Wood v. Vaughan

• Decision Date: 14 September 1962
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 535.
• Citation: 209 F. Supp. 106
• Parties: Virgil WOOD et al., Plaintiffs, v. William VAUGHAN, Mayor, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

209 F. Supp. 106

Virgil WOOD et al., Plaintiffs, v. William VAUGHAN, Mayor, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 535.

United States District Court W. D. Virginia, Lynchburg Division.

September 14, 1962.

Len Holt, Norfolk, Va., for plaintiffs.

S. Bolling Hobbs, Lynchburg, Va., C. Shepherd Nowlin, City Atty., Lynchburg, Va., for defendants Vaughan, McKenna, Bell, Brooks, Judge Earl Wingo and J. Hundley.

Frederick T. Gray, Atty. Gen., Va., Richmond, Va., for defendants Judges Burks and Cundiff.

MICHIE, District Judge.

The plaintiffs, Virgil Wood, O. C. Thaxton and T. N. Burton, alleging that they are "citizens of the United States and of the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, and environs and are members of the so-called Negro race or the so-called African race" filed this suit designated by them "an omnibus suit which seeks to end all racial segregation and all racial discrimination of all public facilities of the City of Lynchburg, Virginia" against William Vaughan, Mayor of Lynchburg, F. K. McKenna, Department of Parks, G. M. Bell, City Treasurer, R. O. Brooks, Chief of Police, J. Hundley, Department of Health and Welfare, Raymond Hogan, Administrator of the Lynchburg General Hospital, Judge Earl Wingo of the Municipal Court of Lynchburg, Judge O. Raymond Cundiff of the Corporation Court of Lynchburg and Judge C. Burk of the Circuit Court of Lynchburg, seeking a declaratory judgment and a temporary and permanent injunction to enjoin the defendants from discrimination on account of race in all of the public institutions of the City of Lynchburg and also to enjoin the appropriation of any public funds to any of such institutions so long as racial segregation and racial discrimination is enforced therein. The institutions specifically mentioned are the public swimming pools, the City Parks, the Lynchburg Nursing Home, the Lynchburg General Hospital, the City Jails, the city cemetery, the city Armory, the City Hall building and the municipal, corporation and circuit courts. Towards the end of the bill of complaint appear "some examples — by way of further pleadings—of racial segregation and racial discrimination in Lynchburg public institutions", to-wit, segregation by floors at the Lynchburg Nursing Home, in the swimming pools, in the rest rooms of some public facilities and in the walled portion of the City cemetery, as well as in the Lynchburg General Hospital and the Lynchburg Nursing School, with which two latter we are not here concerned for reasons that will shortly appear. In addition institutions and buildings said to be affected were elsewhere enumerated as the public swimming pools, the City Parks, the Lynchburg Nursing Home, the Lynchburg General Hospital, the City Jails, the city cemetery, the city Armory and the City Hall building and the municipal, corporation and circuit courts. The defendants Vaughan, McKenna, Bell, Brooks, Wingo and Hundley — all officers or employees of the City of Lynchburg — filed jointly a motion to dismiss the complaint, quash the summons and for a more definite statement. The Lynchburg General Hospital and Judges Cundiff and Burks filed somewhat similar motions. And the Attorney General of Virginia filed a somewhat similar but briefer motion on behalf of Judges Cundiff and Burks.

The motion of Judges Cundiff and Burks was granted, as well as a similar motion on behalf of Judge Wingo and this action of the court has been appealed by the plaintiffs and is now pending in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

One of the grounds urged by the City and Hospital officials for dismissing the complaint against them was that there was a misjoinder of causes of action. I held that there was such a misjoinder.

The Lynchburg General Hospital was an independent incorporated body created under Article 1 of Chap. 13 of Title 32 of the Code of Virginia and was not subject to control by the City. After the suit was instituted the plaintiffs moved to add the Hospital itself as a party.

