Wood v. President and Trustees of Spring Hill College in City of Mobile

• Citation: 978 F.2d 1214
• Decision Date: 09 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-7762,91-7762
• Parties: , 78 Ed. Law Rep. 314, 3 NDLR P 184 Jennifer WOOD; Carol Wood; W.B. Wood, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The PRESIDENT AND TRUSTEES OF SPRING HILL COLLEGE IN the CITY OF MOBILE, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 1214

978 F.2d 1214

24 Fed.R.Serv.3d 400, 78 Ed. Law Rep. 314,

3 NDLR P 184

Jennifer WOOD; Carol Wood; W.B. Wood, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The PRESIDENT AND TRUSTEES OF SPRING HILL COLLEGE IN the CITY OF MOBILE, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-7762.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 9, 1992.

Domingo Soto, Madden & Soto, Mobile, Ala., Jeanne M.L. Player, Tallahassee, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Walter M. Cook, Jr., Joseph J. Minus, Jr., William E. Shreve, Jr., Mobile, Ala., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, MORGAN and JOHNSON ^*, Senior Circuit Judges.

JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

This case arises on appeal following a jury verdict in favor of defendant-appellee Spring Hill College ("Spring Hill") on plaintiff-appellant Jennifer Wood's claim that Spring Hill discriminated against her on the basis of her handicap, in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp.1992) ("section 504"). On appeal, Wood raises four challenges to the jury instructions given by the district court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's entry of judgment in accordance with the jury verdict.

I. BACKGROUND

On Friday, January 6, 1989, Jennifer Wood and her mother visited the Spring Hill campus for the purpose of enrolling Jennifer in the college. During their visit, Spring Hill admissions counselor Tim Host told Wood that she was admitted to Spring Hill, and the college later confirmed the admission by letter. Wood moved into a Spring Hill dormitory room on the following Sunday, registered for classes on Monday, and attended classes from Tuesday, January 10th, through Friday, January 13th, 1989. On the following Monday, Wood withdrew from Spring Hill and did not return to classes.

The parties vigorously dispute the circumstances of Wood's withdrawal. According to Wood, her withdrawal was in fact a constructive dismissal. Specifically, Wood alleged that the college began treating her in a hostile manner upon learning that she had been diagnosed as schizophrenic. ¹ Wood argued that she was made to feel so unwelcome at Spring Hill in her week there that she felt compelled to withdraw.

Spring Hill claimed that the only action the school took regarding Wood was to encourage Wood to defer her admission until the fall semester so that she could take Spring Hill's remedial summer classes. Spring Hill asserted that this action was motivated solely by its discovery that Host had erred in admitting Wood. Spring Hill claimed that Wood met none of the college's admission standards, ² and that serious questions existed as to Wood's ability to meet Spring Hill's academic demands. ³ Despite the mistake, Spring Hill claimed that it was prepared to honor its admissions decision at all times. According to Spring Hill, a position was even held open for Wood in its summer and fall programs after Wood withdrew from the spring session. ⁴

On May 16, 1989, Wood brought an action in federal district court against Spring Hill College. In her final amended complaint, Wood asserted a federal claim for violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, ⁵ and various pendent state law claims. On August 1, 1991, following a three-day trial, Wood's section 504 claim and state law claim for breach of duty ⁶ were submitted to a jury. The jury returned its verdict in favor of Spring Hill on both claims. Wood then brought this appeal challenging the jury instructions on the section 504 claim. ⁷

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews jury instructions to determine whether the instructions objected to below create a "substantial and ineradicable doubt" that the jury may have been misled in its deliberations. McElroy v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 894 F.2d 1504, 1509 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting National Ind. Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Charter Fin. Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1396, 1402-03 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1056, 105 S.Ct. 2120, 85 L.Ed.2d 484 (1985)). For those instructions that Wood challenges for the first time on appeal, however, this Court applies the plain error standard of review. See Electro Servs. Inc. v. Exide Corp., 847 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th Cir.1988). To merit relief under the plain error standard, the instruction must be likely to have led to an incorrect verdict, resulting in substantial injustice. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Wood challenges four aspects of the district court's jury instructions. First, Wood claims that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it must find "intentional discrimination or discriminatory animus" on the part of Spring Hill in order to find for Wood. Second, Wood challenges the district court's instruction that the term "solely" as used in section 504 required a verdict for Spring Hill if any factor other than handicap motivated Spring Hill's actions toward Wood. Third, Wood argues that the district court should have instructed the jury on the duty of Spring Hill to afford Wood "reasonable accommodation" of her handicap. Finally, Wood asserts that the district court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the shifting burdens of proof in Title VII cases. We address each of these challenges in turn.

