Woodard v. Farris, 2:20-cv-00007

• Decision Date: 25 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2:20-cv-00007,2:20-cv-00007
• Parties: BERNARD WOODARD, Plaintiff, v. EDDIE FARRIS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

BERNARD WOODARD, Plaintiff, v. EDDIE FARRIS, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-00007

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE COOKEVILLE DIVISION

March 25, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Bernard Woodard, an inmate of the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex in Pikeville, Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Eddie Farris, Sheriff of the Putnam County Jail; Phil Arms, Captain; Tim Nash, Jail Administrator; f/n/u Brandon, Officer; Dillard Shift, Sergeant; and two John Doe Officers. (Doc. No. 1).

The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

I. PLRA Screening Standard

Under the PLRA, the Court must conduct an initial review of any civil complaint brought by a prisoner if it is filed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), seeks relief from government entities or officials, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, or challenges the prisoner's conditions of confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Upon conducting this review, the Court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), "governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)." Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

In reviewing the complaint to determine whether it states a plausible claim, "a district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir.2009) (citations omitted)). A pro se pleading must be liberally construed and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

II. Section 1983 Standard

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . .." To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6^th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6^th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

III. Alleged Facts

According to the complaint, at the time of the incidents giving rise to this action, Plaintiff was a 62-year-old convicted and sentenced state prisoner housed in the Putnam County Jail. (Doc. No. 1 at 4). The complaint alleges that, on September 23, 2019, Sergeant Shift, Officer Brandon, and two as-yet unidentified officers searched Plaintiff's cell at the Putnam County Jail. When one of the officers attempted to search Plaintiff, he ran. Officer Brandon "dived on [Plaintiff's] back" and tasered him while other officers attempted to handcuff Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 1 at 12). The complaint further alleges that one of the officers slammed Plaintiff into the "tier" of the cell, causing injury to Plaintiff's face. (Id.) While officers claim they found "suprenorphine naloxone sublinguals film," nothing was found on him. (Id.) According to the complaint, Plaintiff instead was placed in "holding" for ten days so that his swelling would be hidden. (Id.)

Additionally, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff was temporarily relocated to Knoxville, Tennessee, to attend court from October 16, 2019 to December 2, 2019 and, when Plaintiff returned, his personal property was missing from his cell at the Putnam County Jail. (Id. at 14).

IV. Analysis

A. Excessive Force Claims

From the complaint, it appears Plaintiff was a convicted prisoner, not a pre-trial detainee, at the time of the alleged use of excessive force. The legal status of an alleged victim of excessive force is significant because the conduct of the offending officer must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to the applicable constitutional provision. See Coley v. Lucas Cnty., Ohio, 799 F.3d 530, 538-39 (6^th Cir. 2015) ("The Supreme Court has recently clarified . . . that when assessing pretrial detainees excessive force claims we must inquire into whether the plaintiff shows'that the force purposefully or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.'") (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, ___ U.S. ___, ___ 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015)).

Under the Eighth Amendment, which applies to convicted prisoners, an officer's conduct will be found to amount to cruel and unusual punishment "when the[] 'offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6^th Cir. 2014) (quoting Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6^th Cir. 2011)). In examining an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, the constitutional analysis has both a subjective and an objective component, requiring a court to determine "whether the force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm," and whether "the pain inflicted was sufficiently serious." Cordell, 759 F.3d at 580 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration added). The heightened Eighth Amendment standard acknowledges that "'[t]he maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under common law.'" Id. (quoting Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)) (alteration in original).

In determining whether the force used was applied in a good faith effort to restore discipline or rather inflicted for a malicious purpose, it is "proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat 'reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,' and 'any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)).

"While the extent of a prisoner's injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official, it is not dispositive of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred." Cordell, 759 F.3d at 581 (citing Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010)). "'When prison officialsmaliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.'" Cordell, 759 F.3d at 581 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)) (alteration in original). A significant physical injury is not required to establish the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 1178-79 ("An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury."). In the end, a determination of what constitutes "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," is "contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8.

Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff states colorable Eighth Amendment excessive force claims under Section 1983 against Defendant Officers Brandon and John Doe 1 (the officer who allegedly slammed Plaintiff into the "tier" of his cell) in their individual capacities. Although the complaint alleges that only Officers Brandon and John Doe 1 used excessive and unnecessary force against Plaintiff, the complaint alleges that Sergeant Shift and Officer John Doe 2 were present at the time of the assault, failed to intervene, and attempted to obstruct an investigation. See Walls v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., No. 17-2549-JPM-tmp, 2018 WL 3468379, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. July 18, 2018) ("A guard who stands and watches while another guards beats a prisoner violates the Constitution . . . ."); Johnson v. C/O Lane, No. 15-2260-JDT-tmp, 2016 WL 1734111, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 29, 2016) (on PLRA screening, finding that prisoner "has alleged a plausible claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment" against the guard who allegedly assaulted plaintiff as well as the guards who allegedly "stood by and did not intervene."). Therefore, the allegations of the complaint withrespect to these Defendants warrant further factual development. The claims against these Defendants in their individual capacities also will proceed.

Although designation of "John Doe" or "Jane Doe" defendants is not favored, it is permissible when the defendants' identities are not known at the time the complaint is filed, but may be determined through discovery. See Berndt v. Tenn., 796 F.2d 879, 882-84 (6^th Cir. 1986). The Court concludes that it would be inappropriate to dismiss the claims against the John Doe Defendants at this juncture because of the likelihood that the identities of these...