Wood v. Village of Grayslake

Decision Date20 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 2-91-0966,2-91-0966
Citation170 Ill.Dec. 590,229 Ill.App.3d 343,593 N.E.2d 132
Parties, 170 Ill.Dec. 590 Keith WOOD, a Disabled Person, By and Through his Coguardians and Next Friends, Nancy Harrold et al., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The VILLAGE OF GRAYSLAKE et al., Defendants-Appellees (Gayle Kostycz, Defendant).
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Thomas J. Tyrrell, Ltd., Jeffrey D. Javors, Melissa L. Granholm, Tyrrell, Etchingham & Assoc., Chicago, for Nancy Harrold and Ronald C. Wood.

Dennis J. Cotter, Glen E. Amundsen, Mary T. Nagel, Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Waukegan, Kurnik, Cipolla, Stephenson, Barasha & O'Dell, Arlington Heights, for

Village of Grayslake, County of Lake and Highway Dept. Lake Co.

Vincent C. Cipolla, Kurnik, Cipolla, Stephenson & Barasha, Ltd., Arlington Heights, Leo J. Sullivan, Sullivan, Smith, Hauser & Noonan, Ltd., Waukegan, for Gayle Kostycz.

Justice McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Keith C. Wood, plaintiff, a disabled person, by and through his coguardians and next friends Nancy Harrold and Ronald C. Wood, appeals from an order dismissing his third amended complaint against the Village of Grayslake (the Village), the County of Lake, and the Highway Department of County of Lake, an agent of the County of Lake (hereinafter collectively referred to as the County), defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Route 83 runs in a northwesterly/southeasterly direction and intersects with Lake Street, a north/south road, at an angle in the County of Lake. On September 20, 1988, at approximately 10 p.m., Keith Wood was operating his motorcycle on Route 83 in a northwesterly direction near its intersection with Lake Street. At the same time, Gayle Kostycz was travelling north on Lake Street. Wood's motorcycle collided with a vehicle driven by Kostycz at this intersection, and Wood suffered permanent and disabling injuries. At the time of the collision, the intersection was controlled by stop signs on Lake Street for northbound and southbound traffic. Motorists travelling on Route 83 were not subject to any traffic control devices and were not required to stop.

Plaintiff's third amended complaint alleged that the Illinois Highway Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 121, par. 1-101 et seq.), the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-304), and a maintenance agreement between the County of Lake and the State of Illinois imposed the following duties on the Village and the County:

To exercise ordinary care to inspect, control, regulate and maintain the public streets and roads, within and without its jurisdiction, in good repair and in a reasonably safe manner, and to provide, inspect, control and maintain adequate traffic signs, markings and devices, warning of dangers to motorists approaching the intersections of Route 83 and Lake Street and to provide adequate traffic control devices to regulate, guide or warn traffic of the unusual nature of the intersection which endangered the safe movement of traffic, said conditions not being reasonably apparent to or anticipated by a person in the exercise of due care and, further, to warn motorists of hazards adjacent to the roadway and to remove public nuisances adjacent to the roadway.

In separate counts, the complaint alleged that the Village negligently and/or intentionally or recklessly committed the following acts and omissions:

(1) Failed to provide sufficient traffic control signs, markings and devices at or near the intersection to provide a warning to northbound traffic on Lake Street of the presence of an intersecting northwesterly/southwesterly roadway (namely Route 83);

(2) failed to improve the existing traffic control devices by erecting signs or devices warning that cross-traffic on Route 83 does not stop and that the intersection is dangerous;

(3) failed to clear obstructions at the southeast corner of the intersection, namely an advertising sign, cement posts, and illegally parked automobiles, which hindered the view of oncoming traffic to motorists;

(4) failed to erect and maintain signs, markings or devices warning motorists that cross-traffic on Route 83 had an open intersection and was not required to stop or reduce speed;

(5) failed to reduce the designated speed limit on Route 83;

(6) failed to provide, erect or install stop signs, markings or other traffic control signals at or near all corners of the intersection to fully control the intersection;

(7) failed to maintain the crossroad indication sign on Route 83 located 650 feet southeast of its intersection with Lake Street at the time of the collision;

(8) failed to erect a sign on Lake Street warning motorists travelling on Lake Street approaching Route 83 that the crossroad indication sign 650 feet southeast of the intersection on Route 83 was not present and had been missing for an appreciable length of time; and

(9) otherwise failed to adequately control, maintain, inspect and regulate said highways.