It seemed to me that any right that the plaintiffs might have had against Mr. Hogan and the Lynchburg General Hospital could not have arisen out of the same "transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" (Fed.R. Civ.P. 20, 28 U.S.C.A.) which gave rise to rights against the City and the city officials and consequently I ordered a severance of the two causes of action and I will not be further concerned with the cause of action against Mr. Hogan and the Hospital in this opinion as that severed case has not as yet been heard.

The plaintiffs shortly after the argument on the defendants' motion to dismiss asked leave to join the City of Lynchburg, the City Sergeant of Lynchburg and the Hospital Authority as parties defendant and this motion was granted, except as to the City Sergeant, neither the court nor counsel either, apparently, being then familiar with the cases of Monroe v. Pape (1961), 365 U. S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 and Egan v. City of Aurora (1961), 365 U.S. 514, 81 S.Ct. 684, 5 L.Ed.2d 741 and cases in the District Courts and the Courts of Appeal following those decisions.

In Monroe v. Pape, supra, plaintiff sued the City of Chicago and other defendants for wrongfully breaking into his home in the early morning and ransacking the place without a search warrant and for inflicting various other indignities upon him.

The jurisdiction of this court is set forth as follows in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343:

"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:

* * * * * *

"(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;

"(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote." (Emphasis supplied.)

It will be observed that the introductory portion of the section refers to "any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person" so that the section itself, while defining the jurisdiction of the district courts, does not create any right on the part of any individual to sue. If he has that right it is provided that he may sue in the district court but one must look elsewhere to determine whether he has a right to sue. Hatfield v. Bailleaux (9th Cir.1961), 290 F.2d 632.

When we look elsewhere for authorization we must turn to section 1983 of 42 U.S.C.A. which reads as follows:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." (Emphasis supplied.)

In Monroe v. Pape, supra, the Supreme Court, held, in brief, that the City of Chicago was not a person and therefore could not be sued under the above quoted section for violation of a citizen's civil rights.

The court admitted that in certain cases before it judgments under similar circumstances had been rendered against cities but said in a footnote at page 191 of 365 U.S., 81 S.Ct. at page 486:

"The question dealt with in our opinion was not raised in those cases, either by the parties or by the Court. Since we hold that a municipal corporation is not a `person' within the meaning of § 1983, no inference to the contrary can any longer be drawn from those cases."

Upon motion of the City, based on Monroe v. Pape, supra, and made shortly before the case was scheduled to go on trial, the court stated that the City would in due course be dismissed as a defendant.

Inasmuch as the court and counsel had originally thought the City could be held responsible for everything done by its agents, the plaintiffs had not made parties to the suit all the officials of the City who might be charged with responsibility for the various actions alleged to be contrary to the plaintiffs' civil rights. Upon announcing my decision as to the dismissal of the City I stated that I would give the complainants leave to make additional parties defendants and would postpone the hearing of the case until that could be done. Counsel for the complainants however, stating that he thought my ruling as to the City was erroneous, stood on his position and declined the opportunity to add other parties. So the trial proceeded.

While the original bill of complaint was entirely devoted to alleged discriminations by city officials involving segregation of the races, in the parks, playgrounds, etc. of the City, the plaintiffs later filed a document entitled "Specificity of Segregation" which might be deemed to be somewhat in the nature of a bill of particulars though none had been asked for. This document raised questions of discrimination as between Negroes and whites in the appointment of persons to positions in the Fire and Police Departments of the City and of promotion within the latter and generally throughout the City. It also raised questions as to the selection of election officials, service at polling places, jury lists, jury commissioners, etc. The City raises the point that this document was not an amended bill of complaint, was filed without consent of court and has no official standing in the case and therefore cannot be used as a basis for raising those new points in the trial. Technically the City may be right but the matters were gone into very thoroughly at the trial and for the purposes of this opinion I shall treat the "Specificity" as a bill of particulars or amended bill of complaint.

However, by concession of coun...