Wood v. Trenchard

• Decision Date: 01 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 4560,4560
• Parties: W. Doyle WOOD, a/k/a William D. Wood, and Jane L. Wood, Appellants (Defendants below), v. Mary H. TRENCHARD, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 490

550 P.2d 490

W. Doyle WOOD, a/k/a William D. Wood, and Jane L. Wood, Appellants (Defendants below), v. Mary H. TRENCHARD, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 4560.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

June 1, 1976.

Stephen E. Cole, Worland, for appellants.

J. Patrick Hand and I. Vincent Case, Jr., of Hand, Hand & Hand, Douglas, for appellee.

Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, RAPER, THOMAS, and ROSE, JJ.

GUTHRIE, Chief Justice.

Appellants, defendants below, present this appeal from the grant of a summary judgment by the district court on the pleadings and affidavits of the parties. This action was instituted by the plaintiff to quiet title and secure possession in certain lands in Natrona County, Wyoming, ¹ which the defendants now claim by virtue of a lease secured from Harry Gourley, who was seized with a life tenancy at the time of the execution of the lease.

The lands in question were originally owned by Harry Gourley, who on November 23, 1955, conveyed them to Harry C. Gourley, his son, by warranty deed which was recorded November 26, 1955. Thereafter Harry C. Gourley, on February 15, 1956, made and recorded an affidavit reciting that he was the grantee in the deed from his father, and although it was omitted it was their intention at the time of the execution of the original deed that Harry Gourley reserve and have a life estate in the premises, and the son acknowledged that he held the title to the real estate subject to his father's right to occupy and live upon the lands during his lifetime. ² At the time of the filing of this proceeding plaintiff, appellee here, claimed by virtue of a warranty deed from Harry C. Gourley. On August 26, 1969, Harry Gourley gave a lease to appellants for a ten-year term, which was recorded September 5, 1969. Thereafter, on October 5, 1972, Harry Gourley by agreement extended the term of the lease for ten years, or to and until December 1, 1989. On June 27, 1973, Harry Gourley died at the age of 86.

Before proceeding to other areas of discussion, there are certain general rules of law which must be considered in connection with this disposal. A life tenant cannot make a lease for a term extending beyond his lifetime, Haywood v. Briggs, 227 N.C. 108, 41 S.E.2d 289, 171 A.L.R. 480, 486, and annotation beginning at 489. A most succinct statement of this appears in 4 Thompson on Real Property, § 1896, p. 717 (1961 Repl.): 'The life tenant cannot lease beyond his own life.' Appellants must be presumed to know the law, In re Hartt's Estate, 75 Wyo. 305, 295 P.2d 985, 1001, and Cooley v. Frank, 68 Wyo. 436, 235 P.2d 446, 451, and must be charged with the notice that Harry C. Gourley owned the fee simple title at the date of the lease and that the father could not lease it for a term past his lifetime. Appellants cannot claim that they did not know Harry C. Gourley was the owner of these premises by virtue of the recording of the conveyance from his father at the time they secured this lease because a subsequent purchaser has constructive notice of the title, Crozier v. Malone, Wyo., 366 P.2d 125, 127, and § 34-21, W.S.1957.

It is improper to grant a summary judgment if there is any real issue of material fact, Godard v. Ridgway, Wyo., 445 P.2d 757, 759; Kover v. Hufsmith, Wyo., 496 P.2d 908, 910; but a material fact is one which 'would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential * * * defense(s) asserted by the party,' and if the asserted conflict does not meet this test, a summary judgment is proper, Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867, 872. We have suggested earlier it is the duty of both parties in a summary judgment matter to come forward with their evidence to demonstrate the existence or lack of a conflict of the material facts, McClure v. Watson, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1059, 1062, and Clouser v. Spaniol Ford, Inc., Wyo., 522 P.2d 1360, 1363, but we have not been faced with a factual situation similar to this case. Here the appellee made a prima facie case of a right to have judgment by proof of title in herself. The record also demonstrated that it was subject only to a life estate which had terminated by reason of the death of the life tenant. Absent some impeachment or avoidance of the effect of these instruments, plaintiff had made a prima facie case, which would have entitled her to a directed verdict if that is all that was in the record. Appellants do not attack her title, which is understandable because that came from a common source. There is, however, the well-recognized rule which is applicable hereto:

'However, if the movant makes out a prima facie case that would entitle him to a directed verdict if uncontroverted at trial, summary judgment will be granted unless the party opposing the motion offers some competent evidence that could be presented at trial showing that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact. One commentator explains this process as follows: 'the burden of producing evidence is shifted to the party opposing the motion.' * * *' 10 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2727, pp. 536-537 (1973).

In support thereof see Stansifer v. Chrysler Motors Corporation, 9 Cir., 487 F.2d 59, 63; James v. Honaker Drilling, Inc., 10 Cir., 254 F.2d 702, 706; and Gifford v. Travlers Protective Ass'n of America, 9 Cir., 153 F.2d 209, 211. We will determine this mater under this rule, and unless appellants herein have come forward with competent evidence to avoid the effect of appellee's showing, this judgment must be affirmed.

Appellants do not deny the rule that a life tenant cannot make a lease for a term extending beyond his lifetime, but they claim an exception to the effect that the rule applies only 'in the absence of consent of, ratification by, or estoppel of the remainderman,' 31 C.J.S. Estates § 54, p. 116. The appellants' claim here is based upon two affirmative defenses by which they seek to avoid the effect of the appellee's instruments demonstrating her title. First, that appellee and her husband, who conveyed these premises to her, ratified and acquiesced in the lease and its extension. Second, that because of their conduct and action, appellee may not assert her claim by virtue of an equitable estoppel.

Where a lease for a term of years must be in writing, any ratification of it by the remainderman must also be in writing, Edwards v. Griffin, 228 Ark. 844, 310 S.W.2d 798, 800; Austin & Bass Builders, Inc., v. Lewis, Mo., 359 S.W.2d 711, 715; 51 Am.Jur.2d Life Tenants and Remaindermen, § 97, p. 345; and there can be no question that a lease for this term of years must be in writing by virtue of our statute, § 16-1 Fifth, W.S.1957. Since appellants rest their principal basis of ratification upon the two statements made by Harry C. Gourley, which will be set out and discussed later in this opinion, it is apparent that any conflict which involves oral statements or actions of appellee or a predecessor in interest is not material because it could not effect a...