Wood v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 20 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION H-09-1390 |
| Parties | JOHN L. WOOD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KATY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
"This action is in the nature of an appeal" of a Texas Education Agency ("TEA") Hearing Officer's decision under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (Docket Entry No.8, page 1). Pending are TEA's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Docket Entry No.45) and the Katy Independent School District's ("Katy ISD") Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No.46) and Opposed Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Demand for a Jury Trial. (Docket Entry No.57). For the reasons to follow, the Court will grant in part, and deny in part, TEA's Motion to Dismiss, deny Katy ISD's Motion for Summary Judgment, and grant Katy ISD's Opposed Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Demand for a Jury Trial.
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the filing of a motion to dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). A lawsuit must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction "when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (). The party seeking to litigate in federal court bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the filing of a motion to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of its entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation omitted). A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that is "plausible" on its face. Id. at 569. A claim is facially plausible when a "plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). It is the court's responsibility to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success. Id. However, conclusory allegations and unwarranted factual deductions will not suffice to avoid a motion to dismiss. United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotations omitted). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "courts must limit their inquiry to the facts stated in the complaint and the documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint." Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff's claims against the TEA are two-fold. First, plaintiff's contend that TEA failed to oversee the TEA Hearing Officer with respect to her compliance with IDEA requirements or alternatively, that the TEA has no particular expectations of its hearing officers with respect to the IDEA's requirements. (Docket Entry No.8, page 25). Second, Plaintiffs contend that TEA failed to oversee the Katy Independent School District ("Katy ISD") in any meaningful way as required by the IDEA. (Id., page 24).
TEA moves to dismiss both claims on grounds that plaintiff failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the IDEA, that the IDEA does not provide for a private cause of action against TEA with respect to plaintiff's claims, and that the TEA is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. (Docket Entry No.45).
The IDEA provides that a parent may bring an administrative due process hearing challenging "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") to such child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). If a parent is dissatisfied with the educational agency's findings and decision, the parent may file a civil action in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Before filing a complaint related to the aforementioned challenges, a plaintiff must exhaust his state administrative remedies. Gardner v. Sch. Bd. Caddo Parish, 958 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir. 1992). The complaint is "not a justiciable controversy until the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies, or proved that exhaustion would be futile or inadequate." Id. at 112. A plaintiff bears the burden of proving that administrative review would be futile or inadequate. Id.
The IDEA's exhaustion requirement applies to a broad spectrum of claims. See Sch. Bd. of Lee County, Fla. V. M.M. ex rel. M.M., 348 Fed. App'x 504, 511 (11th Cir. 2009);Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg'l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247, 255 (1st Cir. 2003) (). However, section 1415(i)(2)(A) of the IDEA "limits a party's right of action under the IDEA to issues presented at the due process hearing." Hooker v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., Civil Action No.3:09-1289-D, 2010 WL 4025877 at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2010) ().
A plaintiff need not show that the parent exhausted administrative remedies if the parent "'can show that the agency's adoption of an unlawful general policy or practice would make resort to the agency futile, or that the administrative remedies afforded by subchapter II of IDEA are inadequate given the relief sought.'" Rafferty v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41, 52 (1st Cir. 2000)); accord Papania-Jones v. Dupree, 275 Fed. App'x 301, 303 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit has recognized that exhaustion is futile where the plaintiff alleges a systematic violation, such as the widespread failure to implement IEPs, where the plaintiff challenges a settled state policy that the IDEA's administrative process could not address, and where the due process hearing officer is powerless to correct an alleged IDEA violation. Papania-Jones, 275 Fed. App'x at 303-04. Furthermore, whether exhaustion is required depends on the source or the nature of the alleged injury and not the specific remedy the plaintiff requested. Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. #403, 308 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). If the plaintiff's injuries could be redressed to any degree through IDEA's exhaustion process, then exhaustion is required. Id. Even if IDEA's ability to remedy an alleged wrong is unclear, "exhaustion should be required to give educational agencies an initial opportunity to ascertain and alleviate the alleged problem." Id. See Gardner, 958 F.2d at 111-12.
The IDEA provides that "[a]ny State educational agency . . . that receives assistance under this part [20 USCS §§ 1411 et seq.] shall establish and maintain procedures in accordance with this section." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (brackets in original). One of the procedures that TEA, as a state educational agency receiving federal funds, is required to establish and maintain is as follows, in pertinent part:
Whenever a complaint has been received under subsection (b)(6) or (k) of this section, the parents involved in such complaint shall have an opportunity for impartial due process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State educational agency.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).
In Count IV of their Amended complaint, Plaintiffs complain that TEA failed to oversee "the hearing officer and her procedures" and that such failure "led to delay, uncertainty, and bias in the hearing, which led to denial of Plaintiffs' IDEA due process rights." (Docket Entry No.8, page 36). Plaintiff's complaint against the TEA with respect to the conduct of the Hearing Officer and TEA's oversight of the Officer and the due process hearing is really a claim that TEA denied them an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing.1 Compare D.B. ex rel. C.B. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., Civil Action No.H-06-0354 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2007) ().
Plaintiffs, however, do not allege that they complained to the Hearing Officer or to the TEA at any time during the proceedings that the Hearing Officer was not impartial, that she refused to recuse, or that the procedures she employed during the due process proceedings were unfair or outside state law or evidentiary rules, or TEA rules at any time. By failing to raise such objections during the due process proceedings, Plaintiffs denied the Hearing Officer and TEA an opportunity to ascertain and alleviate any alleged problems with respect to due process hearing and the conduct of the Hearing Officer.
Plaintiffs, however, claim that exhaustion of remedies in this case would be futile or inadequate "given the apparent relationship between TEA and the District."2 (Docket...
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