Wood v. Idaho Transp. Dep't

Docket Number49298
Decision Date09 June 2023
PartiesTODD A. WOOD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Blaine County. Ned C. Williamson, District Judge.

The decision of the district court is affirmed.

Brian E. Elkins, P.C., Ketchum, for Appellant.

Brian E. Elkins argued.

Raul R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent.

Timothy J. Stover argued.

BRODY JUSTICE

This appeal concerns the administrative suspension of Todd Wood's driving privileges, the rules for breath alcohol concentration (BAC) testing promulgated by the Idaho State Police (ISP) under IDAPA 11.03.01, and whether the provisions of Idaho Code section 18-8004(4) providing for the automatic admission of BAC results in administrative license suspension (ALS) hearings violate the separation of powers doctrine.

After a lawful traffic stop, Wood submitted to BAC testing. His results were 0.178 and 0.175, both in excess of Idaho's legal limit of 0.08. However, during the fifteen-minute pretest observation period, the deputy sheriff admittedly did not observe Wood for roughly three minutes to ensure mouth alcohol was not present by way of burp, external contaminant, or otherwise prior to evidentiary testing. Wood challenged his suspension and argued that his BAC results were inadmissible because they had not been obtained in compliance with the required fifteen-minute pretest observation procedure. The ALS hearing officer disagreed, reasoning that ISP had promulgated rules making the pretest observation period only discretionary; thus Wood's BAC test results were not based on unlawful procedure. Wood petitioned for judicial review and argued the BAC rules allowing for a discretionary observation period are violative of "due process" and "fundamental fairness." Wood further argued that the automatic admission of BAC results in his ALS hearing, pursuant to section 18-8004(4), unconstitutionally usurps the judicial branch's power over the admission of evidence. The district court rejected Wood's arguments and upheld his administrative license suspension. Wood appealed to this Court on the same grounds. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 2020, a deputy sheriff conducted a lawful traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Wood. When the deputy contacted Wood, he observed that Wood exhibited signs of impairment, such as an "odor of alcoholic beverage, slurred speech and bloodshot eyes." Wood admitted to having consumed alcohol that day. The deputy administered field sobriety testing, with Wood performing poorly on three tests. The deputy then placed Wood in the back of his patrol vehicle and initiated BAC pretest procedures for the Lifeloc FC20 machine. The deputy checked Wood's mouth for substances that could interfere with the BAC test, and then told Wood, "Don't burp or belch for the next 15 minutes." During the "15-minute monitoring period," the deputy left to speak with passengers in Wood's vehicle, which was parked roughly thirty to forty feet from the patrol vehicle. While doing so, the deputy did not observe Wood for "approximately three minutes." After the fifteen-minute pretest period ended, Wood provided evidentiary BAC samples of 0.178 and 0.175, both in excess of Idaho's legal limit of 0.08.

Wood was cited for driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") in violation of Idaho Code section 18-8004 and was given a notice that his driving privileges would be suspended for 90 days for failing evidentiary BAC testing. The notice informed him that he had seven days to request a hearing and appeal the suspension of his driving privileges. Wood timely requested a hearing and roughly one month later, in October 2020, Wood's administrative license suspension hearing ("ALS Hearing") was held before hearing officer Robert Vogt ("ALS Hearing Officer").

At the hearing, Wood argued that a fifteen-minute pretest observation period was mandatory, and that rules promulgated by ISP (through its Forensic Services department ("ISPFS")) unlawfully made that period discretionary by redefining the definitions of "deprivation period," "observation period," and "monitoring period"-with interspersed "should" instead of "shall" language. Wood pointed out that prior case law in Idaho, manuals for the BAC testing devices, and ISP's standard operating procedures (SOPs) prior to 2010 had used all three terms interchangeably-and uniformly treated the fifteen-minute observation period as mandatory. From this, Wood maintained that his license suspension must be vacated under Idaho Code section 18-8002A(7)(d) because his BAC testing did not satisfy the requirement in Idaho Code section 18-8004(4) that the test be conducted in conformity with the standards for administering BAC testing approved by the ISP.

