Wood v. Davis

• Decision Date: 12 November 1971
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 70--64
• Citation: 276 N.E.2d 756,2 Ill.App.3d 550
• Parties: Jean WOOD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Everette L. DAVIS and Sheila Ruth Davis, Defendants-Appellees. Jean WOOD and Kathleen Wood, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Everette L. DAVIS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 756

276 N.E.2d 756

2 Ill.App.3d 550

Jean WOOD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Everette L. DAVIS and Sheila Ruth Davis, Defendants-Appellees.

Jean WOOD and Kathleen Wood, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Everette L. DAVIS, Defendant-Appellee.

Gen. No. 70--64.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Nov. 12, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 8, 1971.

Ryan & Heller, Mattoon, Harlan Heller and Dale A. Cini, Mattoon, of counsel, for plaintiffs-appellants.

William L. Turner and Baker & Baker, Shelbyville, for defendants-appellees.

GEORGE J. MORAN, Justice.

On November 6, 1965, Jean Wood, plaintiff-appellant, and Everette Davis, defendant-appellee, entered into a verbal agreement to operate a farm of 2640 acres in Mississippi on a fifty-fifty basis, each party to furnish half of the work and receive half of the profits. As a result of disagreements, the parties entered into a written agreement to terminate the partnership as of January 1, 1967.

On September 3, 1966 both parties signed a comprehensive written statement of account purporting to show the contributions of each to the partnership from its inception until September 3, 1966. This statement disclosed that Davis owed Wood the sum of $16,597.64 up to that date. At that time Davis executed a promissory note payable to the order of Jean and Kathleen Wood in the amount of $16,000, with interest at the rate of 8% And wrote 'not for resale' on it. Wood later brought the note back to Davis because he objected to the additional language on the note by Davis. Davis then executed a new note dated September 3, 1966 in favor of Jean Wood and his wife in the amount of $16,000 with interest at 8%. On September 10, 1966 Davis gave Wood a check in the amount of $400 to be applied on the balance. There were numerous other transactions by the parties subsequent to this date which are too numerous to mention but which are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has expended a substantial amount more than the defendant.

The plaintiff initially brought suit on two negotiable notes upon which judgments were entered by the court. One of the notes was the one mentioned for $16,000 which was to include all transactions in the partnership up to that date. The other note was for $7250 and was dated January 6, 1967, and resulted from a mortgage payment made by the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant. After judgments by confession were entered, they were opened on motion of the defendants and the plaintiffs then filed their first amended complaint for an accounting between the parties. The trial court found for the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the amount of $10,234. Plaintiffs filed a post trial motion for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in arriving at its judgment, and further asked for judgment in the amount of $29,185.48. Both motions were denied and the plaintiffs have appealed.

Included in the September 3, 1966 accounting was a certain amount for bulldozing of the farm done by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims that this work was worth $31,000 and is reflected in the 1966 accounting. The appellee contends the work was worth only $16,000 and, over the appellant's objection, was allowed to introduce evidence of transactions prior to the September 3, 1966 accounting. The appellant claims that it was error to inquire into transactions prior to the accounting, and that as a result, the trial court did not give effect to the accounting. If the accounting was considered by the court, and the note for $7250 was also considered, the total would be in excess of $23,000 and hence totally irreconcilable with the court's judgment of $10,324. This is necessarily so because subsequent transactions would be unable to make up the $13,000 difference. Because the trial court failed to set forth its findings of fact, it is impossible to determine what the trial court did or did not include in this judgment.

The appellants first argue that the trial court should set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law in arriving at its judgment. While this is no longer required, see Chapter 110, Ill.Rev.Stat., Sec 64(3), it has been...