Wood v. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering System Co.

• Decision Date: 16 June 1966
• Docket Number: CITRONELLE-MOBILE,1 Div. 332
• Citation: 189 So.2d 346,279 Ala. 662
• Parties: A. E. WOOD v.GATHERING SYSTEM CO., Ltd., et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 346

189 So.2d 346

279 Ala. 662

A. E. WOOD v. CITRONELLE-MOBILE GATHERING SYSTEM CO., Ltd., et al.

1 Div. 332.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 16, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 25, 1966.

Thornton & McGowin, Mobile, for appellant.

Lyons, Pipes & Cook, Mobile for appellees.

MERRILL, Justice.

This is an appeal by respondent Wood from a final decree in an interpleader suit granting relief to complainant, Citronelle-Mobile Gathering System Company, Ltd., et al., after a hearing.

Respondent Wood claims to own .27 of an acre in a 40-acre tract of land under which is a pool of oil. Wood did not lease his oil interest and no pump is located on his property. This 40 acres was a unit operation under Act 352, Acts of Alabama 1957, approved August 23, 1957, listed as Art. 4, Tit. 26, §§ 179(70)--179(78), Recompiled Code 1958. This means that the State Oil and Gas Board may require unit operation of a pool and the owner of the oil interest shall receive his pro rata share of the proceeds from the pool and bear his pro rata share of the expenses of production.

This unit was operated by Gulf Oil Corporation when the well came in; it was later operated by Citmoco Field Operations, Inc., and they were succeeded by the present operator, Unit Manager, Citronelle Unit.

It was the custom and regular procedure of the oil business generally for oil purchasers to require an attorney's title opinion of the owners of mineral interests before releasing the money accrued from sales to the owner. Since Wood owned only .27 acres, his pro rata share amounted to payments varying from $15 to $41 per month. Due to the cost of an abstract and title opinion, he did not furnish same and he received no payments. He sued complainant in trover and recovered a judgment for $620.42 in February, 1964, his pro rata share of the proceeds from the sales of oil up to that time.

Because of the suit, complainant, on June 17, 1964, filed a bill of interpleader against Wood and some forty-odd predecessors in title. The bill alleged that complainant did not know the true owner, it had been sued by Wood and had paid the judgment; and it paid into court the money ($608.45) then due the owner of the .27 acres, and proposed to pay the proper amount due each month thereafter.

Wood demurred to the bill and it was sustained on the ground that it was not shown that there were multiple claims to the money paid into court. The bill was then amended by adding an additional party respondent, 'Unit Manager, Citronelle Unit,' and alleging in the bill that the Unit Manager, Citronelle Unit, was John E. Stein of Citronelle; and that two or more of the respondents claimed some right, title or interest in the minerals or some lien or encumbrance thereon.

The demurrer to the amended bill was overruled and the cause came on to be heard.

The trial court ordered that the amount accrued ($747.51) be paid to Wood; that Wood pay Unit Manager, Citronelle Unit, $73.55, his pro rata share of the costs of production; that complainant continue to pay Wood; that Wood pay his share of the costs of production within thirty days after being billed for same; that Unit Manager, Citronelle Unit, have a lien on Wood's share of the oil and its proceeds to pay the pro rata cost of production; that the costs be taxed against complainant; and that jurisdiction of the cause was retained to enforce the lien if necessary.

Appellant argues first that there were not two claimants to the money and cites our statement in Finn v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 222 Ala. 413, 132 So. 632, that: 'The first essential ground of interpleader is that the same thing, debt, or duty must be claimed by the parties sought to be interpleaded.' (Other cases cited in brief hold similarly). But all the cases cited were decided prior to the effective date of the Equity Rules, January 1, 1940.

We have held and the Legislature has said that the Equity Rules adopted by this court in 1940, and subsequently, supercede any statutes, rules of court or decisions contrary thereto. Tit. 7, § 289, Code 1940; Faust v. Paramore, 272 Ala. 19, 127 So.2d 832. Prior to the adoption of the Equity Rules, our broadest interpleader statute was § 10390, Code 1923. That statute became a part of Equity Rule 36, but the second paragraph of that rule is new and obviated the requirement that in interpleader 'the same thing, debt, or duty must be claimed' to support the action. Loop National Bank of Mobile v. Cox, 261 Ala. 148, 73 So.2d 364; Creel, 'Comment on New Equity Rules,' 1 Alabama Lawyer 22, 29; Tilley, Alabama Equity Pleading & Practice, § 139, pp. 158--159.

The undisputed evidence shows from the testimony of Stein, the Unit Manager, that he was claiming a pro rata share of the money paid into court in this cause as operating costs. We are convinced that there were two claimants to the fund or part of it--the appellant and the Unit Manager.

Appellant argues next that there still was only one claimant because 'a position is not a legal entity which can constitute a claimant-litigant in court.' He contends that 'Unit Manager, Citronelle Unit' is a non-legal entity and is, therefore, not a suable entity. There is authority in this State and elsewhere which supports appellant's contention, but we do not think it is applicable in the instant case. It is true that 'Unit Manager, Citronelle Unit' describes a position rather than a person, but this is not erroneous in all situations. In Carlisle v. Peoples Bank, 122 Ala. 446, 26 So. 115, the note and mortgage were made to 'The Peoples Bank,' and the plaintiff did business in that name as well as his own, W. B. Folmar. The court said, in effect, that if The Peoples Bank and W. B. Folmar were one and the same, that Folmar could sue in the name of The Peoples Bank.

In Milbra v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 182 Ala. 622, 62 So. 176, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 274, this court said: 'Jurisdiction attaches to persons, to things, to facts, not to mere words, and an error in name is nothing where there is certainty to the thing. * * * A person may adopt what name he pleases, and if he deals with...