After the hearing, the ALS Hearing Officer issued a written decision and upheld Wood's automatic license suspension. The ALS Hearing Officer concluded that, based on the separate definitions of "Deprivation Period," "Monitoring Period," and "Observation Period" in Idaho Administrative Code ("IDAPA") 11.03.01.010.12, 010.17, and 010.18, respectively, a fifteenminute period of actually observing Wood was discretionary and only required when "a single adequate sample is obtained." In Wood's case, two valid breath samples were obtained and correlated within 0.02 g/210L. See IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03.g-h. Thus, the ALS Hearing Officer concluded an observation period in Wood's case was discretionary, where failure to observe Wood for the full fifteen minutes was not fatal to the evidentiary testing process. From this, the ALS Hearing Officer determined that, "by a preponderance of the evidence the evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Code [section] 18-8004, the IDAPA rule, and Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedure. Therefore, Wood's argument fails."

Wood moved for the ALS Hearing Officer to reconsider. On reconsideration, Wood argued that ISP's actions in changing the pretest observation period from mandatory to discretionary through SOPs since 2010, and through IDAPA 11.03.01 since 2014-15, violates "fundamental fairness and due process" such that the adopted rules are "void for failure to be properly promulgated through the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act." Wood further argued that Idaho Code section 18-8004(4)-to the extent that it allows for the automatic admission of BAC test results in ALS hearings-violates the "separation of powers between the legislative, judicial and executive branches of government."

Less than one month later, the ALS Hearing Officer denied Wood's motion for reconsideration. The ALS Hearing Officer reiterated its prior rule-based reasoning for why the deputy was not required to observe Wood for a complete fifteen minutes before the BAC results were admissible in Wood's ALS proceeding. However, the ALS Hearing Officer declined to address Wood's promulgation argument because "[t]he determination of whether rules were properly promulgated is outside the authority of the hearing officer, is beyond the scope of the ALS hearing, and is also not one of the five (5) grounds enumerated by statute upon which a hearing officer may vacate the ALS suspension per Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7)."

Roughly one month later, in December 2020, Wood timely petitioned the district court for judicial review of the ALS Hearing Officer's decision sustaining Wood's 90-day license suspension. In his opening brief, filed two months later in February 2021, Wood raised the same arguments with some refinement. Wood essentially maintained that the BAC testing rules promulgated by ISP that made the observation period discretionary violated "due process" and were "arbitrary and capricious" because they were made without regard to a report from a hearing officer during the rulemaking process who recommended to ISP, after a public hearing, that the pretest observation period be mandatory:

Mr. Wood respectfully submits that what has happened to the SOP and IDAPA 11.03.01 since 2010 constitutes a violation of due process and fundamental fairness with how breath tests are administered in Idaho. This is especially true when the SOPs went through the IDAPA approval process, had a public hearing, a hearing officer was appointed to preside over the matter-Michael Kane-who made specific recommendations that there "shall" be a 15 minute "observation period" before the administration of a breath test on a DUI suspect. And then ISPFS ignores it.

(Emphasis added.)

However, throughout his opening brief, Wood also interspersed language familiar to a procedural due process argument (e.g., "fundamental fairness"). From this, the Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") initially responded to Wood as raising a procedural due process challenge. However, in reply, Wood clarified that he "did not raise a procedural due process issue." Wood also emphasized that he was not challenging the BAC testing rules promulgated by ISP as having "no scientific basis." Instead, Wood was challenging the "method and manner" by which the BAC testing rules under IDAPA 11.03.01 were "promulgated" as violative of "due process":

To reiterate, ITD is missing the issue being presented by Mr. Wood. Mr. Wood's argument is not the "current test has no scientific basis." It is his position that the method and manner by which the IDAPA 11.03.01 and SOPs were promulgated violate due process. That is the first and primary level of his arguments. The secondary effect of those changes is that they were done without any regard to scientific principles and protocols.

(Emphasis added.)

In his reply, Wood reiterated many facts from...

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