Wood v. Swift

Decision Date21 May 1968
Docket NumberNo. 5--4527,5--4527
Citation244 Ark. 929,428 S.W.2d 77
PartiesStella May WOOD, Appellant, v. Henry J. SWIFT, Trustee of the T.E. (Dick) Dill Trust Estate et al., Appellees.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

James E. Hyatt, Jr., Osceola, for appellant.

Seift & Alexander, Osceola, for appellees.

JONES, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Mississippi County Chancery Court, osceola District, dismissing a complaint filed by the appellant, Stella May Wood, to set aside a deed executed and delivered by her to T. E. Dill.

The appellant, Mrs. Wood, was 87 years of age at the time of trial. Her husband had been dead some thirty odd years and she had lived alone at her home in Luxora, Arkansas, since her only son was killed in line of duty as a federal prohibition officer in 1934. From about 1934, Mrs. Wood had owned, in her own right by inheritance and purchase, a 160 acre farm in Mississippi County. A part of the farm had been taken for highway purposes leaving 115.74 acres which Mrs. Wood leased for cash. T. E. Dill was some sixteen years younger than Mrs. Wood and he owned a farm of some 400 acres near Mrs. Wood's farm. In 1950 when Mrs. Wood was 70 years of age and Mr. Dill was 54, through the encouragement of mutual friends, they became acquainted with each other. Upon Mr. Dill's second or third visit with Mrs. Wood in 1950, he assured Mrs. Wood, upon inquiry, that he was divorced and not married, so their acquaintance quickly developed into deep affection attended by constant companionship.

In August 1960, Mrs. Wood conveyed the title in her farm to Mr. Dill by warranty deed, which, except for the description and covenants of warranty, recited as follows:

'WARRANTY DEED

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, Stella May Wood, a widow, for and in consideration of the sum of Ten ($10.00) Dollars to me in cash in hand paid by T. E. Dill, and other good and valuable consideration had and received by me from him, and in consideration for invaluable services rendered and to be rendered me by Grantee, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said T. E. Dill, and unto his heirs and assigns forever, subject to the reservation hereinafter expressed, the following lands lying and being situated in the Osceola District of Mississippi County, Arkansas, to-wit:

* * *

* * *

Grantor hereby expressly reserves unto herself during the full term of her natural life the right of possession and occupancy in and to the above described property and the rents and profits arising therefrom, it being her specific intention by this instrument to convey to the Grantee herein the full fee title to said real estate, subject only to the life estate herein reserved by her.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same unto the said T. E. Dill, and unto his heirs and assigns forever, together with all and singular the tenements, appurtenances and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in any wise appertaining, subject to the life estate herein reserved in Grantor.'

This deed was dated August 31, 1960, and was filed for record on September 2, 1960. It was prepared by Mrs. Wood's attorney upon Mrs Wood's request and at Mr. Dill's direction. Mrs. Wood then went to her attorney's office and signed the deed. The deed was delivered to Mr. Dill after it was recorded and the relationship of the parties continued as before. About two and one-half years after the deed was executed and delivered, Mr. Dill suffered a heart attack and moved into the home with Mrs. Wood. About the time Mr. Dill moved into the home with Mrs. Wood, she executed a will devising her home, without remainder over, to Mr. Dill, and Mr. Dill also executed a will including all his real property in a testamentary trust for the benefit of his three daughters and his grandchildren. On June 14, 1965, Mr. Dill died and after his death, Mrs. Wood filed the present action to set aside the deed for lack of consideration, mutual mistake, failure to conform to the intent of the parties as orally agreed, unilateral mistake, unjust enrichment, undue influence, fraud and duress.

Upon trial of the case, the chancellor dismissed the complaint for want of equity and upon appeal, Mrs. Wood designates the following points for reversal:

'The court erred in finding and holding that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proof in every instance and in dismissing plaintiff's complaint for want of equity and in failing and refusing to grant the relief prayed for in the complaint and amendment thereto.

The court erred in refusing to receive in evidence and consider in this case the Arkansas Supreme Court opinion in the Dill vs. Dill case reported in volume 209 Arkansas Reports at pages 445, (191 S.W.2d 829) et seq.'

Primarily, a fact question was presented to the chancellor in this case and upon trial de novo in this court, we are of the opinion that the decree of the chancellor is not against the preponderance of the evidence.

Aside from the land involved here, the Dill estate was by no means insolvent. Mrs. Wood had one sister in a rest home in Missouri, and another in California at the time of Mr. Dill's death. Mrs. Wood had a brother living at the time the deed was executed, and according to her own testimony she told her brother that she intended to deed the property to Mr. Dill, but did not ask her brother's advice in the matter and did not advise him of the details of the transaction. The brother has since died, and the two sisters are her nearest relatives.

