Wood v. Manatee Bay Corp., 79-2072

• Decision Date: 06 August 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-2072,79-2072
• Citation: 386 So.2d 320
• Parties: Robert E. WOOD and Diane Bass Wood, Appellants, v. MANATEE BAY CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 320

386 So.2d 320

Robert E. WOOD and Diane Bass Wood, Appellants, v. MANATEE BAY CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 79-2072.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 6, 1980.

R. Justin Marshall, Palmetto, for appellants.

James M. Wallace, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

OTT, Acting Chief Judge.

Following the remand of this case after an unsuccessful earlier appeal by Manatee, the trial court purported to enter a "Supplemental Final Judgment" in favor of Manatee. The action of the court was a nullity because it had no jurisdiction to make such an award. Consequently, we vacate the void supplemental judgment.

In 1977 the Woods filed suit to quiet title to their home. Specifically, they asked the court to declare that a $2,900 note, which they executed in favor of Manatee in 1961, together with the mortgage securing it, were invalid and unenforceable. Manatee counterclaimed, claiming default in the note on the ground that no payments had been made since 1962, and seeking foreclosure of the mortgage. In response to that counterclaim, the Woods raised the statute of limitations and other affirmative defenses.

On August 16, 1978 the trial court entered a final judgment purporting to adjudicate all matters in dispute. The action to quiet title was treated as a suit to cancel the debt and was granted. The mortgage was cancelled and Manatee's counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice. Manatee appealed and this court affirmed the judgment in an opinion filed May 18, 1978, which stated in part:

The final judgment is ambiguous as to whether it purports to cancel the debt evidenced by a promissory note which underlies the mortgage. We construe the judgment to mean that the underlying debt between the parties is not affected. The judgment is affirmed as construed.

Manatee Bay Corporation v. Wood, 371 So.2d 197, 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

The mandate of this court, dated June 7, 1979, returned the case to the trial court, but was withdrawn on August 1, 1979 when the Woods petitioned for rehearing and clarification and established that they had not been served with the mandate. Their petition was denied September 17, 1979 and we issued a new mandate on October 3, 1979.

In the meantime, on May 31, 1979, Manatee filed in the trial court a motion for the entry of a "Supplemental Final Judgment." The basis for the motion was an assertion that the opinion of this court was "a mandate" for judgment in Manatee's favor on the promissory note. The trial court agreed and on June 4, 1979 entered the supplemental final judgment, "nunc pro tunc August 14 (sic), 1978," awarding Manatee a judgment against the Woods for some $10,000.

The Woods' motion to set aside the supplemental final judgment, on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter it, was denied and this present appeal followed.

There are two jurisdictional defects in the supplemental final judgment. The most glaring, of course, is revealed by simply reciting the chronology. On June 4, 1979 the first appeal was still pending in this court. The court below had no jurisdiction to proceed with the case. ¹ Rule 9.600 of Florida Appellate Procedure; State ex rel. Davis v. Clearwater, 108 Fla. 635, 146 So. 836 (1933).

Equally devastating to the validity of the supplemental judgment is the fact that this court affirmed the "Final Judgment" of the trial court, which purported to be a final adjudication of all the matters at issue in the case. The effect of that affirmance was that thereafter the trial court was powerless to amend or change the judgment. Budd v. Williams, 152 Fla. 189, 11 So.2d 341 (1943). The lower court had no power to amend its final judgment, now affirmed by this court, and grant some new, different or further relief. Airvac, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co., 330 So.2d 467 (Fla.1976); Palm Beach Estates v. Croker, 106 Fla. 617, 143 So. 792 (1932). New matter affecting the judgment could not be presented without our permission. Rinker Materials...