Wood v. Town of Milton

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: RUGG, J.
• Citation: Wood v. Town of Milton, 197 Mass. 531, 84 N.E. 332 (Mass. 1908)
• Decision Date: 28 February 1908
• Parties: WOOD et al. v. TOWN OF MILTON.

197 Mass. 531

84 N.E. 332

WOOD et al. v. TOWN OF MILTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

February 28, 1908

COUNSEL

Chas F. Hall, for petitioners.

A. R Tisdale, for respondent town.

OPINION

RUGG J.

The single question presented is whether, after it has been voted at a town meeting to postpone indefinitely an article in the warrant to see if the town will accept a street as laid out by the selectmen, the town can, at a subsequent meeting called upon a new warrant containing an appropriate article vote to accept the same street as originally laid out without further or renewed action of the selectmen touching the subject. Primarily it is necessary to ascertain the meaning of the vote to indefinitely postpone the acceptance of the street. It is of assistance in interpreting language to consider the nature of the body or person by whom it is used. A town meeting is a single gathering of the voters of a town, called for the purpose of considering only those subjects distinctly set forth in the warrant by which the citizens are summoned. Such a meeting, although commonly consisting of but a single session, may be adjourned from time to time in order to finish its business. It is not self-perpetuating nor is it a legislative body with fixed sessions. It passes out of existence with the performance of the particular duties which called it into being. Its dissolution without affirmative action as to any of the matters properly before it is ordinarily equivalent to their rejection. The meeting, once dissolved, never can be brought into being again. Other business of the town can be transacted only at a new meeting, called upon another warrant, which will set forth only the subjects it can pass upon. It is not a representative body, but a pure democracy, where the citizens, as to matters within their jurisdiction, administer the affairs of the town in person. It exercises both legislative and executive functions. The freest discussion prevails, yet in some respects its proceedings are inherently somewhat summary. The technical rules of parliamentary law, designed for the regulation of deliberative assemblies, are in some respects ill adapted for the transaction of the affairs of a town meeting. Hence, although in general the action of town meetings conforms to parliamentary procedure, it never has been held that they are governed by the strict rules of legislative practice. Hunneman v. Grafton, 10 Metc. 454. The ample powers possessed by moderators, recognized from earliest times and growing out of the imperative needs of the office, are inconsistent with many incidents of ordinary parliamentary law. When a meeting of such powers, limitations and general characteristics votes, as to any of its articles, indefinite postponement, this action of necessity means that the meeting is opposed to the proposition presented. Indefinite postponement by a body having only definite present existence is the equivalent of complete disapproval. This conclusion is confirmed by the technical meaning, which the phrase has acquired in parliamentary usage. There is a consensus of opinion among writers upon this subject that it means suppression of the question, and is equivalent to a negative vote. Cushing, Law & Practice of Legislative Assemblies, § 1386; Crocker,...