Wood v. Wood

• Citation: 292 S.C. 43,354 S.E.2d 796
• Decision Date: 23 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 0919,0919
• Parties: Judith Tomerlin WOOD, Respondent, v. G. Thomas WOOD, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 796

354 S.E.2d 796

292 S.C. 43

Judith Tomerlin WOOD, Respondent, v. G. Thomas WOOD, Appellant.

No. 0919.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Feb. 23, 1987.

Decided March 30, 1987.

Moss, Bailey, Dore & Kuhn, P.A., Beaufort, for appellant.

Harper & Harper, P.A., Beaufort, for respondent.

CURETON, Judge:

In this divorce action the former husband, Dr. G. Thomas Wood, appeals the awards of equitable distribution, alimony, and attorney fees to his former wife, Judith Tomerlin Wood. We find the record insufficient to support the trial judge's equitable distribution award or to allow us to make our own determination of the fairness of the award. Consequently, we remand all issues to the trial court for proper findings and determination of equitable distribution and attendant determinations of alimony and attorney fees.

The parties were married in 1982. They had lived together since 1976 and had two sons, born in 1979 and 1981. Mrs. Wood had previously worked as a real estate agent, but in 1977 went to work for Dr. Wood in his general surgery practice on Hilton Head Island. She continued to work for the practice until shortly after their marriage. In the past several years she has returned to part-time real estate work.

The couple separated several times during the marriage. They reconciled in January 1984 but separated once again in November of that year. Mrs. Wood petitioned for a divorce on the ground of adultery, equitable distribution, sole interest and possession of the marital home, alimony, child support, and attorney fees. The court required Dr. Wood to pay unallocated pendente lite support of $4000.00 per month and granted Mrs. Wood sole possession of the marital home and attorney fees.

The divorce hearing was held on August 26 and 27, 1985 with the final order issued on September 27, 1985. Mrs. Wood was granted a divorce, a special equity in Dr. Wood's professional association, $1,000.00 per month alimony, custody of the children, $1,000.00 per month child support, the marital residence free and clear of any liens, some debentures and a $10,000.00 attorney fee. Dr. Wood appeals, arguing the judge erroneously valued and distributed the marital assets, erred in awarding Mrs. Wood lifetime alimony and medical insurance benefits, and erred in awarding her a $10,000.00 attorney fee.

I.

We first consider the equitable distribution award. Dr. Wood argues the judge erred in awarding Mrs. Wood a 63% equitable interest in marital assets where the order misidentified certain property as marital assets, erroneously valued certain assets, and failed to determine Mrs. Wood's respective contributions to the acquisition of these assets.

In determining an equitable distribution of property, the trial judge should make findings of facts as to identity, value, and proper division of all marital property. Johnson v. Johnson, 288 S.C. 270, 341 S.E.2d 811 (Ct.App.1986); Foreman v. Foreman, 280 S.C. 461, 313 S.E.2d 312 (Ct.App.1984). The judge must also determine whether the parties made material contributions to the acquisition of property and must identify the proportionate contribution of each party. Brewington v. Brewington, 280 S.C. 502, 313 S.E.2d 53 (Ct.App.1984). The judge has wide discretion in determining an equitable distribution of marital property, and his judgment will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Gay v. Gay, 288 S.C. 74, 339 S.E.2d 532 (Ct.App.1986).

The most significant asset of the marital estate is Dr. Wood's medical practice, which the judge valued at $300,000.00. ¹ This value was apparently derived solely from evidence presented by Mrs. Wood. She testified that his medical charges and collections were around $250,000.00 per year, and that her valuation was based on the income the practice generated, all the equipment he owns, the value of which "I don't know offhand," and a value Dr. Wood put down on "some paper" that his accounts receivable were worth "around a hundred thousand dollars." Dr. Wood testified that he valued his practice at $8,000.00, the cost to replace his equipment, and $98,000.00 in accounts receivable, of which only approximately $60,000.00 were collectible. He also testified the practice had "a certain intrinsic worth" which could not be valued as it depended on whether he could continue to work. On cross-examination, he admitted that in a personal financial statement prepared for the purpose of securing a loan in April, 1983, the practice was valued at $200,000.00. He testified he believed Mrs. Wood had prepared the statement, although he signed it. This document was introduced into evidence, but does not appear in the record. The record does contain a schedule of assets prepared by Mrs. Wood, which values the practice at $325,000.00, and a schedule prepared by Dr. Wood which values it at $0. In addition, there is a deposition of Hubert Bernheim, accountant for the practice during 1985. Bernheim testified as to the practice's profits and earnings from October 1983 to the time of the hearing, and produced profit and loss financial statements for the business from a period beginning October 1, 1984. He did not, however, testify as to the value of the business.

In any equitable distribution of marital assets, the family court must determine the fair market value of the property "by considering the business' net asset value." Reid v. Reid, 280 S.C. 367, 312 S.E.2d 724 (Ct.App.1984). Moreover, while this Court held that in a business of this sort, which relies heavily on the skills and efforts of a sole owner, goodwill may be divisible, Casey v. Casey, 289 S.C. 462, 346 S.E.2d 726 (Ct.App.1986), cert. granted, Order of The Supreme Court of South Carolina February 17, 1987, the trial court made no effort to separate the value of Dr. Wood's potential for future earnings and the value, if any, of his medical practice without him as its employee.

We find the judge's valuation of the business at $300,000.00 to be unsupported by any competent evidence. In addition, the judge's values for the M.L. Barge property at $158,000.00, the Lemon Island property at $18,000.00, and the Governor's Road house at $50,000.00 are also unsupported by the evidence. Since a divorce proceeding is a matter in equity, this Court is entitled to find facts based upon our own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Baker v. Baker, 276 S.C. 427, 279 S.E.2d 601 (1981). In this case, however, the record is devoid of any competent evidence from which this Court can make determinations of value. Therefore, we remand to the family court to take further evidence from which to make a fair valuation of the marital assets for the purposes of...