Wood v. Ratliff

• Decision Date: 06 April 1925
• Docket Number: 24818
• Citation: 103 So. 356,138 Miss. 783
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: WOOD et al v. RATLIFF, et al. [*]

103 So. 356

138 Miss. 783

WOOD et al v. RATLIFF, et al. ^[*]

No. 24818

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 6, 1925

Division B

INJUNCTION. Equity will enjoin and punish for contempt, continued trespass, though acts also punishable as crime.

Equity will enjoin and punish for contempt one who trespasses and damages the property of another, and continues to do so, and threatens further trespass and irreparable injury; the acts constituting a civil wrong, though they are also punishable as a crime.

HON. G C. TANN, Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court of Lauderdale county, HON. G. C. TANN Chancellor.

Suit by J. R. Wood and others against S. A. Ratliff and others. From decree dismissing bill, complainants appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

F. K. Ethridge, for appellant.

The chancellor erred in holding that the violation of the injunction was a criminal offense, if any, and should be punished as such. The courts have, time without number, punished for the violation of injunctions, especially in timber cases and when the trespass was a more incident to the enforcement of vested rights.

There is no denial of the absolute title to the Wood farm being in Wood and his family, the answer admits that both farms are in the stock-law district and that Wood has vested rights that have been interfered with and he and his family deprived of the peaceful enjoyment of the fruits of their labor.

The testimony of seven witnesses shows that S. A. Ratliff and Kutcher Ratliff went to the home of J. B. Wood, engaged in unseemly conduct, trespassed upon his land and upon the peace and quietude of his family, cursed and threatened, abused, scared them and rendered life for them unbearable.

The defendants themselves are the only two witnesses for themselves and they admit every material fact testified to for the plaintiff except they cursed, threatened or trespassed. The learned chancellor, who reminds me of some county justice of the peace trying to split the difference, found that this was true in his decree for he required them to execute a peace bond in the sum of five hundred dollars and required the defendants to pay half the cost.

This case is like Floyd v. Alder, 96 Miss. 546, a case involving property rights where this court held; "It is true that the appellant may be guilty of a criminal trespass if some of the allegations in the bill are sustained, but these facts are not made the basis of any relief at the hand of a court of equity, but is a mere incident. The real purpose of the bill is to obtain possession of the building in question by compelling the surrender of the key then and in addition to prohibit the appellants from interfering in any way with the completion and use of same by the appellee."

The real purpose of the bill in this case is to secure the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of property rights that are vested in the appellants and that are guaranteed by our Constitution. Will a court of equity, of morals, of conscience, grant a remedy and then forsooth because some ruthless person is violating its solemn writ of prohibition and the criminal law at the same time sit quietly by and say, because in violating my decree you violated the criminal law, I will leave the matter up to the criminal courts.

The court decided in Munday v. Terrall, 87 Miss. 284, "That a court of equity could and would enjoin criminal trespass where property rights are involved." The holding of the chancellor was directly in conflict with the opinion of this court in Durham v. State, 52 So. 627, 97 Miss. 549. The last error assigned was that the court erred in assessing the appellant Woods with half the cost. We simply say that there is absolutely no justification in the record for the court requiring appellant to pay any part of the costs.

The appellant came into court for relief, proved absolutely he was entitled to relief, the chancellor realized this and so found, in that he held the acts were criminal and should be punished as such, and that the appellees should give a bond to keep the peace. It simply amounted to penalizing a man and his family for appealing to the court for protection and enforcement of their rights.

No brief filed for appellee.

Argued orally by F. K. Ethridge, for appellant.

OPINION

HOLDEN, P. J.

The appellant J. R. Wood lived with his family on his place about six miles east of Lauderdale Station, in a stock-law district. The appellee Ratliff and his family lived near by on an adjoining farm. These neighbors had a controversy with reference to the stock of Ratliff trespassing upon the land of appellant Wood, and this bill for an injunction restraining Ratliff from further trespassing upon his land was sued out by appellant Wood, and on a hearing of a citation of appellee Ratliff for contempt, the bill was dismissed upon the ground that--"The violations of the injunction by the defendants on the 16th day of March, 1924, if any, were acts in the nature of violation of the criminal statutes of the state, and as such are punishable in the criminal courts, of the proper jurisdiction, and not in a court of equity."

This excerpt is copied from the written opinion of the chancellor.

The bill for the injunction charged that the Ratliffs had been guilty of various trespasses upon the land of appellant Wood, had personally assaulted appellant and his family, allowed live stock, such as hogs and goats, etc., to habitually go upon appellant's land and destroy the crops, and that the Ratliffs were threatening the...