Wood v. Neff

• Decision Date: 30 December 1998
• Parties: , 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 11,625 Richard N. WOOD, Respondent, v. Edgar L. NEFF, Doing Business as J.R.'s Auto Repair, Formerly Known as A.M. Auto Repair, Appellant. (And a Third-Party Action.)
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 612

683 N.Y.S.2d 612

250 A.D.2d 225, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 11,625

Richard N. WOOD, Respondent, v. Edgar L. NEFF, Doing Business as J.R.'s Auto Repair, Formerly Known as A.M. Auto Repair, Appellant.

(And a Third-Party Action.)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Dec. 30, 1998.

Thaler & Thaler (Richard T. John of counsel), Ithaca, for appellant.

Williamson, Clune & Stevens (John H. Hanrahan III of counsel), Ithaca, for respondent.

Before: MIKOLL, J.P., and MERCURE, CREW III, PETERS and CARPINELLO, JJ.

CARPINELLO, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Relihan Jr., J.), entered January 15, 1998 in Tompkins County, which denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

On August 15, 1990, plaintiff was driving a dump truck owned by his employer, Norman Tidd, when the truck's left front tire blew out causing plaintiff to lose control of the vehicle. The truck rolled over several times ejecting plaintiff and his passenger. As a result of the accident, plaintiff was rendered a paraplegic. He commenced this action against defendant, owner of the automotive repair shop that issued a safety inspection certificate for the vehicle on March 12, 1990. Defendant, in turn, commenced a third-party action against Tidd's estate and plaintiff. At issue on appeal is Supreme Court's order denying defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (175 Misc.2d 151, 668 N.Y.S.2d 873).

Defendant concedes for the purpose of summary judgment that he permitted Tidd's truck to pass inspection with the defective tire that caused the subject accident. He nevertheless contends that he is entitled to summary judgment on the alternative grounds that his only duty of care in this case--to notify Tidd of the defective tire--did not extend to plaintiff and, in any event, his alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident because intervening events--plaintiff's knowledge of the tire's defective condition--broke the causal chain between such negligence and the accident.

As a threshold matter, we note our disagreement with defendant's legal assumption that his only duty as a certified inspector in this case was to notify Tidd of the necessity to repair the truck and that such duty did not extend to third parties, including plaintiff. In undertaking the inspection of Tidd's truck as a licensed inspection station operator, defendant was obligated to, inter alia, conduct "a complete inspection" of the vehicle in conformity with all applicable rules and regulations (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 306[d]; see, 15 NYCRR 79.20[c][6] ), issue a certificate only if all prescribed mechanisms and equipment were "in proper and safe condition" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 304[a]; see also, 15 NYCRR 79.20[a]; 79.21), notify Tidd of any necessary repairs (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 304[b]; 15 NYCRR 79.5[b] ) and issue an "inspection rejection notice * * * if the condition of any item required to be inspected [was] found defective" (15 NYCRR 79.20[a]; see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 306[d] ). ¹

Notably, inadequate tread and/or bumps, bulges and knots on a tire are grounds upon which to issue an inspection rejection notice (see, 15 NYCRR 79.21[c][1], [3] ). ² Indeed, the failure to conduct inspections in conformity with statutory and regulatory requirements subjects inspection station operators to license suspension, revocation and nonrenewal (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 303[e][1], [5] ). Moreover, we believe that an inspector's duties under the Vehicle and Traffic Law do extend to third parties as it is reasonably foreseeable that someone, other than its owner, may be injured in an accident because of a defect in a motor vehicle. A plain reading of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 309(1) and (2) supports the conclusion that the Legislature enacted Vehicle and Traffic Law articles 5 and 5-A to protect not only owners of defective motor vehicles, but third parties who could be injured thereby. ³

Similarly unavailing is defendant's claim that intervening events, particularly plaintiff's knowledge of the tire's defective condition on the day of the accident, break the causal chain between any negligence on his part and the accident. First, this argument is based on a factual premises, i.e., plaintiff's knowledge of the tire's condition, that cannot be conclusively established on this record. Plaintiff testified at his examination before trial that he was not responsible for the maintenance on the truck and that, with the exception of a transmission problem, he never observed any mechanical problems with it. He also testified that, although he "vaguely" recalled hearing about problems with the truck's tires, he assumed that they were taken care of prior to the accident.

Additionally, while a negligent defendant may be relieved of liability if the conduct of another has intervened to "break[ ] the chain of causal connection" between that defendant's breach of duty and the ensuing injury (Mesick v. State of New York, 118 A.D.2d 214, 218, 504 N.Y.S.2d 279, lv. denied 68 N.Y.2d 611, 510 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 502 N.E.2d 1007), the conduct must be so extraordinary or unforeseeable that it is unreasonable to hold the defendant responsible for the resulting damages (see, Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 434...