Wood v. State

• Decision Date: 09 December 1948
• Docket Number: 37.
• Citation: 62 A.2d 576,191 Md. 658
• Parties: WOOD v. STATE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

62 A.2d 576

191 Md. 658

WOOD v. STATE.

No. 37.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 9, 1948

Appeal from Criminal Court of Baltimore City; Emory H. Niles, Robert France and John T. Tucker, Judges.

Roy Arnold Wood was convicted of first-degree murder, and he appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Hamilton O'Dunne, of Baltimore, for appellant.

Harrison L. Winter, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John C. Weiss, Asst State's Atty., of Baltimore (Hall Hammond, Atty. Gen and J. Bernard Wells, State's Atty., of Baltimore City, and Wm. H. Maynard, Deputy State's Atty., both of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

HENDERSON Judge.

Roy Arnold Wood was tried before a three-judge court without a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City, on a charge of murdering Joseph D. Benedict, a police officer. He was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. To understand the issues raised on this appeal, it is necessary to state the facts in some detail.

On February 13, 1948 at about 3:15 A.M. Wood entered a black and white 'Sun' taxi-cab, driven by Howard P. Prough, at the corner of St. Paul and Center Streets, in Baltimore City, in which another passenger was riding. This other passenger was discharged at 708 St. Paul Street, from which point Prough proceeded up St. Paul Street towards the destination given him by Wood at 20th Street and Greenmount Avenue. When the cab was just beyond the intersection of North Avenue and St. Paul Street, at about 3:20 A.M., the appellant placed a 38 caliber pistol at the back of Prough's neck and said: 'This is a stick-up'. Wood then ordered him to drive to the Old York Road. When they reached a point about two blocks from 42nd Street and Greenmount Avenue, Wood took Prough's money. He then ordered him to drive south on Greenmount Avenue. Prough managed to switch on his overhead burglar alarm. In the 4400 block, Prough noticed a police car, which flashed its lights at him. Wood saw the car and threatened to shoot. He made Prough drive to Calvert and 30th Streets, where Wood ordered Prough out of the cab and drove off in it. Prough ran to Greenmount Avenue and 30th Street, where he found a police car and at about 3:45 A.M. informed Sergeant Mann and Officer Benedict what had happened.

In the meantime, Wood drove the stolen cab to 20 1/2 Street and Guilford Avenue, where he abandoned it. At about 3:50 A.M. he hailed another cab of the same company, a few blocks away. Wood entered the front seat beside the driver, Michael J. Kuczak, directing him to drive to Loch Raven Boulevard and 33rd Street. Kuczak noticed that his passenger kept looking in the rear-view mirror. As the cab crossed 33d Street, Kuczak observed that a car was following them. At Loch Raven Boulevard, he stopped for a red light, and a police car pulled alongside on the right. Sergeant Mann, in the police car, asked Kuczak if he was 'all right'. Wood pulled out his pistol, placed it in Kuczak's ribs and said: 'Don't stop, keep going.' Kuczak made an effort to start but stalled the cab. Wood opened the cab door. At this moment, Officer Benedict walked around in front of the headlights of the police car, towards the cab door. Wood got out, ran towards Benedict, fired at him, and ran across the street. According to Kuczak, Benedict was about three feet away when the shot was fired, and his hands were empty.

When Sergeant Mann and Officer Benedict received the report from Prough, they began to cruise around, looking for the stolen cab. At about 4 A.M. they saw a cab of the same company proceeding north on Greenmount Avenue, and followed it, they pulled alongside this cab at a red light. When Benedict was shot through the lung he collapsed on the left front fender of the police car, and within a few minutes died of his wound. The pistol, shown to be the one from which the fatal bullet came, was found on Wood when he was arrested, and offered in evidence.

Substantially all of the foregoing facts were admitted by Wood, who took the stand in his own defense. He admitted robbing Prough and taking his cab. He admitted getting into Kuczak's cab, and seeing a car following them. He testified that he pulled out his pistol at the light and ordered Kuczak to proceed, but the cab stalled. He had the gun to 'scare' people and never intended to shoot anyone. He saw a policeman get out of the right door of the other car and come around in front of it. He was panic-stricken and opened the door to run and escape. He ran forward, slipped on the icy street and collided with Benedict, who grabbed him. The gun was in his hand when he opened the door. He couldn't remember pulling the trigger although it was his gun that fired. The gun was loaded because 'I could scare people with it by shooting it'.

