Wood v. City of Detroit, No. 444.

• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: OSTRANDER
• Citation: 155 N.W. 592,188 Mich. 547
• Parties: WOOD v. CITY OF DETROIT.
• Decision Date: 21 December 1915
• Docket Number: No. 444.

188 Mich. 547
155 N.W. 592

WOOD
v.
CITY OF DETROIT.

No. 444.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 21, 1915.

Certiorari to Industrial Accident Board.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mary Wood to obtain compensation for the death of her husband, opposed by the City of Detroit, the employer. Compensation was awarded, the award affirmed by the Industrial Accident Board, and the employer seeks to review the award on certiorari. Order of the Board affirmed.

Argued before BROOKE, C. J., and KUHN, MOORE, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, STEERE, and PERSON, JJ.

[155 N.W. 593]

Louis H. Wolfe and Chester L. Schwartz, both of Detroit (Maurice E. Fitz-Gerald and Samuel W. Shier, both of Detroit, or counsel), for claimant.

William E. Tarsney, of Detroit (Richard I. Lawson, of Detroit, of counsel), for defendant.

Grant Fellows, Atty. Gen., and L. W. Carr, Asst. Atty. Gen., amici curiae.

OSTRANDER, J.

[1] In March, 1914, an employé of the Public Lighting Commission of the city of Detroit in the course of his employment was killed. The Industrial Accident Board affirmed an award to a member of the family of the deceased made under the provisions of Act No. 10 of the Public Acts of the Extra Session of 1912, overruling the contention of the city that, as applied to municipal corporations, the act is void. The act is entitled:

‘An act to promote the welfare of the people of this state, relating to the liability of employers for injuries or death sustained by their employés, providing compensation for the accidental injury to or death of employés and methods for the payment of the same, establishing an industrial accident board, defining its powers, providing for a review of its awards, making an appropriation to carry out the provisions of this act, and restricting the right to compensation or damages in such cases to such as are provided by this act.’

The propositions of plaintiff in certiorari are that the effect of the act, in operation, is to deprive it of its property without due process of law, the Legislature being without power to compel it to respond in damages to an employé injured without its fault; that by the terms and operation of the law and in respect to its private and proprietary functions and powers its rights and the similar rights of individuals and of private corporations are not equally protected. It is also contended that in the Home Rule Act the Legislature exhausted its powers and may not by the act in question affect municipal affairs as it has assumed to do. On the other hand, the claimant, the defendant in certiorari, presents points which are stated in the brief as follows:

‘(1) That Act No. 10, Public Acts 1912, Extra Session, is constitutional and is within the police power of the state; and that the state has absolute control of municipalities.

‘(2) That the Legislature in passing Act No. 279 in 1909, known as the Home Rule Bill, did not relinquish its control or its further guidance or restrictive powers as to municipalities; that the provision in the Constitution made in 1908 in which it is stated that the Legislature shall provide a general law for the incorporation of cities and villages with reference to the rate of taxation for municipal purposes and restricting their powers to borrow money and contracting debts did not prevent the Legislature from passing a law such as Act No. 10 of the Public Acts of 1912, Extra Session.

‘(3) The appellee contends that municipalities, such as cities, willages, towns, townships, and counties are not discriminated against in Act No. 10 of the Public Acts of 1912, Extra Session; that the Legislature did not exceed its authority in passing a measure which compels an employer (municipality) to pay money to an employé who is injured while within the scope of his employment, whether or not the employer (municipality) is negligent in any degree.’

A Workmen's Compensation Act has been held to be invalid, because compulsory, in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156, and valid, though compulsory, in State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101,37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466. The New York decision was made in March, 1911. In November, 1913, the Constitution of New York was amended (article 1, § 19), and it has since been held (Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600) that the constitutional amendment meets the objections suggested by the court and sustains the present act, which differs essentially from the one considered in the Ives Case. See, also, State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602,39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 694, and Porter v. Hopkins (Ohio) 109 N. E. 629. The broad

[155 N.W. 594]

question discussed in the cases referred to is not before us. The questions here are whether the Legislature may impose the obligation upon a municipal corporation, and, if it may, then whether the act discriminates, unlawfully, between such corporations and others affected by the act.

