Wood v. Walton

• Decision Date: 29 February 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. WDQ–09–3398.
• Citation: 855 F.Supp.2d 494
• Parties: Joseph Edward WOOD, Plaintiff, v. Dean Anthony WALTON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

855 F.Supp.2d 494

Joseph Edward WOOD, Plaintiff,

v.Dean Anthony WALTON, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. WDQ–09–3398.

United States District Court,

D. Maryland,

Northern Division.

Feb. 29, 2012.

Mark E. Rosasco, Hyatt and Weber PA, Annapolis, MD, for Plaintiff.

Craig Kaiser Ronald, Ronald S. Landsman Attorney at Law, M. Hamilton Whitman, Jr., Jack Daley, Kelly M. Preteroti, Ober Kaler Grimes and Shriver PC, Baltimore, MD, Winn C. Friddell, Bodie Nagle Dolina Smith and Hobbs PA, Jake E. Zellweger, H. Barritt Peterson and Associates, Towson, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM D. QUARLES, JR., District Judge.

Joseph Wood sued Dean Walton and KMGP Services Company, Inc. (“KMGP”) for negligence, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) for breach of contract. For the following reasons, KMGP's motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.¹

I. Background ²

KMGP operates a Baltimore facility that unloads cargo ships for a steel mill. Len Crescenzo Dep. 8:16–9:2, Sept. 1, 2010. In summer 2008, KMGP hired Walton, a Louisiana citizen, as a temporary crane operator in Baltimore. Dean Walton Dep. 6:12–13, 7:5–8, 19:22–20:4, Oct. 22, 2010. Walton worked the night shift, 7 p.m. to 7 a.m., but did not work every day during his Baltimore stay. ³ His job was “[d]ischarging boat coal out of [a] ship and putting it on the bank.” Id. 29:11–16.

While in Baltimore, KMGP supplied Walton with a hotel room, allowances for meals, a rental car and fuel. Len Crescenzo Dep. 18:21–20:3, 59:1–17. The company allowed Walton to drive the rental car for personal use, and told Walton not to take out insurance for the rental car. Id. 40:1–21; Dean Walton Dep., 31:11–16.

A written KMGP policy prohibited alcohol on the job,⁴ but the Baltimore facility was “kind of a drinking place.” ⁵ The company allowed employees to drink during company sponsored business or social functions “where the use of alcohol remain[ed] moderate.” Policy at 2. Supervisors could be reimbursed by the company for taking employees out to happy hours. Len Crescenzo Dep. 51:5–8. Violations of the alcohol policy “[would] result in disciplinary action ..., up to and including termination.” Policy at 6.

Despite the policy prohibiting drinking on the job, employees routinely drank alcohol during the night shift. Dean Walton Dep. 58:4–60:22. One employee regularly made and distributed “snow balls”—vodka or bourbon poured over shaved ice. Id. 58:4–60:1–9. Walton's shift supervisor, Mike Elias, knew of this custom and sometimes consumed snowballs while working. Id. 61:19–62:11. When a co-worker first offered Walton a snowball, Walton accepted, not knowing that it contained alcohol. Id. 59:9–15. Although Walton “wasn't into drinking like that,” he “didn't want to hurt [the co-worker's] feelings.” Id. 59:14–18. He “held [the snowball] for a while” then threw it away when the co-worker wasn't looking. Id. 59:18–19. Walton never took another bite of a snowball. Id. 60:22–61:6.

After the night shift, the crane operators, truck driver, and front-end loader regularly went to a bar called The Fort, and Elias would buy the first one or two rounds of drinks. Id. 34:21–35:9. Elias showed Walton how to get to the bar, and Walton joined his co-workers “a couple of times” to “get a couple beers.” Id. 35:9–36:6. Walton would buy “the second round or the third round,” and Elias “wasn't used to [anybody] else buying them.” Id. 56:20–57:6.

