Wood v. State

• Decision Date: 31 March 1949
• Docket Number: 121.
• Citation: 65 A.2d 316,192 Md. 643
• Parties: WOOD v. STATE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

65 A.2d 316

192 Md. 643

WOOD v. STATE.

No. 121.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 31, 1949

Appeal from Circuit Court, Prince George's County; Charles C Marbury, Judge.

John William Wood was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and he appeals.

Affirmed.

HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ., dissenting.

Walter L. Green and Edward C. Bell, Jr., both of Hyattsville (Green Whalin, Babcock & Bell, of Hyattsville, on the brief), for appellant.

Harrison L. Winter, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Hall Hammond, Atty. Gen. and A. Gwynn Bowie, State's Atty., for Prince George's Co., of Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MARBURY, Chief Judge, and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

DELAPLAINE Judge.

John William Wood has appealed here from a judgment entered in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County upon the verdict of a jury convicting him of the statutory crime of carrying a concealed weapon. Code 1939, art. 27, sec. 40. The trial judge, after overruling a motion for a new trial, sentenced him to the Maryland House of Correction for a term of twelve months.

On July 24, 1948, about 10:30 p. m., appellant, a 27-year-old resident of Bowie, and a friend named Dorothy Thomas, while sitting on the back seat of an automobile parked in front of the home of Norman Foote in Bowie, were attacked by Robert Parker, who struck at them with a knife through the open window of the car. Parker testified that someone in the car shot him in the chest, but on account of darkness, he did not see who fired the shot, but it seemed to him that it came from the back seat. Later he testified without qualification: 'I was shot by some one in the back of the car.'

Dorothy Thomas testified that she and appellant had been at a crab feast in Foote's home, and they had just entered the back seat of the car, which was owned by Bernard Chittam, who had offered to drive them home, and that Chittam and two other men were on the front seat. She further testified that Parker was 'cutting in the car with a knife,' and after she screamed, a shot was fired at Parker. She claimed that she did not know who fired the shot. She stated that she neither had nor saw any weapon that night, and that appellant did not have anything in his hands when he entered the car.

On August 2 appellant was arrested by Officer Richard A. Pearson, of the Prince George's County police force, to whom appellant made a confession at the police station in Hyattsville. Appellant gave a detailed account of the occurrence. He indicated that during the crab feast his girl friend showed disapproval of Parker's attentions. He then told of the shooting as follows: 'I stayed about another hour and then Bernard Chittam came and told me he would take me home. We got in Bernard's car, but he couldn't get the car in reverse. While he was trying to start the car, Parker came around to the side of the car and reached inside the car and started cutting at me with the knife. I was jumping around in the car trying to keep from getting cut, and got the gun and fired. Parker ran after I fired one shot, and I got out of the car and walked around the house and went into Washington, where I stayed until August 1, when I returned to Bowie.' He then specifically confessed that he had a .38 caliber revolver in his right-hand pocket when he was in Foote's home and also when he was on the street. The confession was typewritten and thereupon was signed by appellant in the presence of the officer and two other witnesses.

Counsel for the defense objected to the admission of the confession for two reasons, and asked the Court: 'Shall we state our reasons at the bench or from here? The judge replied: 'You can state them where you are.' After the arguments were heard, the judge overruled the objections, and the confession was read to the jury. It is unquestionably the best practice to hear evidence on the preliminary question whether a confession was freely and voluntarily made out of the presence of the jury. But we have held that where a confession is properly admitted in evidence by the court, no prejudice is done to the accused because testimony on the preliminary question whether the confession was freely and voluntarily made was taken in the presence of the jury. Smith v. State, Md., 56 A.2d 818. At the trial in the Court below no request was made that the arguments be made out of the presence of the jury. Nor was any objection made to arguments in the jury's presence. We hold that no prejudice resulted from the arguments on the admissibility of the confession in the presence of the jury, as the confession was subsequently admitted in evidence.

Appellant also contended that the trial judge, while explaining his ruling on the admissibility of the confession, made the comment in the presence of the jury that Parker was shot by an occupant of the back seat of the car. The record, however, does not show that he made such a statement. What he said was: 'There is also evidence that the occupants in the back of the automobile were two people, Wood and Dorothy Thomas, and evidence tending to show--it may or may not be correct--that Parker was shot by someone from the back seat.' As the judge summarized the testimony correctly, we find no reversible error in his statement.

One reason advanced by appellant against the admission of his confession was that there was no evidence that it was read by or to him. However, the confession recites that he was asked if he could read and write, and he answered that he could; and also that he was asked if he would sign the statement if it were true, and he again answered in the affirmative. Moreover, he did not deny the authenticity of the confession. He made no effort to show that the statement was incorrect in any respect or that he did not understand it after it was typed. Of course, the burden of proof is upon the State to show that a confession was freely and voluntarily made and was not obtained by improper inducements. Lubinski v. State, 180 Md. 1, 5, 22 A.2d 455; Peters v. State, 187 Md. 7, 14, 48 A.2d 586. But in this case there was no contradiction whatever of the policeman's statement that he informed appellant that he did not have to make a statement if he did not wish, but that his statement had to be made freely and without any expectation of receiving any reward for giving it.

The principal reason advanced by appellant against the admission of his confession was that the testimony of Parker and Dorothy Thomas, the only eyewitnesses of the fight who testified at the trial, to the effect that a revolver was shot by somebody in the automobile was insufficient to prove the corpus delicti. He argued that the eyewitnesses did not testify positively that he carried a concealed weapon. He urged that, even if he had fired the shot, the revolver might have been lying unconcealed on the seat or floor of the automobile. There is no question that an extrajudicial confession of guilt by a person accused of crime uncorroborated by any other evidence, is not sufficient to warrant a conviction. Weller v. State, 150 Md. 278, 132 A. 624; Markley v. State, 173 Md. 309, 196 A. 95; Jones v. State, Md., 52 A.2d 484. The law requires that a jury be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, and generally an uncorroborated confession does not as matter of law establish the commission of crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The purpose of the rule requiring corroboration of confessions is to protect the administration of the criminal law against errors of conviction based upon untrue confessions alone. ...