Wood v. Paccar, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-CV-1010-LRR,19-CV-1010-LRR |
| Parties | MICHAEL GERALD WOOD, Plaintiff, v. PACCAR, INC, PETERBILT MOTORS COMPANY, a Wholly Owned Subsidiary of PACCAR, INC, and UNKNOWN FABRICATORS AND MANUFACTURES, Defendants, JMJ EQUIPMENT TRANSPORT, INC., Claimant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 2
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................... 2
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION ........................... 2
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD .......................... 3
V. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......................... 4
A. The Parties ........................................ 4
B. Overview of the Dispute ................................ 4
VI. ANALYSIS ............................................. 6
A. Parties' Arguments ................................... 6
B. Legal Conclusions .................................... 7
VII. CONCLUSION .......................................... 18
I. INTRODUCTION
The matter before the court is Defendants PACCAR, Inc ("Paccar") and Peterbilt Motors Company's ("Peterbilt") (collectively, "Defendants") "Motion for Summary Judgment" ("Motion") (docket no. 54).
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 22, 2018, Plaintiff Michael Gerald Wood filed a "Petition" (docket no. 3) in the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County. On August 28, 2018, Wood filed the "First Amended Petition at Law" (docket no. 3-1) in the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County. On April 23, 2019, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal (docket no. 1), bringing the case before this court.
On August 7, 2019, Wood filed the "Second Amended Complaint" (docket no. 32), alleging strict liability (Count I) and negligence (Count II) against Defendants; and products liability (Count III) against unknown fabricators and manufacturers pursuant to Iowa Code section 613.18(3). See generally Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 10-39. On August 21, 2019, Defendants filed an Answer (docket no. 33).
On December 18, 2019, Defendants filed the Motion. On January 15, 2020, Wood filed the Resistance (docket no. 67). On January 24, 2020, Defendants filed the Reply (docket no. 78). Wood requests oral argument. See Resistance at 1. The court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. Accordingly, Wood's request is denied. The matter is fully submitted and ready for decision.
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The court has diversity jurisdiction over the claims because complete diversity exists between the parties and Wood alleges that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) ( ).
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show'" an absence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact. Hilde v. City of Eveleth, 777 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). "A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case." Massey-Diez v. Univ. of Iowa Cmty. Med. Servs., Inc., 826 F.3d 1149, 1157 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Gazal v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 647 F.3d 833, 837-38 (8th Cir. 2011)). "The movant 'bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,' and must identify 'those portions of [the record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Once the movant has done so, "the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
On a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009)). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial," and summary judgment is appropriate. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 586 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). "The nonmovant 'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . .'" Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586). Instead, "[t]o survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must substantiate [its] allegations with sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [its] favor based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy." Williams v. Mannis, 889 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 2018) () (quoting Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782, 801 (8th Cir. 2011)). Mere "self-serving allegations and denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact." Anuforo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 614 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir. 2010). "Evidence, not contentions, avoids summary judgment." Reasonover v. St. Louis Cty., 447 F.3d 569, 578 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 2003)).
V. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
Wood is a resident and citizen of the State of Arizona. See Second Amended Complaint ¶ 1. Paccar is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Bellevue, Washington. Id. ¶ 2. Peterbilt is an unincorporated operating division of Paccar with its headquarters and principal place of business in Denton, Texas. Id. ¶ 3.
B. Overview of the Dispute
On September 12, 2016, Wood was operating a 2014 Peterbilt Model 579 heavy truck that was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Id. ¶ 9; Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("SUF") (docket no. 58-1) ¶ 1. Wood was driving the truck in the scope of his employment with JMJ Equipment Transport on NW Arterial Road near the intersection of Plaza Drive in Dubuque, Iowa, when another motorist, David McGhee, failed to yield at the intersection and struckWood. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 9; SUF ¶ 1. McGhee was driving a Honda CR-V, which hit the Peterbilt truck, resulting in the truck striking a traffic signal pole at the intersection. Id. Wood and McGhee both sustained injuries. Id.
Wood is an Arizona resident, and his employer, JMJ Equipment Transport, Inc. ("JMJ Transport"), is an Arizona business. SUF ¶ 2. JMJ Transport's workers' compensation carrier is Ecole, also an Arizona business. Id. Following the September 2016 accident, Wood received workers' compensation benefits from Ecole in Arizona. SUF ¶ 3. Wood has received in excess of $1,100,000 in workers' compensation benefits from Ecole in Arizona. Id. Wood will continue to receive workers' compensation benefits coverage from Ecole in Arizona, for current and future treatment. Id.
On May 20, 2018, Wood's counsel informed Ecole's counsel that he had been retained for all third-party claims arising from Wood's injuries. SUF ¶ 8. On July 26, 2018, counsel for Ecole informed Wood's counsel by letter that, under Arizona law, "all third[-]party rights pertaining to Woods' on the job injury on September 12, 2016 have been deemed assigned to Ecole, and on behalf of Ecole, demand is hereby made that Woods take no action to interfere with the same." Defendants' Exhibit G (docket no. 58-4) at 2; SUF ¶ 12.1 On August 10, 2018, Ecole filed suit against McGhee in Arizona. SUF ¶ 16. On August 12, 2018, Wood filed suit against McGhee and Paccar in Iowa. Id. ¶ 21. On September 12, 2018, the two-year statute of limitations expired for anyclaims against Paccar arising out the accident. Id. ¶ 22. In an undated letter, which was signed by Ecole and delivered to Wood's counsel in April 2019, Ecole stated that:
This letter serves to formally confirm on behalf of Ecole that Ecole never asserted any third[-]party rights except as to the Hartford policy which insured McGhee as of the date of the accident, and all other rights were considered by Ecole to remain available to Woods should he desire to pursue the same. This was confirmed by the aforementioned July 26 correspondence.
Id. ¶¶ 40-41; Defendants' Exhibit N (docket no. 58-11); Defendants' Exhibit O (docket no. 58-12).
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Parties' Arguments
Defendants argue that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, Wood "is not a real party in interest and, thus, cannot pursue his claims against [them]." Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Brief") (docket no. 58) at 5. Specifically, Defendants assert that "any claims [Wood] had against [Defendants] (or any other third party) resulting from the [accident] were automatically assigned to Ecole by operation of [Arizona] law under A.R.S. § 23-1023." Id. Defendants maintain that "Arizona law, not Iowa law, determines whether [Wood] is a real party in interest." Id. at 6. Specifically, Defendants assert that, pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 185 and Moad v. Dakota Truck Underwriters, 831 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 2013), because Wood "obtained workers' compensation benefits in Arizona through Ecole, an Arizona benefits provider," this court "must apply Arizona state law to determine what interest Ecole (and, by implication, [Wood]) has in tort against third parties (including [Defendants]) as a result of the [accident]." Id. at 6-7. Defendants contend...
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