion that, to the degree it sought to obtain relief based on alleged violations of the FCPA that occurred before the primary and runoff elections, the Ropers were claiming that Rhodes was ineligible to participate in those elections, and, therefore, that the Ropers' action was an attempt to contest those elections. 988 So.2d at 477. We then noted that § 17-15-6 (currently § 17-16-44), Ala.Code 1975,

"prohibits a court from exercising jurisdiction over any proceeding seeking to

"`ascertain[] the legality, conduct or results of any election, except so far as authority to do so shall be specially and specifically enumerated and set down by statute; and any injunction, process or order from any judge, court or officer in the exercise of chancery powers, whereby the results of any election are sought to be inquired into, questioned or affected, or whereby any certificate of election is sought to be inquired into or questioned, save as may be specially and specifically enumerated and set down by statute, shall be null and void.' "(Emphasis added.) See also Etheridge v. State ex rel. Olson, 730 So.2d 1179, 1182 (Ala.1999) (`We note again, as we have done on previous occasions, that a court does not have jurisdiction to interfere in an election result unless a statute authorizes it to do so. The Legislature has made this abundantly clear. See § 17-15-6.' (emphasis added))."

Roper, 988 So.2d at 477-78. We then stated:

"Under Harvey [v. City of Oneonta, 715 So.2d 779 (Ala.1998)], and Davis [v. Reynolds, 592 So.2d 546 (Ala.1991)], to the extent the Ropers alleged that Rhodes violated the FCPA before the primary and runoff elections, the Ropers were contesting those elections on the basis that Rhodes was allegedly ineligible to be a candidate in those elections. A procedure for contesting primary and runoff elections is set forth in §§ 17-16-70 to -89 [currently §§ 17-13-70 to -89], Ala.Code 1975, and § 17-16-71(2) includes the ineligibility of a candidate as a ground for contesting a primary or runoff election. However, the Ropers did not follow the procedure outlined in §§ 17-16-70 to -89, Ala.Code 1975, and the Ropers have not cited another statutory provision that authorized their action to the extent it contested the primary and runoff elections on the basis that Rhodes was allegedly...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Bryan v. Hubbard
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • 10 d5 Outubro d5 2008
    ......, Paul Reynolds (by phone), Harold Sachs, Kevin Speed, George Williams (by phone), and Bill Wood (by phone). .         "The Chairman stated the purpose of the meeting was to hear the ...          Wood v. Booth, 990 So.2d 314, 317-18 (Ala.2008)(quoting Ex parte Forrester, 914 So.2d 855, 858 (Ala.2005)). . ......
  • State ex rel. Allison v. Farris
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • 18 d5 Setembro d5 2015
    ......v. Powell, 748 So.2d 869 (Ala.1999) ; Ex parte Graham, 702 So.2d 1215 (Ala.1997).’ ”Wood v. Booth, 990 So.2d 314, 317–18 (Ala.2008) (quoting Ex parte Forrester, 914 So.2d 855, 858 ......
  • Rice v. Chapman
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • 28 d5 Maio d5 2010
    ......Hubbard, 6 So.3d 491 (Ala.2008); Roper v. Rhodes, 988 So.2d 471 (Ala.2008); and Wood v. Booth, 990 So.2d 314 (Ala.2008).        6 The Court also notes that it is undisputed ......
1 books & journal articles
  • Interpreting the Alabama Constitution
    • United States
    • Alabama State Bar Alabama Lawyer No. 71-4, July 2010
    • Invalid date
    ...due regard being had to the broader objects and scope of the constitution as a charter of popular government.").22. See Wood v. Booth, 990 So. 2d 314, 332 (Ala. 2008) (Smith, J., concurring specially) (noting that "This Court has applied the expressio unius maxim in interpreting provisions ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT