Wood v. Callahan

Decision Date03 September 1997
Docket NumberNo. 1:96CV5-MMP.,1:96CV5-MMP.
PartiesPatsy M. WOOD, Plaintiff, v. John J. CALLAHAN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

N. Albert Bacharach, Gainesville, FL, for Plaintiff.

Roy F. Blondeau, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT

PAUL, Senior District Judge.

This social security case is before the Court upon the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation dated June 10, 1997 (doc. 19). All parties have been furnished with copies of the report and recommendation and have been afforded an opportunity to file objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Having considered the report and all objections timely filed by the parties, the Court has determined that the recommendation should be ADOPTED.

DISCUSSION:

At the time of her application for disability benefits, the Plaintiff was a fifty-four-year-old woman alleging disability due to a host of complications. These complications included asthma, emphysema, fibromyalgia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and arthritis. The Plaintiff testified that the date of the onset of these complications was June 15, 1990 and that the pain they caused prevented her from performing full-time work. Additionally, several of the Plaintiff's treating physicians previously noted that her condition limited her working ability.

On March 30, 1993, the Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance and supplemental security benefits. The administrative law judge (ALJ) entered a partially favorable and partially unfavorable decision on February 24, 1995. In the decision, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff was disabled as of October 23, 1993, the date she turned 55 years of age. The Plaintiff appealed but the Appeals Council denied review, thereby making the ALJ's decision the final agency decision. The Plaintiff then filed the instant action, which was referred to the Magistrate.

The Magistrate Judge, in his report, determined that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is premised upon correct legal principles (doc. 19 at 13). The Plaintiff objected to the report (doc. 20) and to the Magistrate's recommendation that the Plaintiff's action should be dismissed. As support for her objection, the Plaintiff referred the Court to the arguments made in her memorandum of law filed on July 31, 1996 (doc. 17).

According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.603(b), the Plaintiff may not receive benefits for a period greater than twelve months prior to the filing of her application. Although the Plaintiff requests benefits from her alleged onset date of June 15, 1990, the earliest date from which she could have started receiving benefits was March 5, 1992. Therefore, the Plaintiff's present action essentially involves the determination of whether she is entitled to benefits from March 5, 1992 through October 22, 1993.

The Plaintiff contends that the ALJ inappropriately disregarded or undervalued the opinion of her treating physicians. Absent good cause, the opinions of the Plaintiff's treating physicians must be accorded considerable or substantial weight. Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 960-61 (11th Cir.1985). In accordance with Broughton, the ALJ specifically discussed the findings of the Plaintiff's physicians finding that the opinions of disability were not supported by clinical or laboratory findings and, additionally, that the opinions were inconsistent with other evidence in the record. Furthermore, the ALJ noted that the Plaintiff's complications were not accompanied by explanations as to how these complications are equivalent to those listed under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) as required by Bell v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir.1986). Therefore, the ALJ was correct in giving the treating physician's opinions minimal weight.

The Plaintiff also argues that, because of her pain, she could not work full-time during the relevant period. The ALJ, though, stated sufficient reasons to disregard the Plaintiff's testimony regarding pain and her inability to work. The reasons cited by the ALJ included the statement that no finding was made by any physician of any limitation on walking, standing, or sitting. The ALJ also noted that the Plaintiff was involved with daily activities inconsistent with her testimony. Therefore, the ALJ made the proper credibility determination based on substantial evidence in the record.

Although this determination is dispositive of the issue of whether the Plaintiff is unable to work, the Plaintiff incorrectly cites Johnson v. Harris, 612 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980)1 for the proposition that her inability to work full-time makes her incapable of performing "substantial gainful activity." The Johnson court stated that "[i]t has been held that a physical limitation which prevents a claimant from working a full workday, minus a reasonable time for lunch and breaks, constitutes a disability within the meaning of the [Social Security] Act." Id. at 998 (citations omitted). This dicta suggests that anything short of full-time capability to work, including part time work, cannot constitute "substantial gainful activity" and therefore qualifies the applicant for disability benefits. See Burkhalter v. Schweiker, 711 F.2d 841, 844-45 (8th Cir.1983); Lebron v. Secretary of HHS, 593 F.Supp. 34, 37-38 (D.P.R.1984).

Although no Eleventh Circuit case has expressly determined the issue, most other Circuits, such as the Eighth Circuit, and several District Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have recognized that part-time work may constitute "substantial gainful activity." See, e.g., Comstock v. Chater, 91 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir.1996); Leachman v. Sullivan, No. 91-1015-T-M, 1993 WL 291781 (S.D.Ala. Apr.23, 1993); Cross v. Califano 475 F.Supp. 896 (M.D.Fla.1979). Additionally, 20 C.F.R § 404.1572(a) states that "work may be substantial even if it is done on a part-time basis." Therefore, because the relevant language in Johnson consists of only dicta, the weight of authority from other Circuits and the Code of Federal Regulations allow part-time work to be considered as "substantial gainful activity."

