Wood v. United States
Decision Date | 25 March 1936 |
Docket Number | No. 6646.,6646. |
Citation | 65 App. DC 330,83 F.2d 587 |
Parties | WOOD v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Robert I. Miller, William E. Leahy, and William J. Hughes, Jr., all of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
L. C. Garnett, U. S. Atty., and Irvin Goldstein, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Washington, D.C.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, GRONER, and STEPHENS, Associate Justices.
Appellant was convicted of petty larceny in the police court of the District of Columbia, and sentenced to 240 days' confinement in jail. We shall call him defendant.
At his trial, twelve prospective jurors were called. In their examination it was disclosed that one of them was the holder of a "bonus certificate"; another was a clerk in the United States Weather Bureau; another a clerk in the Federal Emergency Administration; another a clerk in the Treasury Department; and another a clerk in the Navy Yard. One was a Civil War pensioner. Counsel for defendant challenged each of these prospective jurors individually and collectively for cause, on the ground that each had an interest in the United States which disqualified him to sit in the trial of a criminal case to which the United States was a party. The court disallowed the challenge. When the jury was finally impaneled and sworn, one of the 12 was a clerk in the Treasury Department, one a clerk in the Navy Yard, and one a recipient of a Civil War pension. All had been challenged for cause, both before and after the exhaustion of defendant's peremptory challenges. The case was tried. A motion for a new trial, urged on the ground that the jury was illegally constituted, was overruled and sentence imposed. We granted an appeal because of the importance of the question involved.
On the appeal, the United States relies upon a recent statute, Act of August 22, 1935 (Session Laws, 1st Sess., 74th Congress 1935, part 1, 49 Stat. p. 682), entitled, "An Act To amend the law providing for exemptions from jury service in the District of Columbia." It reads as follows:
Prior to the passage of this statute, the provision with relation to the qualifications of a juror was that he should be a citizen of the United States, a resident of the District of Columbia, over 21 and under 65 years of age, able to read and write and understand the English language, and a person who had never been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. In 1908, the Supreme Court held in Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 29 S.Ct. 260, 264, 53 L.Ed. 465, 15 Ann. Cas. 392, that an employee of the United States was not qualified to serve as a member of a petit jury in the District of Columbia in the trial of a criminal case. The effect of the decision and of others of like nature which followed, resulted, it is said, in narrowing the eligible list of jurors in the District to the point where it sometimes became difficult to secure jurors possessing the necessary qualifications. To correct this, Congress extended the list of eligibles to include employees of the United States and of the District of Columbia, officers and enlisted men of the National Guard and of the Military, Naval, Marine, and Coast Guard Reserve Corps, notaries public, postmasters, and recipients of pensions and gratuities from the United States or the District, as well as those having contracts with the United States or the District; and the question we have to decide is whether this statute, when applied in a criminal case like the present, is in violation of the provisions of the Sixth Amendment guaranteeing to the accused in all criminal prosecutions the right of trial by an impartial jury. Stated otherwise, the question is whether defendant has been accorded a trial by an impartial jury within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.
It is, of course, elementary that all the provisions of the Constitution are in all respects applicable to the District of Columbia. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 550, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 1304, 32 L.Ed. 223; Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5, 19 S.Ct. 580, 43 L.Ed. 873; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S.Ct. 770, 777, 45 L.Ed. 1088. And in the Downes Case, the court said:
It is equally elementary that the word "jury" and the words "trial by jury" and "impartial jury" should be construed with reference to the meanings they had in England and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S.Ct. 620, 42 L. Ed. 1061. The American colonists regarded the right to trial by jury, which, of course, means trial by an impartial jury, as "the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy." They regarded their claim to it as the clear and inevitable result of their origin and historical development. 2 Story on the Constitution, § 1779.
At common law, employees or servants of a party to a suit were disqualified as jurors on the theory of implied prejudice or bias. In Coke's Commentary on Littleton's Institute (p. 155) it is stated: "He that is of a jury, must be liber homo, that is, not only a free-man and not bond, but also one that hath such freedom of mind as he stands indifferent as he stands unsworn."
And Blackstone defined a principal cause of challenge as one "where the cause assigned carries with it prima facie evident marks of suspicion either of malice or favour"; and this situation, he declared, exists as to jurors in all cases of the relation of master and servant. 3 Black.Comm. 358.
Without more, therefore, it is safe to say that at common law the relationship of employer and employee worked an absolute disqualification, and this was equally true in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. But it is insisted, on the part of the United States, that, since the right to establish qualifications for those who shall serve as jurors is a matter intrusted to the state, it is within...
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