Wood v. Yordy
| Decision Date | 03 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–35336.,12–35336. |
| Citation | 753 F.3d 899 |
| Parties | Lance Conway WOOD, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Keith YORDY, Ex–Deputy Warden at Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI); Steve Nelson, Ex–Deputy Warden at ISCI; Jay Christensen, Deputy Warden at ISCI; Eric MacEachern, Deputy Warden at Idaho Correctional Institution of Orofino (ICIO); Todd Martin, Deputy Warden of ICIO; Bill Finely, Sergeant of ISCI; Sandra Martin, Ex–Correctional Officer CIO of ICIO; LaWanda Thomason, Ex–Lieutenant at ICIO; Mike Ludlow, c/o at ISCI; Leslie Petersen, Coordinator at ISCI, Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Warren Postman (argued) and Shay Dvoretzky, Jones Day, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Michael J. Elia (argued) and Brady J. Hall, Moore & Elia, LLP, Boise, Idaho, for Defendants–Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No.1:07–cv–00350–EJL.
Before: MARY M. SCHROEDER, SIDNEY R. THOMAS, and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Lance Wood is an Idaho state prisoner with an apparent penchant for romantic (but, as all parties stress, not sexual) relationships with prison guards. When prison authorities found that he was utilizing chapel facilities for such purposes, they curtailed his opportunities for chapel access. He filed this action against individual prison officials under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), claiming they had imposed an unwarranted burden on his exercise of religion. The issue of first impression in this circuit is whether he may seek damages against prison officials in their individual capacities. We agree with the unanimous conclusion of all of the other circuits that have addressed the issue that such a claim may not be maintained. This is principally because RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to Congress's constitutional powers under the Spending Clause, and the individual defendants are not recipients of any federal funds. See, e.g., Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1335 (10th Cir.2012).
Wood also claims a violation of his First Amendment rights, alleging the defendants acted in retaliation for an earlier suit, in which he prevailed on appeal in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process claim arising out of one of his prison guard relationships. Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir.2012). There is, however, insufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact as to a retaliatory motive.
We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Wood is currently serving a life sentence in Idaho prisons. The relationship that led to Wood v. Beauclair began in 2003 in the Idaho Correctional Institute–Orofino (“ICIO”). He was later transferred to the Idaho State Correctional Institution (“ISCI”) where he is currently housed.
Wood, who characterizes himself as a very religious person, began soon after his transfer to engage in many activities in the prison chapel. These included working as a janitor, attending services, and volunteering in various capacities. In the course of investigating the relationship with Correction Officer Taylor–Martin underlying the Wood v. Beauclair litigation, the Deputy Warden of ISCI, Keith Yordy, discovered that Wood may also have been involved in an improper relationship with an ISCI officer, Cheryl Davis, and that Wood was using the prison chaplain, Les Petersen, as a go-between to communicate with Davis. According to Yordy, in 2006 he limited Wood's chapel access in order to curtail his contacts with Petersen pending an investigation.
In early 2007, the Deputy Warden of Operations at ISO, defendant Steve Nelson, directed one of the chaplains to further restrict Wood's access to the chapel to two hours a week, to consist of private counseling. According to Nelson, this action was taken because Wood's activities had created tension between chaplains and with other inmates who complained Wood was monopolizing the chapel.
In addition to the chapel restrictions, Wood alleges there was a pattern of harassment conducted by another correctional officer, Mike Ludlow. As part of this alleged pattern, Ludlow falsely reported that he had seen Wood stash contraband prescription medication in a windowsill. The charge against Wood was later dismissed on appeal.
Wood filed this action in 2007 under RLUIPA against defendants Yordy and Nelson claiming damages from them in their individual capacities, and under § 1983 against Ludlow, as well as Yordy and Nelson, for First Amendment retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment on all of the claims, and Wood appeals.
RLUIPA, in relevant part, prohibits any “government” from burdening the religious exercise of a person residing in a correctional institution. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1. RLUIPA was passed in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), limiting congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict governmental interference with the exercise of religion. RLUIPA was then enacted pursuant to Congress's spending and commerce powers. Sossamon v. Texas, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1656, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011). RLUIPA affects only prisons and land use.
With respect to prisons, RLUIPA's reach is limited to prohibiting a “government” from burdening religious exercise in correctional institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1. The Act goes on to define “government” as any governmental entity created under the authority of the State, and “any other person acting under the color of State law.” § 2000cc–5(4). The Act authorizes private citizens to assert a violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and to “obtain appropriate relief against a government.” § 2000cc–2(a).1
In Sossamon v. Texas, the Supreme Court considered the phrase “appropriate relief.” Sossamon concerned an action for damages against state officers in their official capacity. 131 S.Ct. at 1656. The Court held the statutory language was not sufficiently specific to abrogate state sovereign immunity with respect to money damages. Id. at 1660. Wood correctly points out that his suit against state officers as individuals would not implicate sovereign immunity. Immunity, however, is not the issue before us. The question before us, and that has been decided adversely to plaintiffs by all of the other circuit courts to consider a suit like this one, is whether allowing such an action against individuals who do not receive any federal money would reach beyond the scope of Congress's constitutional authority. All of the circuits have refused to allow such an action to go forward. The principal underlying reason is the limitations of Congress's power under the Spending Clause.
In the leading Spending Clause decision, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, the Supreme Court recognized that, pursuant to its spending powers, Congress may place conditions on the disbursement of federal funds. 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). The Court explained that such legislation functions like a contract. In return for funds, states agree to adhere to any attached conditions. Id. These conditions, however, must be clearly stated. Otherwise, states cannot be said to have knowingly accepted them. Id.
In reliance on Pennhurst, the Seventh Circuit in Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir.2009), held that legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause cannot subject state officers to individual suits, because the individual officers are not the recipients of any federal funds. The individuals thus cannot be bound by contractual conditions which would attach to receipt of the funds. Id. at 888–89. The Third and Tenth Circuits are now in accord. Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144 (3d Cir.2012); Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir.2012). The Fourth Circuit had earlier rejected such suits on the related ground that the statute itself does not give sufficient notice that the receipt of funds for prisons would be conditioned on the “creation of an individual capacity damages action.” See Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir.2009).
Wood, while acknowledging the force of these holdings, contends they are undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004). Sabri was a prosecution under the federal bribery statute, enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, to criminalize bribes to recipients of federal funds. Id. at 602, 124 S.Ct. 1941. In Sabri, the question was whether the bribe had to directly affect the expenditure of federal funds, and the Supreme Court answered in the negative. It held that because funds are fungible, if the entity receiving the federal funds was the object of the bribe, the statute was violated. Id. at 606, 124 S.Ct. 1941.
Focusing on the fact that the criminal defendant in Sabri was not the recipient of federal funds, Wood attempts to argue that the Supreme Court opinion means defendants in a civil damage action under RLUIPA need not be recipients of federal funds. This is not a sensible conclusion. The point in Sabri was to protect the financial integrity of the governmental entity that did receive the federal funds. Thus paying a bribe to that entity violated the statute, even if the bribe did not directly affect the federal funds. In this case, Wood's suit against the defendants in their individual capacities seeks to hold them liable for their personal conduct. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). By definition, in suing these defendants in their individual capacities, Wood is not targeting assets of the entities that receive federal funds, i.e., the prison or the State. Wood's argument, while novel, does not...
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