Wood v. Hicks

• Decision Date: 31 October 1865
• Parties: F. M. WOOD, Plaintiff in Error v. S. L. HICKS, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

36 Mo. 326

F. M. WOOD, Plaintiff in Error

v.S. L. HICKS, Defendant in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1865.

Error to Jefferson Circuit Court.

John L. Thomas, for plaintiff in error.

I. The court below should have omitted the declarations of A. H. Downing, because they were against his interest at the time they were made. (16 Mo. 250.) The case in (32 Mo. 464), is not in point.

J. A. Beal, for defendant in error.

I. The court properly ruled out the declarations of Downing because he was a competent witness, and no foundation had been laid to impeach his evidence by first asking him if he made a particular statement to Power, on a specified time and at a particular place. “Declarations of a maker of a deed attacked for fraud, are not evidence in favor of those who claim under the deed.” (32 Mo. 464.)

II. Courts of equity have uniformly set aside deeds and judgments obtained by fraud, or where deeds and judgments have been had and obtained in bad faith, although for a valuable consideration. (Fonb. Eq. 642, n. & 470; 1 Sto. Eq. §§ 333, 353-54, 369.) This doctrine was laid down in Twyne's case (3 Co. 81), and it has ever since been steadily adhered to. Cases have been repeatedly decided in which persons have given full and fair prices for goods, and where possession has been actually delivered; yet being done for the purpose of defeating creditors, the transaction has been held fraudulent. So where a man, knowing of a judgment and execution, and with a view of defeating it, should purchase the debtor's goods, it would be void, because the purchase is iniquitous. (1 Sto. Eq. § 369; Johnson v. Sullivan, 23 Mo. 482; 12 Pick. 388, 392; 7 Johns. 182; 3 Dessauss. 323; 3 Phil. Ev. 854-5.) A creditor may combine with his debtors fraudulently to defraud his other creditors, and the conveyance is void, although the purchase is for a valuable consideration. (Johnson v. Sullivan, 23 Mo. 482; 35 Pa. 432; 12 Ind. 259; 3 Clark, Iowa, 543; 19 Texas, 257; 22 Texas, --; 29 Pa. 357; Fairfield v. Baldwin, 12 Pick. 388; R. C. 1855, p. 802, § 2.)

III. A confession of a judgment in favor of a bona fide creditor, given with the knowledge that another creditor is about to attach the property, is void as to the creditor. (Ryan v. Daly, 6 Cal. 238.) I maintain that the well settled principles of equity, from the case of Twine to the present time, all uniformly lay down the doctrine, that a conveyance or judgment in favor of a person for a valuable and adequate consideration, if done in bad faith or in fraud of other creditors, is null and void because of the intent. (Johnson v. Sullivan, 23 Mo. 482; Knox v. Hunt et al., 18 Mo. 180-81; 15 Mo. 378; 1 Bur. 474; 7 B. Mon. 369; 4 Ver. 412; 18 Mo. 180.)

LOVELACE, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a petition to set aside a decree rendered in the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of the defendant Hicks and against one Downing, decreeing title to certain real estate in said Hicks. The petition set out that at the June term of the Jefferson Circuit Court, 1860, the plaintiff obtained judgment against said Downing for the sum of $138 and 74 cts., upon which judgment and execution issued, and certain real estate which is described in the petition was levied on as the property of said Downing and sold to the plaintiff; that previous to the sale of the land to the plaintiff, as aforesaid, the defendant Hicks had commenced proceedings in the Jefferson Circuit Court against said Downing for the purpose of obtaining title to the land in question, claiming that said Downing had, by a verbal contract, agreed to sell the land to said Hicks, and that in pursuance of said contract said Hicks had taken possession of said land and made valuable improvements thereon, and paid the purchase money therefor. The petition charges that all the above allegations made in the petition of Hicks against Downing were false, and that the said Downing had filed an answer to said petition denying each and every one of said allegations; that, after the sale of said land under the plaintiff's execution, Hicks and Downing combined and confederated together for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff out of the land, and to accomplish this it was agreed that Hicks should pay to Downing a certain sum of money claimed to be due upon the verbal sale, and that Downing should withdraw his answer filed in said cause and permit a decree to be entered against him for the land, and that in accordance with said agreement Downing did withdraw his answer and permit a decree to be entered against him without any evidence being offered to sustain the allegation in Hick's petition. The petition also charges that Hicks had knowledge of the plaintiff's judgment and execution at the time said decree was rendered.

The answer admits the plaintiff's judgment and execution against Downing, and the sale of the land under the same, and the purchase by plaintiff; but denies all combination or fraud between the defendant and Downing for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff, and insists upon the truth of all the allegations made by him in his petition against Downing.

Upon the trial, the court found the facts set forth in the petition to be true, and made a decree in favor of the plaintiff, setting aside the decree formerly rendered in favor of Hicks against Downing, and vesting the tite to said land in the plaintiff, and ordering the plaintiff to pay to Hicks the sum of one hundred and eighty dollars. To...