In this appeal the appellant contends that evidence of the armed robbery of Prough should not have been admitted over his objection, and that it should have been excluded on motions which were denied. Much, if not all, of this testimony was admitted subject to exception, and at the conclusion of the case the court heard extensive argument, raising the points here made. The court said: 'We deny the motion to strike out all the testimony relevant to the robbery of the witness, Prough. That was the motion left pending * * *.' The court also denied motions designed to limit the effect of that testimony to the charge of premediation in the indictment. Under the circumstances we think the objections were properly preserved for consideration by this court.

The indictment charged that Wood, on February 13, 1948, 'at the city aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully and of deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, did kill and murder one Joseph D. Benedict'. It followed precisely the language set out in section 665 of Art. 27 of the Code, which provides: 'In any indictment for murder or manslaughter, or for being an accessory thereto, it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner or means of death. It shall be sufficient to use a formula substantially to the following effect: 'That A. B., on the ___ day of _____ nineteen hundred and _____, at the county aforesaid, feloniously (wilfully and of deliberately premeditated malice aforethought) did kill (and murder) C. D.''

The appellant did not challenge the sufficiency of the indictment, but contends that the evidence relating to the Prough robbery was inadmissible to prove premeditation. 'As a general rule, upon the trial of a criminal case, evidence of the commission of other independent crimes by the defendant is inadmissible to show either guilt or that the defendant would be likely to commit the crime with which he is charged * * *. Evidence of the commission of independent crimes is irrelevant where it has no tendency to prove some material fact in connection with the crime charged or where it merely tends to show that the accused is a criminal generally. * * * If evidence is relevant, it is immaterial that it shows the commission of another crime.' Wharton, Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., § 343. 'If evidence of another crime tends directly to prove the defendant guilty of the crime for which he is being tried, or if the other crime and the crime charged are so linked together in point of time or circumstances that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other, the general rule of exclusion does not apply. * * * If proof of another crime explains or accounts for the crime for which the accused is on trial, it is relevant and competent. * * * collateral offenses may be shown to prove the mental processes or mental attitude of the accused' such as motive or intent. Wharton, supra, § 345. See also 2 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed., § 363; Underhill, Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., §§ 180-184. The Maryland cases fully recognize these principles. Purviance v. State, 185 Md. 189, 196, 44 A.2d 474; Perrera v. State, 184 Md. 51, 40 A.2d 53; Jones v. State, 182 Md. 653, 35 A.2d 916; Wilson v. State, 181 Md. 1, 26 A.2d 770; Berger v. State, 179 Md. 410, 20 A.2d 146; Mitchell v. State, 178 Md. 579, 16 A.2d 161; Callahan v. State, 174 Md. 47, 197 A. 589. In Kernan v.

State, 65 Md. 253, 259, 4 A. 124, evidence was admitted to show an assault with a pistol upon another person, in a saloon a half square away from the scene of the fatal shooting. It was held admissible 'to show that he was armed and prepared for mischief, and was seriously at that moment bent on mischief, and in a frame of mind likely to result in mischief. * * * it was evidence to show he was armed and prepared to kill, though it did not of itself show intention to kill the deceased. * * * [It] was inseparably connected with the history of his conduct at the time, and necessary to an intelligent appreciation of his doings'.

Tested by the standards laid down in these cases, we think it is clear that the evidence relating to the Prough robbery, within three-quarters of an hour prior to the fatal shooting, was properly admitted. Wood's prior conduct was directly and inseparably related to the killing, and bore upon his motive and intent. As was said in Suhay v. United States, 10 Cir., 95 F.2d 890, 894: 'The evidence relating to the offenses committed in New York [bank robberies] was material upon the question of motive for the homicide. It tended to show that the appellants killed the deceased with deliberation, premeditation, and malice aforethought for the purpose of avoiding arrest for return to that state for prosecution.' The evidence being admissible, we cannot pass upon its weight, or sufficiency to establish premeditation. Hill v. State, Md. 59 A.2d 630; Jones v. State, Md. 52 A.2d 484.

The appellant contends, however, that even if admissible to show premeditation, it was...