On August 4, 2008, Walton joined his co-workers ⁶ at The Fort because “it was at the end of the job” and he “had a lot of peer pressure.” Id. 35:12–16. He stayed at the bar “[a] couple of hours,” “had quite a few” beers,⁷ and drank at least one shot of Jagermeister, a liqueur. Id. 40:1–14–41:16. Although he knew he was drunk, Walton tried to drive from the bar to his hotel. Id. 42:1–44:3. Walton ran a red light and collided with Wood, who was turning through an intersection on a motorcycle.ECF No. 42 at 2. Wood was severely injured. ECF No. 48 at 1–2.⁸

On September 23 and November 13, 2009, Wood sued Walton for negligence, KMGP for vicarious liability and negligent entrustment and supervision, and others in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. ECF Nos. 2, 6. Wood also sued his insurer, State Farm, for failing to honor his uninsured motorist coverage. Id. On December 18, 2009, the case was removed to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.⁹

On May 21, 2010, 2010 WL 2106461, the Court granted summary judgment to Wood on the issue of Walton's liability, finding that Walton had negligently injured Wood. ECF No. 42 at 8.

On August 26, 2011, KMGP moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 74. On September 12, 2011, State Farm opposed that motion. ECF No. 75. On September 16, 2011, Wood and Walton opposed the motion. ECF Nos. 76, 77. On October 3, 2011, KMGP filed its reply. ECF No. 79.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, “the judge's function is not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor,” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir.2002), but the Court also “must abide by the affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial,” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir.2003).

B. KMGP's Motion

KMGP argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the vicarious liability claim because, at the time of the accident, Walton was not acting within the scope of his employment, he lacked KMGP's authority to drive while intoxicated, and KMGP did not ratify his conduct. ECF No. 74–1 at 2. KMGP contends that Wood's negligent entrustment and supervision claims ¹⁰ also must fail because he cannot show that the company knew or should have known that Walton would use the rented vehicle in a dangerous manner, or that KMGP failed to use proper care in hiring or training Walton. Id. at 2, 11.

The other parties counter that neither claim can be resolved by summary judgment because each involves a genuine dispute of material fact. ECF No. 75 at 7; ECF No. 76–1 at 4, 10/ ECF No. 77 at 4–5.

1. Vicarious Liability

Under Maryland law,¹¹ an employer may be liable for acts “which his [employee] does with the actual or apparent authority of the [employer], ... the [employee] does within the scope of his employment, or ... the [employer] ratifies with the knowledge of all the material facts.” See, e.g., Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 660 A.2d 423, 426 (1995) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

a. Scope of Employment

Wood and Walton argue that Walton was acting within the scope of his employment during his entire stay in Maryland. ECF No. 76–1 at 6; ECF No. 77 at 15. Walton contends that, but for his employment with KMGP, he “would have [had] no reason to be in the State of Maryland” at the time of the accident. ECF No. 77 at 15. KMGP counters that no case supports “this unsubstantiated leap,” and Maryland courts would likely follow other jurisdictions that have rejected “this ‘perpetual’ scope of employment theory.” ECF No. 79 at 5–8.

“Whether an ... individual's conduct falls within the scope of employment is normally a question for the jury.” S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 836 A.2d 627, 639 n. 6 (2003). “Nevertheless, where but one reasonable inference can be drawn from the undisputed material facts, the question is one of law for the court.” Henderson v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 78 Md.App. 126, 552 A.2d 935, 941 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1989).

An employee's acts fall within the scope of his employment if “they were done by the [employee] in furtherance” of the employer's business, “and were such as may fairly be said to have been authorized by him.” ¹² An act is “authorized” if it is “incident to the performance of the duties entrusted to [the employee] by the [employer], even though in opposition to his express and positive orders.” ¹³

“In applying this test, there are few, if any absolutes,” Sawyer, 587 A.2d at 471, but Maryland courts have cited with approval the Restatements of Agency.¹⁴ Thus, to be within the scope of employment under Maryland law, conduct must (1) be of the kind the employee is hired to perform, (2) occur during a period “not unreasonably disconnected from the authorized period of employment,” (3) take place in “a locality not unreasonably distant from the authorized area,” and (4) be “actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the [employer].” Sawyer, 587 A.2d at 471. Maryland courts also consider whether the employer “has reason to expect that such act will be done,” or furnishes the “instrumentality by which the harm is done.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

In cases involving negligent use of an automobile, Maryland courts have held that an employer may be vicariously liable if the employee is “engaged at the time in furthering the [employer's] business” and

the [employer] expressly or impliedly consents to the use of the automobile, and had the right to control the [employee] in its operation, or else the use of the automobile was of such vital importance in furthering the [employer's] business that his control over it might reasonably be...