It is well to inquire what will be the effect of the law in application to actual affairs, and especially in what way, if in any, it affects, differently, municipal corporations and private corporations and individuals.

Excepting employers of domestic and farm labor, the act abolishes certain defenses in actions for personal injuries as to all employers, in all cases except cases where an employé gives notice that he will not be bound by the act. These defenses are available to an individual or a private corporation in a suit brought by an employé who has so given notice. In no case are they available to a municipal corporation, because its employés are in any event, in express terms, bound by the act. The defenses referred to are: (1) That the employé was negligent, unless willfully so; (2) that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant; (3) that the employé had assumed the risks inherent in, incidental to, or arising out of his employment, or arising from failure of the employer to provide and maintain safe premises and suitable appliances.

Probably no one will now deny the power of the Legislature to abolish these defenses. See Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 96 N. E. 308;Ives v. S. B. R. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156; Quackenbush v. Wis. & Minn. R. Co., 62 Wis. 411, 22 N. W. 519;Quackenbush v. Wis. & Minn. R. Co., 71 Wis. 472, 37 N. W. 834; Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed. 297;Kiley v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co., 138 Wis. 215, 119 N. W. 309,120 N. W. 756;Wilmington Star M. Co. v. Fulton, 205 U. S. 60, 27 Sup. Ct. 412, 51 L. Ed. 708;Minnesota I. Co. v. Kline, 199 U. S. 593, 26 Sup. Ct. 159, 50 L. Ed. 322; Hall v. West & S. M. Co., 39 Wash. 447, 81 Pac. 915, 4 Ann. Cas, 587;Johnson v. So. Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1, 25 Sup. Ct. 158, 49 L. Ed. 362; Walker v. C. C. R. Co., 135 N. C. 738, 47 S. E. 675;Mott v. Southern R. Co., 131 N. C. 234, 42 S. E. 601;Cogdell v. Southern R. Co., 129 N. C. 398, 40 S. E. 202;Thomas v. R. & A. A. L. R. Co., 129 N. C. 392, 40 S. E. 201;Carterville C. Co. v. Abbott, 181 Ill. 495, 55 N. E. 131;Odin C. Co. v. Denman, 185 Ill. 413, 57 N. E. 192,76 Am. St. Rep. 45;D. H. Davis C. Co. v. Polland, 27 Ind. App. 697, 60 N. E, 1124;Island C. Co. v. Swaggerty, 159 Ind. 664, 62 N. E. 1103,65 N. E. 1026;U. S. C. Co. v. Cooper (Ind. App.) 82 N. E. 981;Hailey v. T. & P. R. Co., 113 La. 533, 37 South. 131;Kilpatrick v. G. T. R. Co., 74 Vt. 288, 52 Atl. 531,93 Am. St. Rep. 887;Johnson v. Mammoth Vein C. Co., 88 Ark. 243, 114 S. W. 722,123 S. W. 1180,19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 646;Coley v. N. C. R. Co., 129 N. C. 407, 40 S. E. 185, 57 L. R. A. 817; Lore v. American Mfg. Co., 160 Mo. 608, 61 S. W. 678;Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 Sup. Ct. 136, 55 L. Ed. 78,32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463;Ditberner v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co., 47 Wis. 128, 2 N. W. 69;Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Haley, 25 Kan. 35;Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Mackey, 33 Kan. 298, 6 Pac. 291;Bucklew v. C. I. R. Co., 64 Iowa, 603, 21 N. W. 103;McAunich v. M. & M. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338;Vindicator C. G. M. Co. v. Firstbrook, 36 Colo. 498, 86 Pac. 313,10 Ann. Cas. 1108;Deppe v. C., R. I. & P. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 52;Peirce v. Van Dusen, 78 Fed. 693, 24 C. C. A. 280, 69 L. R. A. 705;Campbell v. Cook, 86 Tex. 630, 26 S. W. 486,40 Am. St. Rep. 878;Thompson v. Central R. & B. Co., 54 Ga. 509;Georgia R. Co. v. Ivey, 73 Ga. 499;Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Castle, 172 Fed. 841, 97 C. C. A. 124;Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. 1161, 32 L. Ed. 107.

But abolishing these defenses, except as against an employé who refuses to be bound by the act, is not the sole, nor main, purpose of the act. Obviously, it is an...