Wood v. Richardson, Civil Action No. 1:93cv374-D-D (N.D. Miss. 1994)
| Decision Date | 01 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:93cv374-D-D. |
| Parties | BILLY WOOD PLAINTIFF, v. GARY RICHARDSON, individually, PAUL SWINDOL, individually, ZACK STEWART, individually, and ROBERT ROBINSON, individually DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
This matter before the undersigned a motion by the defendants for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Original jurisdiction lies with this court by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Plaintiff Billy Wood asserts that he was terminated from his position with the Mississippi State Highway Commission based upon his affiliation with the former State Highway Commissioner Bobby Richardson, in that Richardson and current State Highway Commissioner Zack Stewart are political rivals. Wood asserts that the termination of his employment violated his First Amendment rights of association and speech, and has brought this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
Based on a through review of the parties pleadings, affidavits, briefs, authorities, and the record as a whole, the court hereby grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim under his First Amendment right to free speech, and denies the motion as to the plaintiff's First Amendment right to freedom of association.
Plaintiff Billy Wood was employed with the Mississippi State Highway Commission for approximately eleven years prior to his termination in September of 1993. In May of 1993, another employee of the Commission, Betty Poteet, filed sexual harassment charges against Wood with the Mississippi Department of Transportation. Wood was Poteet's immediate superior in the department. An investigation followed, and Wood was later terminated. Beyond these meager facts, the parties disagree about what really happened.1
Wood asserts that his termination was not based on the sexual harassment charges, but that those charges were fabricated and used as an excuse for his termination. (Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ V.) Wood contends that it was well-known around the Department of Transportation that since Zack Stewart had taken office as Commissioner, Stewart had made a conscious effort to fire as many people as possible who were supporters of the previous Commissioner, Bobby Richardson. (Affidavit of Gerald Creely, Affidavit of Bobby Wood, Affidavit of Freddie Oaks). A former administrative assistant to Bobby Richardson and later for Zack Stewart asserts that Stewart told him he was fired because "of his [Stewart's] politics." (Affidavit of Gerald Creeley). A similar story is told by Freddie Oaks, who claims that he was fired from the Department of Transportation because of his political support of Bobby Richardson. (Affidavit of Freddie Oaks).
Summary Judgment reinforces the purpose of the rules to achieve a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of actions. F.R.C.P. 1. No longer considered a procedural shortcut, summary judgment is an integral part of the framework of the Rules and permits early elimination of claims and defenses which the proponents cannot support. Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1986).
The very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56, advisory committee note on the 1963 amendments to rule 56(e) (quoted in Fontenot, 780 F.2d at 1196). Proper use of Rule 56 "affords a merciful end to litigation that would otherwise be lengthy and expensive." Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Commission, 695 F. Supp. 253, 261 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (quoting Fontenot, 780 F.2d at 1197). Equally important as the need for expediency are the demands of justice. Therefore, the court balances both and will not casually deny a party the protections inherent in a full blown trial. Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Commission, 695 F. Supp. at 261.
As initially stated, summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law — that is the well-settled general rule in this circuit. E.g., St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1987); Bordelon v. Block, 810 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1982); Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Commission, 695 F. Supp. at 261; Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c).
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.2
Pope v. Mississippi, 695 F. Supp. at 261 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 276 (1986)) (emphasis added).
The summary judgment scheme provides for a shifting burden between movant and non-movant as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact. To survive summary judgment and bring the case to trial, the non-movant must be able to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning an essential element of his case. Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1112 (5th Cir. 1979); Bordelon v. Block, 810 F.2d at 470. The mere existence of a factual dispute does not by itself preclude a court from granting summary judgment — the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 211 (1986) (emphasis in original).
Although the court does not assess the probative value of the material presented, Jones v. Western Geophysical Company of America, 669 F.2d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 1982), evidence offered in opposition to the summary judgment motion that is clearly without any probative force is insufficient to create a genuine issue. Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Commission, 695 F. Supp. at 262. Rule 56(e) provides in pertinent part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
(emphasis added). Denials or allegations by the non-moving party in the form of legal conclusions that are unsupported by specific facts have no probative value. Thus, they are insufficient to create genuine issues of material fact, a showing of which, would preclude summary judgment. Broadway v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, 530 F.2d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Benton-Volvo-Metairie, Inc. v. Volvo Southwest, Inc., 479 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1973).
To reiterate, Rule 56 expressly provides that the court should grant summary judgment if (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). The Court must first consider the evidentiary record to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Commission, 695 F. Supp. at 263 (emphasis in original). The purpose of this inquiry is to see whether the case should proceed to trial. The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. at 263, quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212. In other words, the court must decide if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Bache v. American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), 840 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1988). There is no "genuine issue" where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita v. Zenith, 475 U.S. 574, 587 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986). Thus, genuine factual issues are those which could be reasonably resolved in favor of either party; such issues can only be properly resolved by a finder of fact at trial. Pope v. Mississippi, 695 F. Supp. at 263, quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d at 213.
The court must also determine if the factual issues in dispute are material. Pope v. Mississippi, 695 F. Supp. at 263.
Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude an entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d at 211; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273.
After determining that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the court must determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pope v. Mississippi, 695 F. Supp. at 263. The applicable standard for granting summary judgment is the same standard used in granting directed verdicts under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(a). The court "must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S. Ct. at 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d at 213. Summary judgment motions should be granted "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment as set forth in Rule 56(c) is satisfied." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321, ...
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