Consequently, the record has substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to depart from the Magistrate's recommendation that the Defendant Secretary's decision be AFFIRMED.

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The Magistrate's report and recommendation are adopted and incorporated by reference in this order of the Court.

2. The Secretary's decision partially granting and partially denying benefits is hereby AFFIRMED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DAVIS, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rules 72.1(A), 72.2(D) and 72.3 of the local rules of this court relating to review of administrative determinations under the Social Security Act and related statutes. It is now before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act for review of a final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying claimant Wood's application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act.

Upon review of the record before this court, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the findings of fact and determinations of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence; thus, the decision of the Commissioner should be affirmed.

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The claimant filed applications for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Benefits on March 30, 1993. The ALJ entered a partially favorable and partially unfavorable decision on February 24, 1995, finding that the claimant was disabled as of October 23, 1993, the date she turned 55 years of age, but not before. The Appeals Council denied review on November 6, 1995, thereby making the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. This action followed.

B. THE FINDINGS OF THE ALJ

The ALJ found that the claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act; that she had not engaged in substantial gainful activities since June 15, 1990; that she had severe impairments but that her allegations regarding the severity of her subjective physical complaints were not credible; that she had the residual functional capacity to perform the physical exertion requirements of work except for lifting more than 20 lbs. at a time and frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 lbs.; that she had the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work; that she had a sixth grade education; that she did not have work skills which were transferrable to the skilled or semi-skilled work activities of other work; and that she was not disabled prior to October 23, 1993. On October 23, 1993 she became disabled as a result of her having reached the age of 55 years and therefore having qualified as closely approaching advanced age.

C. THE ISSUE PRESENTED

The claimant argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of the treating physician without giving explicit and adequate reasons, and that the ALJ further erred in disregarding the claimant's subjective complaints of pain, and that claimant was disabled from her onset date as a matter of law. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence and must, therefore, be sustained.

The issue thus presented is whether the ALJ's decision that the claimant, in light of her age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, was not disabled prior to October 23, 1993 is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

D. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court must determine whether the Commissioner's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Mobley v. Apfel, 3:98-CV-1184-J-HTS.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • June 14, 2000
    ...a reasonable basis for justification both in fact and law. See Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 703 (11th Cir.1988); Wood v. Callahan, 977 F.Supp. 1447, 1453 (N.D.Fla.1997). The Court also found the judge failed to discuss the pain standard and articulate substantial reasons for rejecting Plain......
  • Kelley v. Apfel, 98-2763
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • April 22, 1999
    ...v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678-79 (3d Cir.1990); Burkhalter v. Schweiker, 711 F.2d 841, 844-45 (8th Cir.1983); Wood v. Callahan, 977 F.Supp. 1447, 1449-50 (N.D.Fla.1997). ...
  • Kelley v. Apfel
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • August 25, 1999
    ...of full-time work to be found capable of working" at Step Five and citing § 404.1572(a) as support for this assertion); Wood v. Callahan, 977 F.Supp. 1447 (N.D.Fla.1997) (taking the position that § 404.1572(a) applies at Step Five, and disregarding the Johnson v. Harris holding as dicta). C......
10 books & journal articles
  • Issue topics
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Bohr's Social Security Issues Annotated - Volume II
    • May 4, 2015
    ...to the opinion of a treating physician, is not good cause for disregarding the opinion of the treating physician. Wood v. Callahan , 977 F. Supp. 1447, 1453 (N.D. Fla. 1997). The opinions of reviewing, non-examining physicians, when contrary to those of examining physicians, are entitled to......
  • Assessment of disability issues
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Social Security Issues Annotated. Vol. II - 2014 Contents
    • August 3, 2014
    ...regarding his pain, and the ALJ’s failure to state a reasonable basis for the rejection of such testimony. But see Wood v. Callahan , 977 F. Supp. 1447, 1455 (N.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that the ALJ stated sufficient reasons to disregard the claimant’s testimony regarding her pain and her ina......
  • Attorneys' fees
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Social Security Issues Annotated. Vol. II - 2014 Contents
    • August 3, 2014
    ...to state sufficient reasons for discounting them. Id., citing Lamb v. Bowen , 847 F.2d 698, 703 (11 th Cir. 1988); Wood v. Callahan , 977 F. Supp. 1447, 1453 (N.D. Fla. 1997); Foote v. Chater , 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11 th Cir. 1995). § 702.6 EAJA: Special Circumstances Exception A New York......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Bohr's Social Security Issues Annotated - Volume II
    • May 4, 2015
    ...at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 1996), § 1107.4 Woods v. Shalala , 884 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D.N.J. 1995), §§ 803, 1803.1 Wood v. Callahan , 977 F. Supp. 1447, 1453, 1454 (N.D. Fla. 1997), §§ 102.2, 202.9, 205.10, 702.5, 1203.6 Wood v. Chater , 952 F. Supp. 785, 788 (M.D. Fla. 1997), §§ 202.2, 320.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT