Wood v. Dretke, SA-01-CA-423-OG.

• Decision Date: 24 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. SA-01-CA-423-OG.,SA-01-CA-423-OG.
• Citation: 386 F.Supp.2d 820
• Parties: Jeffery Lee WOOD, TDCJ No. 999256, Petitioner, v. Douglas DRETKE, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal Institutions Division, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

Page 820

386 F.Supp.2d 820

Jeffery Lee WOOD, TDCJ No. 999256, Petitioner, v. Douglas DRETKE, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal Institutions Division, Respondent.

No. SA-01-CA-423-OG.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division.

August 24, 2005.

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J. Scott Sullivan, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner.

Tomee M. Crocker, Office of the Attorney General, Capital Litigation Division, Austin, TX, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING RELIEF

ORLANDO L. GARCIA, District Judge.

Petitioner Jeffery Lee Wood filed this federal habeas corpus action pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 challenging his March, 1998, Bandera County conviction for capital murder and sentence of death.¹ For the reasons set forth at length hereinafter, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief from this Court but is entitled to a Certificate of Appealability on some of his claims herein.

I. Statement of the Case

A. Factual Background

There is no genuine dispute as to the operative facts regarding petitioner's offense. Shortly after 6:00 a.m. on January 2, 1996, while petitioner remained outside in a vehicle that petitioner had borrowed from his brother, Danny Reneau entered a Texaco station located near IH-10 in Kerrvile, Texas and fatally shot store clerk Kriss Keeran with a .22 caliber pistol.² Reneau and petitioner then removed the store's safe, cash box, and the videotape recorder connected to the store's security camera.³ They proceeded directly to the home of petitioner's parents in Devine, Texas, disposing of the murder weapon along the way.⁴ Upon their arrival at the Wood residence, Reneau and petitioner unsuccessfully attempted to open the safe before they settled for withdrawing a portion of the money inside the safe through a slot in the bottom.⁵ When their efforts to sledge-hammer open the safe woke petitioner's younger brother, Jonathan, they played the videotape showing Reneau's fatal shooting of Keeran for Jonathan before directing him to destroy the tape with a blow torch.⁶

Petitioner and Reneau were both arrested late on the evening of January 2, 1996. Petitioner gave police two statements concerning his involvement in Keeran's murder. In his first statement, which petitioner gave during the early morning hours of January 3, 1996, petitioner attempted to downplay his advance knowledge of Reneau's plan to rob the store and insisted that Keeran was his good friend.⁷ Approximately twelve hours later, however, petitioner gave a second statement to law enforcement officers, in which he admitted that (1) he knew Reneau was going to rob the store, (2) he and Reneau returned to their residence at one point in the hours before the robbery to trade one gun for another that Reneau felt would not be as loud when it fired, and (3) he anticipated that Reneau would shoot Keeran if Keeran refused to cooperate with the robbery.⁸

B. The Indictment

On January 22, 1996, petitioner was indicted on a charge of capital murder, to wit, intentionally causing the death of Keeran by shooting Keeran with a firearm in the course of committing and attempting to commit robbery.⁹

C. Petitioner's Competency Hearings

Petitioner's competence to stand trial was fully litigated prior to the start of his capital trial. At the conclusion of petitioner's first competency hearing, held May 6-7, 1997, the jury (1) found by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner was not then competent to stand trial but (2) also found there was a substantial probability petitioner would attain competency in the foreseeable future.¹⁰ Thereafter, petitioner was committed to a state psychiatric facility.¹¹ On July 3, 1997, the state trial court received a formal report stating that petitioner was deemed competent to stand trial by the staff at the state psychiatric facility.¹²

A second competency hearing was held on October 8-9, 1997, at the conclusion of which a different jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was competent to stand trial.¹³

D. Guilt-Innocence Phase of Trial

The guilt-innocence phase of petitioner's capital murder trial began on February 23, 1998. In addition to the evidence and testimony outlined above, the jury watched a videotape of the crime scene taken minutes after the discovery of Keeran's body.¹⁴ The jury also heard testimony from another employee of the gas station that, in the weeks prior to Keeran's fatal shooting, the petitioner and Reneau had often discussed with him the possibility of robbing the store with his cooperation but that he had always considered such discussions to be a joke.¹⁵

After the State rested, petitioner's trial counsel called petitioner's girlfriend, who testified that (1) Reneau and her sister were living with her and petitioner at the time of the murder, (2) she was aware that petitioner and Reneau planned to rob the gas station, (3) Reneau insisted that he carry a gun during the robbery, (4) the plan was for Reneau and petitioner to rob the store before the banks opened on January 2 because they had learned from store employees that a large sum of cash would be in the safe at that time, (5) Reneau and petitioner went to the store the afternoon before the robbery to talk with Keeran and learned that Keeran would not cooperate with their planned robbery, and (6) when Reneau and petitioner left their home at approximately 5:30 a.m. on January 2, 1996, she believed they were headed to Devine.¹⁶

On the morning of February 25, 1998, after deliberating less than ninety minutes, the jury returned its verdict, finding petitioner guilty of capital murder.¹⁷

E. Petitioner's Requests to Discharge Counsel and Proceed Pro Se

Immediately after the trial judge excused the jury for the remainder of the day, the petitioner requested to address the court. At that point, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Let me — before you address the Court, if you say something, you know, I suppose it's possible that it could be used against you. I would advise you, you know, to not say anything until you have first talked to counsel first and they know what you're going to say and they have told you they think it's in your best interest to say it. Did you talk to your counsel about what you're going to say?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And after consulting them, you still want to make a statement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right, go ahead, Mr. Wood.

THE DEFENDANT: I want to fire both of my lawyers right now.

THE COURT: You want to represent yourself in punishment phase of the trial?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Can you tell me why you want to do that?

THE DEFENDANT: They have done their job. I just — I ain't going forty years for something I didn't do.

THE COURT: I know that you understand this, but I need to say it on the record, that the big issue is the death penalty.

THE DEFENDANT: That's true.

THE COURT: And the State is going to call an expert witness and based on your background and your experience, I don't think that you have the capability of examining — cross-examining an expert witness.

THE DEFENDANT: I ain't going to cross-examine nobody. I'm just going to let them do what they want. They can call anybody they want. I'm not going to ask them any questions. THE COURT: Why is it that you do not want your attorneys to be with you when you take this position?

THE DEFENDANT: I just — like I said, I've got my mind set and it's set. I don't want them to sit there and represent me and not sit there and not say nothing on my behalf, because, I mean, I don't think they would do it, anyway.

THE COURT: Mr. Wood, you control your defense. You know, attorneys ultimately are going to have to follow your lead as to what you want to do. They can't overrule you. Have you talked to your attorneys about doing what you want to do?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And have they said they can't do that? Well, I don't want to put you in the position of saying that. I'm going to be a lot more comfortable if you have them with you doing what you want to do as opposed to you being by yourself doing what you want to do.

THE DEFENDANT: I would prefer not to. I don't want to put them on the burden where they feel like thirteen years down the road or twelve years down the road if they ever try to hang me, to put then on the burden where they didn't try something for me.

THE COURT: I'm going to deny your request to represent yourself in the second phase. The issue, especially the death penalty issue, is so intense from both an emotional standpoint and a legal standpoint, that I don't feel comfortable with you understanding all the concepts of what's going on and not having legal counsel that you can rely on.

THE DEFENDANT: I do.

THE COURT: But I'm going — I'm going to tell you that once again that you need to direct your attorneys on how you want them to prepare your defense or how you want them to react to evidence and then rely on their expertise in doing what you want to do, but I'm going to deny your request to fire your attorneys.

Is there anything else, Mr. Monroe?

MR. MONROE: Well, yes, Your Honor, there is. I certainly understand the Court's ruling. Now, Mr. Whitlow and I are in a very untenable position due to instructions that the Court has made and instructions that Mr. Wood has given us in other areas, because they're conflicting and we are in a very awkward spot. I really don't even know how to address it. Can I confer with Mr. Whitlow for just a second?

THE COURT: Yes.

(At which time defense counsel conferred off the record.)

MR. MONROE: Mr. Wood advised us he does not wish to cross-examine any of the State's witnesses, not does he wish to call any witnesses on his behalf in punishment. He has instructed us to discharge Dr. Coons and make no attempt to prepare for cross-examination of...