Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School District

• Decision Date: 01 June 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 72-398.
• Citation: 342 F. Supp. 1293
• Parties: Cyrus F. WOOD and Dorothy J. Brecher, individually and as parent and natural guardian of Amy Brecher, Plaintiffs, v. MT. LEBANON TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Defendant, Albert B. Winschel et al., Intervening Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

342 F. Supp. 1293

Cyrus F. WOOD and Dorothy J. Brecher, individually and as parent and natural guardian of Amy Brecher, Plaintiffs, v. MT. LEBANON TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Defendant, Albert B. Winschel et al., Intervening Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 72-398.

United States District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

June 1, 1972.

Marjorie Hanson Matson, Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Donald C. Bush, Griggs, Moreland, Blair & Anderson, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendants.

Frank E. Coho, Pittsburgh, Pa., for intervening defendants.

OPINION

GOURLEY, District Judge:

This is a civil rights proceeding in which jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3). The Court has conducted a full and complete hearing and has granted motions allowing the intervention of additional parties.

Plaintiffs assert that a violation of their constitutional rights will occur if defendant is not restrained from permitting or directing the pronouncement of an invocation and benediction at high school graduation ceremonies to be conducted June 7, 1972. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that having an invocation and a benediction as parts of the graduation ceremony amounts to establishment of religion, impairment of freedom of religion, and an improper use of tax monies.

At the outset a jurisdictional question arises as to whether the defendant is a person under the Civil Rights Statutes. The Court, of course, must zealously guard and oversee the proper use of its jurisdiction to insure that it is neither too frugal nor too generous with its application. As a civil rights matter, the Court must conclude that a proper party defendant has not been named to provide this Court with jurisdiction. Since it is set forth that the proposed action is taken under color of state law, it appears that plaintiffs fall within the jurisdictional ambit of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and thus must satisfy its jurisdictional requirement. It is clear that suit must be brought against a person acting under color of state law to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of said statute. It is abundantly certain that the named defendant herein is not such a person. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969); Martin v. Davison, 322 F.Supp. 318 (W.D.Pa.1971). The fact that there have been named individual defendants as intervenors does not alter this reasoning because said individuals would not have acted, as students and parents of students, under color of state law. Therefore, this Court must conclude that there is no jurisdiction to grant plaintiffs any relief whatsoever.

If, however, the Court is in error in this conclusion, there is an alternate basis for reaching the same result and disposing of the case on the merits.

It has been established that the graduation ceremony to be held June 7, 1972 follows and is completely separate and apart from all formal requirements of the school district for graduation. All instruction, examinations, and training will be concluded as of 1:00 P.M., E.D.S.T., on the 7th day of June. Moreover, and this is most significant, the graduation ceremonies are purely voluntary; there is absolutely no compulsion attached to attending the graduation to be eligible to receive a diploma. Indeed, it has been established that the minor plaintiff, Amy Brecher, signed a brief statement, never retracted or revoked, evidencing her intention not to attend the ceremonies. She and some 47 other students plan not to attend for one reason or another; yet, assuming satisfactory completion of all classroom and academic requirements, they will receive all the rights and privileges bestowed on the other 688 seniors. Thus it appears to the Court that graduation ceremonies at Mt. Lebanon Township School District are just that—i. e., they are ceremonial and are in fact not a part of the formal, day-to-day routine of the school curriculum to which is attached compulsory attendance.¹

It is this aspect which distinguishes the present case from Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1961) which held that the saying of a state composed prayer was in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. What the Court struck down in Engel was prayer, albeit denominationally neutral, which was thrust upon students through the use of the public school system. The Court pointed out that ". . . we think that the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government." Engel v. Vitale, supra, at...