Next, plaintiff alleged that the County of Lake and the Highway Department negligently and/or intentionally or recklessly committed the following acts and omissions:

(1) Failed to provide sufficient traffic control signs, markings and devices at or near the intersection to provide a warning to northwesterly bound traffic on Route 83 of the presence of an intersecting north/south roadway (namely Lake Street);

(2) failed to improve the existing traffic control devices by erecting signs or devices warning that the approaching intersection is dangerous, and implement other protective measures for traffic, including placing stop signs or signals to control traffic in all directions;

(3) failed to clear obstructions at the southeast corner of the intersection, namely an advertising sign, cement posts, and illegally parked automobiles, which hindered the view of oncoming traffic to motorists;

(4) failed to erect and maintain signs, markings or devices warning motorists that they were approaching a dangerous intersection;

(5) failed to reduce the designated speed limit on Route 83;

(6) failed to erect and maintain signs, markings or devices warning motorists that the aforementioned obstructions at the southeast corner of the intersection created an unanticipated and unsafe condition;

(7) failed to maintain the crossroad indication sign on Route 83 located 650 feet southeast of its intersection with Lake Street at the time of the collision;

(8) failed to erect a sign on Lake Street warning motorists travelling on Lake Street approaching Route 83 that the crossroad indication sign 650 feet southeast of the intersection on Route 83 was not present and had been missing for an appreciable length of time; and

(9) otherwise failed to adequately control, maintain, inspect and regulate said highways.

The complaint supported its wilful and wanton allegations by attaching reports of collisions occurring at the intersection in the prior four years. Knowledge of the hazardous nature of the intersection was also asserted by virtue of a safety investigation of the intersection commissioned by the Village.

In response, the Village moved to dismiss the third amended complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-615) on the basis that the third amended complaint essentially repleaded the allegations previously presented in the second amended complaint which was dismissed pursuant to a prior section 2-615 motion. The Village also maintained its position that it does not have a duty to maintain the crossroad sign because it is located on a State highway under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation.

In turn, the County moved to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-619(a)(9)). The County asserted that it has no jurisdiction over the roadways in question and therefore owed no duty to plaintiff to control or maintain the intersection. The County further asserted that, even if it did have a such a duty, the intersection was not the proximate cause of the collision and also that the allegations of wilful and wanton conduct were insufficient because the County had no actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous nature of the intersection. After a hearing, the court entered an order dismissing plaintiff's third amended complaint against the Village and the County with prejudice pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code.

When the grounds for a dismissal do not appear on the face of the pleadings, but are established by affidavits or depositions, a defendant may contest the complaint through either a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-619) or a motion for summary judgment (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-1005). (Quinton v. Kuffer (1991), 221 Ill.App.3d 466, 469, 164 Ill.Dec. 88, 582 N.E.2d 296.) The purpose of a section 2-619 motion is to dispose of issues of law or easily proved issues of fact. (Brown v. Chicago Park District (1991), 218 Ill.App.3d 612, 615, 161 Ill.Dec. 353, 578 N.E.2d 999.) A dismissal on the pleadings is warranted only if it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved which would entitle the plaintiff to recover. (Gouge v. Central Illinois Public Service Co. (1991), 144 Ill.2d 535, 542, 163 Ill.Dec. 842, 582 N.E.2d 108; Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights (1990), 139 Ill.2d 501, 505, 152 Ill.Dec. 121, 565 N.E.2d 654.) In reviewing the propriety of a section 2-619 dismissal, we must assume all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint as true. However, conclusions of law or fact unsupported by specific factual allegations may be disregarded. (Nagy v. Beckley (1991), 218 Ill.App.3d 875, 878, 161 Ill.Dec. 488, 578 N.E.2d 1134.) In this case, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's third amended complaint without specifically noting its rationale. However, a section 2-619 dismissal may be...

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