Woodard v. Pacific F. & P. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 November 1940
• Citation: 106 P.2d 1043,165 Or. 250
• Parties: WOODARD <I>v.</I> PACIFIC FRUIT & PRODUCE CO.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

165 Or. 250

106 P.2d 1043

WOODARD

v. PACIFIC FRUIT & PRODUCE CO.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued October 8, 1940.

Reversed November 13, 1940.

Libel and slander — Title to real property

1. "Slander of title" is a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of person's title to real or personal property, causing him special damage, and is not an action for defamation of character of the person, and is therefore distinguishable from ordinary "libel" or "slander", which is more appropriate to the defamation of the character of an individual.

Libel and slander — Slander of title

2. Where produce grower alleged the produce buyer wrote, to other buyers, a letter which was intended to be understood to mean that grower had contracted to sell his produce to buyer and that grower had no right to sell his produce to another purchaser and could not give good title in course of sale of any of his products to any purchaser other than buyer, as result of which grower was unable to sell his crop, and was prevented from borrowing money necessary to produce another crop resulting in damage and loss of anticipated profits, allegations stated a cause of action for "slander of title".

Courts — Dictum

3. Where the court bases decision on two or more distinct grounds, each ground so specified is as much as any of the others one of the grounds, a ruling upon questions involved in the case, and not "dictum".

Libel and slander — Limitations of actions

4. An action for defamation of title to personal property not commenced within one year was barred by limitations, since the one-year limitation as to commencement of actions for libel and slander is the same whether slander involves property or the person.

                  See 17 R.C.L. 454 (6 Perm. Supp. 4290)
                  37 C.J., Libel and Slander, § 591
                

In Banc.

Appeal from the Circuit Court, Multnomah County.

J.P. KAVANAUGH, Judge pro tempore.

Action by Keith Woodard against the Pacific Fruit & Produce Company, a corporation, for damages resulting from the writing of certain letters by the defendant concerning title to plaintiff's property. From a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff, defendant appeals.

REVERSED.

Sidney Teiser, of Portland (Teiser & Keller, of Portland, and Patterson & Patterson, of Seattle, Wash., on the brief), for appellant.

C.A. Beckman and John D. Galey, both of Portland, for respondent.

BELT, J.

This is an action to recover damages sustained on account of certain letters — alleged to be false and malicious — written by defendant of and concerning the title to plaintiff's property. It is generally denominated — although some text writers say improperly — as an action for slander of title. From a judgment based on the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $3,380.85 special damages and the sum of $2,055 punitive damages, the defendant appeals.

A brief statement of the case will suffice for the purpose of determining whether the action is barred by the statute of limitations. At the time of the commencement of this action on November 4, 1938, plaintiff was and for several years prior thereto had been a stockholder and officer of the Pioneer Cauliflower Growers, a corporation organized for the purpose of cooperatively marketing cauliflower produced by certain growers — including plaintiff — in the vicinity of Troutdale, Oregon.

At the times above mentioned, the defendant Pacific Fruit & Produce Company was and is now a corporation engaged in business as a fruit and vegetable broker with its principal office in the city of Portland, Oregon. In 1930, the defendant company entered into a written agreement with the Pioneer Cauliflower Growers, Inc., to act as its exclusive agent on commission in the sale of the latter's commodities. The contract, under its terms, continued in existence until cancelled in writing on or before March 1st of any following year; provided, however, that no right of termination existed on the part of the Pioneer company, if at such time it was indebted to the defendant company. The record does not disclose the termination of the contract. In 1932, the defendant company advanced $1,400 to the Pioneer company, taking as evidence of such indebtedness the Pioneer company's corporate note. This money was parcelled out to various stockholders of the Pioneer company to enable them to grow and harvest crops. Notes from the stockholders for the money thus advanced were taken by the Pioneer company and placed by it with the defendant company as collateral security. The plaintiff, Keith Woodard, did not receive any of such funds and was never indebted to the Pioneer company or to the defendant.

On November 18, 1936, the defendant company wrote the following letter to several of its competitors:

"This is to advise you that we hold signed contracts and notes (latter now past due) from the Association formerly known as Pioneer Cauliflower Grower's Assn. but now operated under another name, by Mr. Chick Peterson, Fred Mishey, Jim Babbitt, Jim Pounder, et al.

"This group of growers, collectively and individually, owe us $605.74 and we are hereby notifying you to either hold up funds due above parties or else make checks payable jointly to Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. until such time as their indebtedness has been paid or satisfactorily adjusted."

It is observed that plaintiff is not named in the above letter, but it is alleged and there is some evidence tending to show that the parties who received such letter understood that the plaintiff was included in the group of growers mentioned therein.

It is further alleged by plaintiff that:

"The defendant intended that said written communication should be understood to mean that the plaintiff had contracted to sell his cauliflower, cabbage and other vegetable products to the defendant; that plaintiff had no right to sell his produce to any person, firm or corporation other than the defendant, and was without legal power to give good title in the course of sale to any of his products to any purchaser other than the defendant."

Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of such letter, he was unable to sell his 1936 crop, thereby sustaining damage in the sum of $880.35 and that he was prevented from borrowing money necessary to produce his 1937 crop, resulting in loss of anticipated profits in the sum of $2,500.

1, 2. We think the above statement shows that this action is one to recover damages for defamation of plaintiff's title to property. An action for slander of title is based upon the false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of the person's title to real or personal property, resulting in special damages: Cawrse v. Signal Oil, 164 Or. 666, 103 P. (2d) 729, 129 A.L.R. 174. The action is not for defamation of character of the person and is, therefore, distinguishable from ordinary libel or slander. As said in Burkett v. Griffith, 90 Cal. 532, 27 P. 527, 13 L.R.A. 707, 25 Am. St. Rep. 151:

"Although the term `slander' is more appropriate to the defamation of the character of an individual, yet the term `slander of title' has by use become a recognized phrase of the law; and an action therefor is permitted against one who falsely and maliciously disparages the title of another to property, whether real or personal, and thereby causes him some special pecuniary loss or damage."

In Potosi Zinc Co. v. Mahoney, 36 Nev. 390, 135 P. 1078, it is said:

"The original application of the term `slander' was applied more to words or utterances, the nature of which were defamatory to the character of an individual. The term, however, has been made applicable to utterances and words made with reference to property, whether real or personal."

Assuming that the above letter is false and malicious and that, as a result thereof, plaintiff sustained damages as alleged, we are called upon to determine whether the action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Defendant contends that the action is barred by chapter 82, Laws of Oregon for 1909 (codified as subdivision 2 of § 1-207, Oregon Code 1930) which provides that "All actions for libel and slander shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action shall have accrued." The word "all" which we have italicized has been eliminated in the codification of the act. In determining the legislative intent as to whether the instant action is governed by limitations applicable to...