Wood v. J. P. Stevens & Co.

• Decision Date: 30 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 62,62
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Eula WOOD v. J. P. STEVENS & COMPANY, Employer and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Carrier, Defendants.

Page 692

256 S.E.2d 692

297 N.C. 636

Eula WOOD v. J. P. STEVENS & COMPANY, Employer and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Carrier, Defendants.

No. 62.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

July 30, 1979.

Davis & Hassell by Charles R. Hassell, Jr., Raleigh, for plaintiff-appellant.

Teague, Johnson, Patterson, Dilthey & Clay by Dan M. Hartzog, and George W. Dennis, III, Raleigh, for defendants-appellees.

SHARP, Chief Justice.

The Industrial Commission concluded as a matter of law (1) that plaintiff's claim was governed by the law in effect in 1958 and (2) that in 1958 byssinosis was not compensable as an occupational disease under G.S. 97-53(13). The Commission heard no evidence but based its decision solely on the stipulations of the parties and information contained in the forms filed by plaintiff for workmen's compensation benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. 36 N.C.App. 456, 245 S.E.2d 82 (1978).

For the reasons which follow we conclude that the Commission's findings of fact are insufficient to enable the Court to determine the rights of the parties. The case must therefore be remanded for further findings of fact in the light of the legal principles enunciated in this opinion. Thomason v. Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 70 S.E.2d 706 (1952); Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 222 N.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 570 (1942); Farmer v. Lumber Co., 217 N.C. 158, 7 S.E.2d 376 (1940).

In denying plaintiff's claim the Deputy Commissioner concluded that "byssinosis was not an occupational disease mentioned in and covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act" as it existed in 1958. The Commissioner explained in an accompanying opinion that byssinosis was "an irritation of the pulmonary air passages" and therefore did not fall within the scope of the 1958 statute which provided compensation for "(i)nfection or inflammation of the . . . oral or nasal cavities." Both the full Commission and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Assuming, Arguendo, that it is the 1958 version of G.S. 97-53(13) which controls this case, an issue which we will discuss subsequently, nevertheless we believe that it was error for the Commission to dismiss plaintiff's claim without hearing evidence or making findings of fact.

Whether a given illness falls within the general definition set out in G.S. 97-53(13) presents a mixed question of fact and law. The Commission must determine first the nature of the disease from which the plaintiff is suffering that is, its characteristics, symptoms and manifestations. Ordinarily, such findings will be based on expert medical testimony. Having made appropriate findings of fact, the next question the Commission must answer is whether or not the illness plaintiff has contracted falls within the definition set out in the statute. This latter judgment requires a conclusion of law.

In this case, instead of hearing evidence and making findings of fact as to the nature of claimant's illness, the Commission simply assumed that "byssinosis is an irritation of the pulmonary air passages." This assumption was proper only if the nature of byssinosis is subject to judicial notice, that is, if the characteristics of the disease are "either so notoriously true as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute or (are) capable of demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy." Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 358, 90 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1956). While it is clear that judicial notice can be used in rulings on demurrers or motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we do not think it is appropriate in this case.

The causes and development of byssinosis, and the structural and functional changes produced by the disease, are still the subject of scientific debate. ¹ This Court has never before considered a case involving byssinosis, and our research discloses only a handful of such cases from other jurisdictions. Under these circumstances judicial notice as to the essential characteristics of the disease is inappropriate. In the absence of evidence or judicial notice, the Commission's legal conclusion that plaintiff's illness was noncompensable cannot stand. It may be that the Court of Appeals and the Industrial Commission are entirely correct in their conclusions as to the characteristics and nature of byssinosis. We simply do not know and are not convinced that knowledge of this disease is so notorious as to justify judicial notice.

We recognize that it might be appropriate for the Commission to dismiss a claim without hearing evidence or making findings of fact when the claim on its face discloses an absolute bar to recovery or shows to a certainty that claimant is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. Such circumstances are not present here.

Plaintiff also contends that the Commission erred in denying her "motion for leave to present further evidence." In that motion, which was filed before the full Commission, plaintiff alleged that there were "expert witnesses available from the field of pulmonary medicine who are of the opinion that a definition of 'oral or nasal cavities' includes pulmonary air passages and lungs when those words are assigned their normal meaning as used in the field."