A. The "Intentional Discrimination or Discriminatory Animus" Instruction

In its charge to the jury on section 504, the district court instructed In order to recover damages under this section, the plaintiff must prove.... that such dismissal was the result of intentional discrimination or discriminatory animus ... on the part of the defendant.... The term discriminatory animus means prejudice, spite, or ill will.

On appeal, Wood challenges two aspects of this instruction. First, Wood argues that she was not required to prove "intentional discrimination" as an element of her discrimination claim. Second, Wood argues that "discriminatory animus" and its definition should not have appeared in the jury charge.

At the outset, we note that the sufficiency of Wood's objection at trial to the use of the term "intentional discrimination" is questionable. At trial, Wood's counsel objected to the instruction on the grounds that the instruction would preclude Wood from obtaining a declaratory judgment and attorney fees in the event that the jury found unintentional discrimination. On appeal, Wood has abandoned that rationale for the objection in favor of a new theory that intentional discrimination is not a required element in a section 504 action to recover compensatory damages. On appeal, this Court generally will address the sufficiency of jury instructions only on those grounds that are raised properly below. See St. Joe Paper Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 376 F.2d 33, 34 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 828, 88 S.Ct. 91, 19 L.Ed.2d 86 (1967). ⁸ The sufficiency of the trial court objection is particularly doubtful in light of the fact that Wood's counsel twice agreed with the district court that a showing of intentional discrimination was required to recover compensatory damages. See Electro Serv., Inc., 847 F.2d at 1528. However, we need not resolve the question of whether Wood's objection was sufficient to preserve this issue for appeal, because we conclude that the district court's instruction on intentional discrimination was an accurate reflection of the law in this Circuit.

To be sure, the extent to which money damages are available as a remedy in section 504 actions is not a settled issue in the Eleventh Circuit. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630, 104 S.Ct. 1248, 1252, 79 L.Ed.2d 568 (1984) (refusing to decide extent to which money damages are available under section 504); Manecke v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, Fla., 762 F.2d 912, 921 n. 8 (11th Cir.1985) (agreeing that law on available remedies for section 504 violations is "murky question"), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1062, 106 S.Ct. 809, 88 L.Ed.2d 784 (1986). ⁹ However, this Circuit has held that plaintiffs who proceed under a theory of disparate treatment in section 504 actions must prove intentional discrimination or bad faith in order to recover compensatory damages. See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1427-28 (11th Cir.1985). As a general matter, good faith attempts to pursue legitimate ends are not sufficient to support an award of compensatory damages under section 504. Cf. Powell v. Defore, 699 F.2d 1078, 1082 (11th Cir.1983). In addition, controlling precedent on Title VI remedies, made applicable to section 504 actions under the Rehabilitation Act, ¹⁰ indicates that compensatory damages are precluded in cases of unintentional discrimination, but are permissible on a showing of intentional discrimination. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 911 F.2d 617, 621 (11th Cir.1990), rev'd on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992); Manecke, 762 F.2d at 922 n. 8. Cf. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1035, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (noting that "a clear majority" in Guardians Ass'n would allow damages in actions for intentional violations of Title VI). Therefore, the district court's instruction did not constitute reversible error.

Wood also objected to the inclusion of the term "discriminatory animus" and its definition in the instruction. Because Wood did not object to the term "discriminatory animus" or its definition at trial, ¹¹ she has not properly preserved this argument for appeal. Therefore, the challenge to this instruction will be reviewed only for plain error. Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Wilson, 304 F.2d 253, 261 (5th Cir.1962). In this regard we note that the district court worded the instruction in alternative language ("intentional discrimination or...