From appellant's own testimony, Mr. Dill made overtures to meet her in 1950 and she finally permitted him to call on her. Upon her inquiry, he assured her that he had obtained a divorce and had been separated from his wife for six years. They quickly became very close friends and constant companions. According to Mrs. Wood's own testimony, Mr. Dill visited her several times a day, seven days a week, four weeks per month, and twelve months per year; and their relationship grew stronger as the years went by from 1950 when they met, to 1960 when she deeded the property to him, and that intimate relationship continued for an additional five years until Mr. Dill's death.

Concerning the execution of the deed, appellant testified:

'(M)y health was beginning to fade in 1960 and I was afraid I would not be able to carry on much longer and I worried quite a bit about it and Mr. Dill, in order to relieve me of all of these worries, offered to take over for me.

* * *

* * *

He offered to take over, look after the farm, see it was planted, collect the rents and see I got my rent and he would see I was taken care of if I got sick, he would see my doctor bills and medical bills were paid and I had a home as long as I lived. After my death--we never figured I would out-live him--after my death he was to collect the rents and divide the profits with my two sisters, my oldest sister is in Sikeston, Missouri in a nursing home and the other sister is in California. He was to divide the income between them and after their death he was to have full possession.

* * *

* * * I decided I would rather give him a deed to it than leave it in a will because I was wanting to save him inheritance taxes. He would have to pay inheritance tax if he inherited through a will.' (Emphasis supplied).

Appellant denied receiving the Ten Dollars consideration recited in the deed and contended that she intended, and that Mr. Dill knew, that their full agreement as to looking after and caring for her during her lifetime, and then paying the rents from the farm to her sisters during their lifetime, was to have been incorporated in the deed. Appellant's life estate was very clearly incorporated in the deed and certainly the chancellor could have concluded that ten years of close daily companionship, as testified by the appellant, would have included 'services performed' as sufficient consideration to support a deed for the remainder following a life estate. According to appellant's testimony, she trusted Mr. Dill to have their entire agreement incorporated in the deed; she did not read the deed when she signed it, and after she delivered it to Mr. Dill, she did not see it again until after Mr. Dill's death on June 14, 1965, when she read the deed for the first time, and learned that all of their agreement was not incorporated in the body of the deed.

According to appellant's testimony on cross-examination, she had been receiving cash rent from her farm, but after the deed to Mr. Dill the land was leased on a crop rent basis, which enabled them to transfer the cotton allotment to more productive land. Mr. Dill went to the farm two or three times a week and appellant went with him on many occasions. Mr. Dill took appellant anywhere she wanted to go, and when Mr. Dill was on his way to Florida he was advised that appellant was ill and he returned without finishing his trip.

Mrs. Johnnie Meadows, one of the daughters of Mr. Dill, testified:

'Q. Did you or did you not know such a deed was in existence?

A. No, sir, I certainly don't know a thing about it.

Q. Did you, after your father's death, visit with Miss Stella?

A. Very often.

Q. During that period of time did you and she discuss this land and her getting it back?

A. On the telephone a few times we have. I don't think on visits we ever did.

Q. That was the only mention of that?

A. On the telephone we have discussed it.

Q. Did you offer to release your interest in these lands to her on the basis that you knew your father had not put any money in these lands or paid any consideration for them?

A. No, not on that basis because I didn't know about their business particularly.

Q. What was the basis?

A. Because Miss Stella and I have always been real good friends and that friendship means more than the money or the land.

Q. Do you know whether or not your father put any money in this...

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7 cases
  • Stokes v. Stokes
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 28 d4 Abril d4 2016
    ...issue of an equitable lien to the jury). Traditionally, setting aside a deed has been an equitable remedy in Arkansas. Wood v. Swift, 244 Ark. 929, 428 S.W.2d 77 (1968). Additionally, an accounting is an equitable remedy. In re Estates of McKnight, 372 Ark. 376, 277 S.W.3d 173. Likewise, in......
  • Rose v. Dunn, 84-143
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 13 d2 Novembro d2 1984
    ...for himself. Support deeds are unquestionably valid in Arkansas. Welch v. Brewer, 267 Ark. 763, 590 S.W.2d 325 (1979); Wood v. Swift, 244 Ark. 929, 428 S.W.2d 77 (1968). The owner of property who is mentally competent may dispose of it as he sees fit. O'Conner v. Patton, 171 Ark. 626, 286 S......
  • Gilbert ex rel. Roberts v. Rainey
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • 20 d3 Março d3 2002
    ...deed, the grantor may sue at law for damages, or may sue in equity to cancel the deed for failure of consideration. See Wood v. Swift, 244 Ark. 929, 428 S.W.2d 77 (1968); Welch v. Brewer, 267 Ark. 763, 590 S.W.2d 325 (Ark.App.1979). Evidence of failure of consideration to justify setting as......
  • Gilbert v. Rainey
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • 20 d3 Março d3 2002
    ...deed, the grantor may sue at law for damages, or may sue in equity to cancel the deed for failure of consideration. See Wood v. Swift, 244 Ark. 929, 428 S.W.2d 77 (1968); Welch v. Brewer, 267 Ark. 763, 590 S.W.2d 325 (Ark. App. 1979). Evidence of failure of consideration to justify setting ......
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