Because this testimony was offered on a motion to present new or additional evidence, the decision whether to hear the testimony was one addressed to the discretion of the Commission. Hall v. Chevrolet Co., 263 N.C. 569, 139 S.E.2d 857 (1965); G.S. 97-85. However, because the case must be remanded for a hearing de novo, we note that, while the construction of a statute is ultimately a question of law for the courts, expert opinion testimony as to the meaning of technical terms used in a statute is clearly competent. Order of Railway Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 525, 67 S.Ct. 405, 408, 91 L.Ed.2d 471, 476 (1947); Satterley v. City of Flint, 373 Mich. 102, 111, 128 N.W.2d 508, 513 (1964); Southern Pacific Co. v. Brown, 207 Or. 222, 231, 295 P.2d 861, 865 (1956). "Expert testimony may be received as an aid to proper interpretation if the statute or rule (a) used technical terms not generally understood . . .; or (b) is ambiguous or indefinite." Hillman v. Northern Wasco County People's Utility District, 213 Or. 264, 297, 323 P.2d 664, 680 (1958). See also Henry v. Leather Co., 234 N.C. 126, 66 S.E.2d 693 (1951) in which this Court based its construction of the term "tenosynovitis caused by trauma" on both medical treatises and expert testimony presented to the Commission. 234 N.C. at 130, 66 S.E.2d at 696.

We also disagree with the Industrial Commission's conclusion that it is necessarily the 1958 version of G.S. 97-53(13) which governs this case. In 1958 when plaintiff left her employment as a spinner with J. P. Stevens the statutory definition of occupational disease set out in G.S. 97-53 included the following:

"Infection or inflammation of the skin, eyes or other external contact surfaces or oral or nasal cavities due to irritating oils, cutting compounds, chemical dust, liquids, fumes, gases or vapors, and any other materials or substances." 1935 N.C.Pub.Laws ch. 123, As amended by 1957 N.C.Sess.Laws ch. 1396, § 6.

In 1963 the statute was amended to include infections or inflammations of "any other internal or external organ or organs of the body" caused by exposure to one of the above-named substances. 1963 N.C.Sess.Laws ch. 965, § 1. This amendment applied only to cases in which "the last exposure in an occupation subject to the hazards of such disease occurred on or after" July 1, 1963. Id. Because plaintiff retired from her position with J. P. Stevens in 1958, this amendment is manifestly inapplicable to her claim.

In 1971 G.S. 97-53(13) was amended again. It now reads as follows:

"Any disease, other than hearing loss covered in another subdivision of this section, which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment."

Unlike the 1963 amendment this addition to the Act was not limited to cases in which the "last exposure" to the hazards of the disease occurred after its effective date. Instead, the amendment expressly applies to all "cases originating on and after July 1, 1971." 1971 N.C.Sess.Laws ch. 547, § 3.

Citing its decision in Booker v. Medical Center, 32 N.C.App. 185, 231 S.E.2d 187 (1977), Rev'd, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979), the Court of Appeals held the 1971 amendment inapplicable on the grounds that a case "originates" within the meaning of the statute when an employee "contracts" the disease. Because plaintiff retired from her job in 1958, the Court reasoned that she must have "contracted" the disease prior to 1 July 1971. Having concluded that neither the 1963 nor the 1971 amendments applied to plaintiff's claim, the Court of Appeals then held that the claim was governed by the law "as it existed in 1958 when the plaintiff was last exposed to the cotton dust which allegedly caused her disease." 36 N.C.App. at 461, 245 S.E.2d at 86. For the reasons which follow we hold this interpretation of the statute to be incorrect.

Nothing else appearing, the legislature is presumed to have used the words of a statute to convey their natural and ordinary meaning. In re Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 242, 188 S.E.2d 452 (1972); State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E.2d 37 (1967), Cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028, 88 S.Ct. 1418, 20 L.Ed.2d 285 (1968). A "case" is defined by Black's Law dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968) as a "general term for an action, cause, suit, or controversy, at law or in equity; . . . an aggregate of facts which furnishes occasion for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of justice." In the ordinary understanding of that phrase a case "originates" when the cause of action arises. Booker v. Medical...